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Eradicating the fear of death is a central concern in Epicurean philosophy. As hedonists, the 
Epicureans seek to pursue pleasure and avoid pain in order to achieve a life of eudaimonia. The 
fear of death is viewed as a particularly damaging form of mental pain, and the Epicureans go to 
great lengths to demonstrate that it is, in fact, irrational.  
The ‘fear of death’ is a relatively broad term. It not only encompasses the fear of being 
dead, but also the fear of dying, the fear of mortality, and the fear of premature death. How 
adequately the Epicureans address each of these fears has been the subject of much debate. I 
argue that the Epicureans do successfully recognise and abolish these four strands of anxiety. 
They use a network of arguments to combat the multi-faceted nature of the fear of death. A close 
examination of these arguments reveals that they are deeply entrenched in the Epicureans’ 
underlying physical and ethical theories. The individual arguments each form one part of a 
holistic attempt to remove the fear that is seen to obstruct a life of pleasure. As such, the 
arguments must not be viewed independently, but rather as a collective whole. I demonstrate that 
the Epicurean efforts to alleviate death-related concerns are comprehensive, cogent, and 
internally consistent. Therefore, when Epicureanism is embraced as a whole, the fundamental 
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The question of how to die well – and, crucially, without being plagued by fear – is a prevalent 
concern in the Greek philosophical tradition. A good death is seen as the culmination of the 
ultimate goal: a good life. This is expressed most famously in Plato’s Phaedo, which details the 
death of Socrates. This death scene portrays a clear interest in philosophy’s role in addressing the 
fear of death. Socrates lives his philosophy right up to the moment that he dies, laying out his 
reasoning for why one need not be afraid of dying. He and his companions discuss the separation 
of the body and the soul upon death (Pl. Phd. 64c2-65a3), and rationalise that our souls must be 
immortal (Pl. Phd. 69e6-107b10). Death is not the genuine end of one’s existence. Rather, the 
soul survives death and is subject to moral judgement. Therefore, death does not warrant any 
anxiety so long as one has led a moral life. Those who are virtuous can expect to be rewarded 
after death and there is nothing to fear about that, while those who are wicked can expect post-
mortem punishment, and consequently they will be afraid of death (Pl. Phd. 107c1-115a8).1  
Socrates, epitomising his own moral commitments right to the end, is able to meet his demise 
without fear: both his example and his arguments serve to alleviate the anxieties of his 
companions (and also the readers of the Phaedo), who should not fear death and should instead 
focus on pursuing virtuous lives (Pl. Phd. 115b1-118a17).  
It is common for not only the life but also the death of a philosopher to be shown in 
accordance with their system of belief.2 They must embody the very essence of their philosophy 
 
1 See Annas (1982) for an examination of Plato’s eschatological myths.  
2 Diogenes Laertius describes the deaths of numerous Greek philosophers in his Lives of Eminent Philosophers. 
Some philosophers are said to have followed the precedent of Socrates in that their deaths upheld their philosophical 
beliefs. One version of Pythagoras’ death has him allow his throat to be cut rather than escape by trampling a field 
of beans – beans being sacred, possibly owing to their resemblance to foetuses (D.L. 8.39). Other philosophers are 
depicted as having died in such a way that undermines their philosophical wisdom. Thales, known for his astronomy, 
is perhaps the most famous example of this: he is said to have tripped into a ditch while gazing up at the stars (D.L. 
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right to the end. The death scene of the Hellenistic philosopher Epicurus follows in this tradition. 
According to Diogenes Laertius, Epicurus wrote the following letter on his deathbed:3 
Τὴν μακαρίαν ἄγοντες καὶ ἅμα τελευταίαν ἡμέραν τοῦ βίου ἐγράφομεν ὑμῖν ταυτί. 
στραγγουρία τε παρηκολουθήκει καὶ δυσεντερικὰ πάθη ὑπερβολὴν οὐκ ἀπολείποντα τοῦ 
ἐν ἑαυτοῖς μεγέθους. ἀντιπαρετάττετο δὲ πᾶσι τούτοις τὸ κατὰ ψυχὴν χαῖρον ἐπὶ τῇ τῶν 
γεγονότων ἡμῖν διαλογισμῶν μνήμῃ. 
On this blissful day, which is also the last of my life, I write this to you. My continual 
sufferings from strangury and dysentery are so great that nothing could augment them; but 
over against them all I set gladness of mind at the remembrance of our past conversations.  
D.L. 10.22 
 
In this letter, Epicurus details how he is able to overcome the considerable pain of dying by 
recalling pleasurable past conversations with his dear friend Idomeneus. This death scene 
epitomises the ideal Epicurean attitude towards death and dying. As is the case with Plato’s 
depiction of Socrates, Epicurus is easily able to dismiss the fear of death, owing to his 
commitment to his own philosophical doctrine. Epicurus is no exception to the goal of erasing 
fear in the face of death, but his approach exhibits certain key differences. Plato and Epicurus 
both share the conviction that rational arguments can alter belief, and that ‘correct’ belief dictates 
one’s attitudes towards death.4 In contrast to Plato, Epicurus does not declare the presence of an 
afterlife or conceive the soul to be immortal. Moreover, there is no expectation of reward or 
 
2.4). Diogenes the Cynic allegedly died after eating raw octopus (in accordance with the Cynic mandate to live as 
natural a life as possible) or by being bitten by a dog (‘Cynic’ being a figurative dog) (D.L. 6.76-77). Bion, a 
blasphemous sophist, is said to have been so afraid of dying that he repented on his death bed and engaged in 
superstitious activity in an effort to continue living (D.L. 4.54).  
3 Translations of all Diogenes Laertius’ texts are taken from Hicks (1958).  
4 Epicurus states this quite explicitly in Kyria Doxa 12: Οὐκ ἦν τὸ φοβούμενον λύειν ὑπερ τῶν κυριωτάτων μὴ 
κατειδότα τίς ἡ τοῦ σύμπαντος φύσις, ἀλλ’ ὑποπτευόμενόν τι τῶν κατὰ τοὺς μύτους· It would be impossible to 
banish fear on matters of the highest importance, if a man did not know the nature of the whole universe, but lived in 
dread of what the legends tells us. See also: Kyria Doxa 21: Ὁ τὰ πέρατα τοῦ βίου κατειδὼς οἶδεν, ὡς εὐπόρστόν 
ἐστι τὸ <τὸ> ἀλγοῦν κατ’ ἔνδειαν ἐξαιροῦν καὶ τὸ τὸν ὅλον βίον παντελῆ καθιστάν· ὥστ’ οὐδὲν προσδεῖται 
πραγμάτων ἀγῶνας κεκτημένων. He who understands the limits of life knows how easy it is to procure enough to 
remove the pain of want and make the whole of life complete and perfect. Hence he has no longer any need of things 
which are not to be won save by labour and conflict. Cf. Pl. Phd. 65e5-66a10.  
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punishment upon death. Both the Epicurean worldview and concept of death are distinctive, 
resulting in different therapeutic strategies. Where some form of immortality in the afterlife is 
the pervasive understanding,5 the Epicureans view death as the complete end of life. Nothing 
persists after death, marking the absolute annihilation of a given individual. Fear in the face of 
death is not tied to concerns of post-mortem judgement, resulting in either reward or punishment, 
but the state of non-existence. The Epicurean notion of death is encapsulated by the famous 
claim: 
ὁ θάνατος οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς· τὀ γὰρ διαλυθὲν ἀναισθητεῖ· τὸ δ’ ἀναισθητοῦν οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς. 
Death is nothing to us; for the body, when it has been resolved into its elements, has no feeling, 
and that which has no feeling is nothing to us. 
Kyria Doxa 2  
 
This rejection of any possibility of post-mortem survival serves a dual purpose as a depiction of 
what death entails and as a demonstration of the correct attitude towards death, negating fear. 
While many philosophers promote composure when confronted by death, Epicurus’ definition of 
death and his conviction of mortality inform a distinct strategic approach to countering the fear 
of death.6 
The cogency and effectiveness of the arguments against fearing death presented in the 
extant Epicurean texts are the focus of this thesis. While the extensive writings of Epicurus 
 
5 The general understanding in Greek religious practice was that the soul would survive death and descend to Hades 
(most notably depicted in Homer’s Odyssey, Book 11). The Pre-Socratics generally claim that the soul is immortal, 
with some such as Empedocles and Pythagoras arguing that the soul is subject to reincarnation (see Graham (2011) 
for selected fragments and testimonia).The soul is also immortal and subject to reincarnation in the Platonic tradition 
(see especially Plato’s Phaedo and Timaeus, as well as his Republic for a description of the tripartite composition of 
the soul). 
6 Democritus is said to have significantly influenced Epicurus’ theory, especially with regard to atomism. See 
Sedley (1982), 176, as well as Warren (2002) and Morel (2009), 69-75. However, Epicurus is definitively the 
dominant voice in this tradition.  
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himself are largely lost, Diogenes Laertius has preserved several of Epicurus’ letters in his Lives 
of Eminent Philosophers, as well as a collection of key doctrines (Kyriai Doxai). These offer 
summarised expositions of Epicurus’ atomist and hedonist theories, which are intimately bound 
up with the Epicurean perspective on death and dying. The Roman poet Lucretius is also a vital 
source, as he himself is a dedicated Epicurean. His widely discussed De Rerum Natura provides 
a detailed Latinised account of Epicurus’ philosophical teachings on physics and ethics. The 
Epicurean arguments against fearing death are embedded primarily in these philosophical texts, 
some more explicitly that others. Two additional sources that feature less prominently in this 
thesis but are nonetheless relevant are the fragmentary works of Philodemus and Diogenes of 
Oinoanda. Philodemus was a first-century Epicurean philosopher, whose partially extant treatise 
On Death clearly reinforces the Epicurean arguments that are found elsewhere.7 He appears to 
begin with the usual atomist arguments concerning the mortality of the soul, before moving on to 
address worries regarding certain potential circumstances surrounding one’s death.8 Diogenes of 
Oinoanda, meanwhile, is most well-known for his Epicurean inscription, discovered in the late 
nineteenth century.9 He states his intention for the inscription as an aid for the ‘morally diseased’, 
who are ignorant of Epicureanism.10 His inscription includes Epicurus’ physical theory, ethical 
theory, several letters, maxims, and an epitome in defence of old age.11 One final and invaluable 
source for the Epicurean arguments against death is the criticism offered by Cicero. 
Predominantly in De Finibus, but also in Tusculanae Disputationes and De Natura Deorum, 
 
7 For an English translation, see Henry (2009). For analyses of On Death, see Sanders (2011), 211-235 and Tsouna 
(2007), esp. 239-311.  
8 Henry (2009), xviii-xxii.  
9 For an English translation of the inscription, see Smith (1993). For an in-depth discussion of the philosophy written 
by Diogenes of Oinoanda, see Hammerstaedt, Morel, & Güremen (2017).  
10 Smith (1993), 122. 
11 Smith (1993), 145-426. 
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Cicero finds significant fault in the Epicurean perspective.12 While he is clearly a hostile source, 
he offers explanation and insight into the philosophy which he is attempting to undermine. This 
thesis will primarily focus on the evidence provided by Epicurus and Lucretius, as the most 
reliable and complete sources for the arguments against fearing death.  
In order to effectively evaluate the Epicurean arguments, it is necessary to first identify 
the exact fears of death that must be eradicated. The ‘fear of death’ is not a single, insulated fear. 
There are multiple aspects of concern that must be analysed. James Warren has suggested four 
distinct (but by no means mutually exclusive) strands of anxiety that are incorporated by the 
overarching ‘fear of death’:13   
1. The fear of being dead  
2. The fear of the process of dying  
3. The fear of mortality (that one is going to die)  
4. The fear of premature death  
 
These four categories are specific enough to be easily distinguished from each other, yet broad 
enough to encompass all of the death-related concerns addressed by the Epicureans. These four 
fears will therefore act as the framework for this thesis. The arguments against each fear will be 
examined and assessed in detail. The Epicureans argue directly that the fears of being dead and 
of dying are irrational in light of their clearly established atomic and hedonist theories. The 
arguments against the fears of mortality and of premature death require more careful 
extrapolation, as the remedies for these concerns are deeply entrenched in the belief system that 
 
12 For discussions of Cicero’s philosophy in De Finibus, including his engagement with Epicureanism, see Annas & 
Betegh (eds., 2016).  
13 Warren (2004), 4. Other scholars distinguish different sets of fears, such as Reinhardt (2002, 291), who includes 
the fear of the cessation of pleasure and the fear of dying while one’s life is incomplete. However, these two can 
easily and respectively be encompassed by Warren’s fear of being dead and of dying prematurely. More meticulous 
classifications used in the field of psychology include Hoelter’s (1979) ‘Multidimensional Fear of Death Scale’ and 




comprises Epicureanism. I will argue that the Epicureans recognised and addressed these four 
death-related fears as part of their advocacy for an ideal attitude and a holistic way of life. The 
ideal Epicurean attitude is a complete lack of anxiety in the face of death, secure in the 
knowledge that death cannot cause any harm. The way of life that the Epicureans promote is 
built on the premise that one should avoid all pain and pursue simple pleasures. They therefore 
simultaneously advise how to achieve pleasure and how to avoid the pain. The arguments against 
fearing death should be viewed as one component of this broader strategy.  
The Epicureans’ attempt to combat the fear of death has inspired criticism from both 
ancient and modern sources alike. Objections have been raised concerning internal consistency 
within Epicurean philosophy, as well as how adequately the arguments deal with the multi-
faceted nature of fear. The most vocal ancient critic is Cicero, who accuses the Epicureans of 
asserting contradictory arguments and of not living according to their own philosophy.14 The first 
century Platonist, Plutarch, also seeks to challenge Epicureanism in his polemic Against Colotes, 
an early follower of Epicurus.15 Much of modern scholarship is similarly dismissive of the 
Epicurean arguments, but predominantly from an external perspective. The various arguments 
are often assessed in isolation and are found to be unintuitive or insufficient in their attempt to 
demonstrate that death is not harmful for the deceased. Brueckner and Fischer have repeatedly 
argued against the Epicurean position, claiming that death is harmful despite the lack of subject 
to experience it. 16  This conclusion is pervasive in modern scholarship, although there is 
considerable contention regarding the exact nature of this harm. 17  Notable scholars such as 
 
14 See especially: Cic. Fin. Books I and II; Tusc. Book II; Nat. D. Book I.  
15 See Inwood & Gerson (1994), 68-74 for relevant fragments.  
16 Brueckner & Fischer (1986), 213-221; (1993), 327-331; (2013), 783-789; (2014a), 1-9; and (2014b), 325-330. 
17 Brueckner & Fischer (2014a; 2014b) have engaged in a back-and-forth debate against Johansson (2013; 2014). 
They also defend their position (2013) against Feldman (2011). 
7 
 
Feldman and Kaufman have argued that the harm of death can be attributed to some form of 
deprivation.18 Currently, the leading voice in Epicurean scholarship is Warren,19 who generally 
argues that the Epicurean arguments are sound. However, he is sceptical of the Epicureans’ 
ability to employ their philosophy beyond mere theory and he adheres to Cicero’s claim that 
there are some issues regarding internal inconsistency.20  
This thesis will seek to defend the Epicurean position from criticism that the arguments 
against fearing death are inconsistent or inadequate. The majority of modern scholarship, and 
particularly the critics of Epicureanism, fail to evaluate the intricacies of Epicurus’ arguments 
from within the Epicurean framework.21 I will demonstrate that when the supposed weak points 
of the Epicurean arguments are considered in conjunction with broader or underlying Epicurean 
theories, they prove to be cogent and able to withstand scrutiny. To do this, I will consider how 
Epicureanism addresses each of the four death-related fears in turn.  
The first chapter will offer an Epicurean definition of death by evaluating the core tenets 
that uphold the four arguments. Epicurus’ philosophy is built from the ground up. His physical 
atomic theory forms the basis of his ethical hedonist theory, which subsequently dictates his 
arguments against fearing death. As such, it is necessary to begin with a discussion of these 
foundations. After an overview of Epicurean physics, outlining their atomic theory and 
highlighting the vital role played by sensory evidence, Epicurus’ ethical theory will be examined, 
 
18 Feldman (1992; 2011) and Kaufman (1999; 2011).  
19 Warren is a particularly prolific author on the subject of Epicureanism. See especially, (2000; 2001a; 2001b; 
2001c; 2002; 2004; 2009; and 2016). 
20 Warren (2004), 161-121.  
21 The most notable exception to this is Warren, although Mitsis (1988) and Rosenbaum (1987; 1989; and 1990) also 
examine the arguments against fearing death with appropriate consideration of the hedonism that underpins them. 
Generally, those who support the Deprivation Account, such as Kaufman (1999; 2011) and Feldman (1992; 2011), 




establishing the hedonist motivations that underpin the entirety of Epicurean philosophy. The 
chapter will then focus on the Epicurean conception of human mortality, as dictated by these two 
theories. The nature of the human soul, and therefore the ‘self’, will be identified, as well as its 
fate upon death. This will reveal the precise connotations of the claim that ‘death is nothing to us’ 
and elucidate the Epicurean arguments against the fears of being dead and of dying.  
In the second chapter, I will investigate one of the more controversial aspects of 
Epicureanism: The Symmetry Argument as presented by Lucretius in De Rerum Natura. This 
argument likens pre-natal non-existence to post-mortem non-existence in an attempt to alleviate 
concern about the ‘nothing’ that awaits us after death. There are competing arguments regarding 
how best to interpret the intent of the argument: whether it is designed to combat the fear of 
being dead or of mortality.22 I will argue in favour of the former. The Symmetry Argument will 
be defended against its primary contender, the Deprivation Account, which claims that death 
causes harm, not by introducing pain, but by removing the pleasures of life. I will argue that the 
Symmetry Argument is successful in its intention, despite many modern contentions and 
attempts to assert asymmetry.   
Finally, the third chapter will focus on the Epicurean arguments against the fears of 
mortality and of premature death. While some critics have accused the Epicureans of 
overlooking these fears, the evidence strongly suggests otherwise. The arguments against these 
fears, while less emphatically presented, are solidly incorporated in Epicurean doctrine. 
Hedonism lies at the heart of these arguments. Against the fear of mortality, Epicurus builds on 
his established claim that death can in no way harm an individual, adding that such a neutral state 
 
22 This debate is driven by Warren (2004), 62, who emphatically argues that the purpose of the Symmetry Argument 
is purely to combat the fear of being dead. The evidence clearly supports this, although many scholars such as 
Kamm (1993), 25; Belshaw (1993), 103; and Mitsis (1989), 306 argue or assume otherwise.  
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should not be feared in prospect. Against the fear of premature death, the Epicureans broadly 
demonstrate that the quality of one’s life is entirely independent of temporal duration.  
This thesis will demonstrate that the Epicureans present sophisticated and internally 
consistent arguments against the four veins of death-related fear that are categorised by Warren. 
These arguments are embedded within Epicurean ethical and physical doctrine, and thus should 
be viewed as part of a complete worldview. The purpose and rationality of these arguments are 
evident when they are examined, not in isolation, but as part of a holistic framework. The centre 
of this framework is Epicurus’ hedonism, which advocates for the pursuit of simple, natural 
pleasures. By carefully curating one’s desires to maximise pleasure, and by avoiding both 
physical and mental pain – including death-related anxiety – a budding Epicurean can ensure a 
life of peace and εὐδαιμονία. Having lived such a life, with the full knowledge that death can 




I. Defining Death 
Epicurus and his followers dedicate themselves whole-heartedly to combating one of the greatest 
threats to a happy life: the fear of death. The Epicurean arguments against fearing death are 
predominantly preserved in Epicurus’ Letter to Herodotus, Letter to Menoeceus, the Kyriai 
Doxai, and the Sententiae Vaticanae, as well as in Lucretius’ De Rerum Natura.23 They employ a 
multitude of arguments against this fear, built upon and around their central assertion that ‘death 
is nothing to us’ (Kyria Doxa 2). The source of this fear, they claim, is ‘false belief’ about what 
exactly death entails (Kyria Doxa 22). They therefore concentrate their efforts on dispelling any 
false understanding of the nature of life and death. They are unwavering intellectualists, relying 
on rational argument to guide belief and emotional commitment to their doctrine. Their 
arguments against fearing death are underpinned by their broader ethical claims, which in turn 
rest securely on the foundations of their physical theory.24 Consequently, in order to understand 
the arguments against fearing death, it is necessary first to discuss Epicurean physics.25  
 
Epicurean Physics: Atomism and Sensation 
Epicurus outlines the fundamental framework of his physical theory in his Letter to Herodotus.26 
He immediately establishes three essential principles, known as the Principles of Conservation, 
 
23 For a discussion of Roman Epicureanism, see Sedley (2009), 29-45 and Erler (2009), 46-64. Other notable 
Epicurean sources include Philodemus and Diogenes of Oinoanda. 
24 See Inwood (2007), 14-36 for a discussion of how many ancient philosophers consider knowledge of nature and 
physics to be an essential component to achieving happiness.  
25 This topic is primarily discussed by Epicurus in his Letter to Herodotus. The Roman poet and philosopher, 
Lucretius, also presents a detailed account of Epicurean physics in his work De Rerum Natura, which is believed to 
be largely derived from Epicurus’ On Nature. See Sedley (1998).  




upon which the rest of his theory is built (Ep. Hdt. 38-9).27 The first two claims are: nothing 
comes into being from nothing and nothing perishes into nothing.28 These are well established in 
the Greek philosophical tradition and are central components to the earlier atomic theory of 
Democritus.29 The third claim is: the sum total of things is unchanging.30 This is dependent on 
the first two claims, as nothing can be added to or subtracted from existence.  
Epicurus then asserts that nature comprises only of the two binary opposites ‘body’ 
(σῶμα) and ‘void’ (κενός) (Ep. Hdt. 39).31 Body is simply that which is tangible, while void is 
intangible.32 Void creates the space in which bodies exist and are able to move, while the bodies 
themselves comprise everything that can be sensed, that can act, and that can be acted upon (Ep. 
Hdt. 40). At their most basic and minute form, bodies are atoms (ἄτομα), as established by 
Epicurus: 
σωμάτων τὰ μέν ἐστι συγκρίσεις, τὰ δ’ ἐξ ὧν αἱ συγκρίσεις πεποίηνται· ταῦτα δέ ἐστιν ἄτομα καὶ 
ἀμετάβλητα, εἴπερ μὴ μέλλει πάντα εἰς τὸ μὴ ὂν φθαρήσεσθαι, ἀλλ’ ἰσχύοντα 
ὑπομένειν ἐν ταῖς διαλύσεσι τῶν συγκρίσεων, πλήρη τὴν θύσιν ὄντα, οἷα δὴ οὐκ ἔχοντα ὅπῃ ἢ 
ὅπως διαλυθήσεται.  
 
Of bodies some are composite, others the elements of which these composite bodies are made. 
These elements are indivisible and unchangeable, and necessarily so, if things are not all to be 
destroyed and pass into non-existence, but are to be strong enough to endure when the composite 
 
27 Cf. D.R.N 1.159-173 
28 πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι οὐδὲν γίνεται ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος. πᾶν γὰρ ἐκ παντὸς ἐγίνετ’ ἂν σπερμάτων γε οὐθὲν προσδεόμενον. 
καὶ εἰ ἐφθείρετο δὲ τὸ ἀφανιζόμενον εἰς τὸ μὴ ὄν, πάντα ἂν ἀπωλώλει τὰ πράγματα, οὐκ ὄντων εἰς ἃ διελύετο. (Ep. 
Men. 38-9). 
29 Long & Sedley (1987), 26. That much of Epicurean atomism is derived from Democritean atomism is often taken 
for granted, although there is ongoing debate regarding the extent to which Epicurus adopted and adapted his 
predecessor’s theory (Sedley (1982), 176). See also Warren (2002) and Morel (2009), 69-75. 
30 καὶ μὴν καὶ τὸ πᾶν ἀεὶ τοιοῦτον ἦν οἷον νῦν ἐστι, καὶ ἀεὶ τοιοῦτον ἔσται. οὐθὲν ἐστιν, ὃ ἂν εἰσελθὸν εἰς αὐτὸ τὴν 
μεταβολὴν ποιήσαιτο. (Ep. Men. 39).  
31 Cf. D.R.N. 1.334-390.  
32 Sedley (1982), 179-191, discusses the deliberate use of the terms ‘tangible’ and ‘intangible’ by Epicurus in order 
to counter conceptual difficulties raised by Aristotle concerning the nature of void. Sedley demonstrates that the 
innovative use of these terms creates a neat pair of symmetrical opposites, unlike the binary terms used by earlier 
atomists, such as ‘empty and full’ or ‘existent and non-existent’, which lend themselves to contradiction.  
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bodies are broken up, because they possess a solid nature and are incapable of being anywhere or 
anyhow dissolved.  
 
Ep. Hdt. 41 
 
 
Epicurus’ atoms are the smallest unit of matter, invisible to the naked eye, although in theory an 
atom may be as large as the universe (Ep. Hdt. 55-59). They form various compounds 
(composite bodies) which give rise to the diversity of the observable natural world. They are 
indivisible, so as to support the Principles of Conservation (although, conceptually they are 
composed of parts, referred to as minima).33 Atoms are also indestructible, such that they are able 
to survive the dissolution of one thing and the formation of another, without incurring any 
damage or change themselves (Ep. Hdt. 40-41; D.R.N 1.503-598). The use of the term ‘dissolve’ 
(διαλύω) as opposed to ‘destroy’ (φθείρω) is therefore very deliberate.  
The third claim states that the sum total of things is unchanging. Thus, both the number 
and the variety of atoms, which make up everything, remain constant. However, the formations 
of atoms change continuously. Atoms are able to form an indefinite variety of compounds,34 but 
their position within a compound is not fixed. They are ‘redistributed’ into other forms, which is 
why change is evident, but not random in the sense of spontaneous creation or destruction of 
atoms. For instance, the atoms which are currently bound together in the shape of a chair were 
not always in the shape of a chair, nor will they be forever. The chair may perish, but the atoms 
which comprise the chair will simply merge together in a different combination of atoms to form 
 
33 Atoms must be made of ‘parts’, as this is necessary for motion (consider the movement of one’s finger from one 
piano key to the key adjacent: movement is gradual, and at some point one’s finger is halfway between the keys. 
One’s finger must therefore consist of multiple parts, with one part on the first key and one part on the second). 
There must also, however, be a limit on the smallest unit of matter, lest everything be infinitely divisible. For further 
discussion of the indivisibility of minimal parts, see Long & Sedley (1987), 39, Vlastos (1965), 121-147, Konstan 
(1982), 60-75, and Bicknell (1992), 241-288.  
34 Epicurus is very explicit in his use of the word ‘indefinite’ (ἀπερίληπτος), as the number of ways that atoms can 
come together is indeed inconceivably large but stops short of ‘infinite’ (ἄπειρος) (Ep. Men. 42).  
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something else. Their indestructability is necessary, so that they themselves are able to survive 
this change. The only qualities that are inherent to an atom are its shape, size, and weight, 
allowing atoms to lock together in a variety of ways to form a diverse range of composite bodies 
(Ep. Hdt. 42). Other characteristics, such as colour, are changeable. These are secondary 
qualities belonging to the composite bodies, but not to the atoms themselves (Ep. Hdt. 54). 
Atoms are also in continual motion, sometimes rebounding off one another, and sometimes 
entangling together (Ep. Hdt. 43).35 The speed at which they travel is inconceivably fast, as the 
surrounding void offers no resistance (Ep. Hdt. 44).   
Atoms do not only comprise physical, observable objects. For the Epicureans, everything 
is physically constructed, including sensation. Atoms belonging to a particular object are said to 
be constantly streaming off the object, creating extremely thin ‘films’ or ‘images’ that retain the 
integrity of the object. These come into contact with our visual sense organs, thus allowing us to 
see the initial object. The process is the same for the other senses, such as hearing and smelling. 
All of our sensations are the result of physical atomic contact (Ep. Hdt. 46-50). The physical 
nature of sensation renders it inherently objective, and it is thus used by the Epicureans as the 
‘criterion of truth’. That is, an objective standard by which to form judgements, as attested both 
by Diogenes Laertius and by the principal sayings attributed to Epicurus: 
ἐν τοίνυν τῷ Κανόνι λέγων ἐστὶν ὁ Ἐπίκουρος κριτήρια τῆς ἀληθείας εἶναι τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ 
προλήψεις καὶ τὰ πάθη...πᾶσα γάρ, φησίν, αἴσθησις ἄλογός ἐστι καὶ μνήμης οὐδεμιᾶς δεκτική· 
οὔτε γαρ ὑφ’ αὑτῆς οὔτε ὑφ’ ἑτέρου κινηθεῖσα δύναταί τι προσθεῖναι ἢ ἀφελεῖν· οὐδὲ ἔστι τὸ 
δυνάμενον αὐτὰς διελέγξαι… οὔτε μὴν λόγος, πᾶς γὰρ λόγος ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἤρτηται. οὔθ’ ἡ 
ἑτέρα τὴν ἑτέραν. 
Now in The Canon Epicurus affirms that our sensations and preconceptions and our feelings are 
the standards of truth… Every sensation, he says, is devoid of reason and incapable of memory; 
 
35 For a discussion of atomic motion and the notorious ‘atomic swerve’, which supposedly discounted determinism 
in Epicurean theory, see Morel (2009), 75-78, Long & Sedley (1987), 49-50, Wendlandt & Baltzly (2004), 41-71, 
and Purinton (1999), 253-299. 
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for neither is it self-caused nor, regarded as having an external cause, can it add anything thereto 
or take anything therefrom. Nor is there anything which can refute sensations or convict them of 
error…nor again can reason refute them, for reason is wholly dependent on sensation; nor can one 
sense refute another. 
Ep. Hdt. 31-32 
 
εἴ  μάχῃ πάσαις ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν, οὐχ ἕξεις οὐδ’ ἃς ἂν φῇς αὐτῶν διεψεῦσθαι πρὸς τί ποιούμενος 
τὴν ἀναγωγὴν κρίνῃς.  
If you fight against all your sensations, you will have no standard to which to refer, and thus no 
means of judging even those judgements which you pronounce false.  
Kyria Doxa 23 
 
While sensation is equal to truth, how one interprets the sensory evidence is subjective, and it is 
incorrect interpretation of the objective evidence that leads to false belief: 36 
τὸ δὲ ψεῦδος καὶ τὸ διημαρτημένον ἐν τῷ προσδοξαζομένῳ ἀεί ἐστιν. 
Falsehood and error always depend on the intrusion of opinion.  
Ep. Hdt. 50 
 
An elaborate analogy by Lucretius further reinforces how the interpretation of sensory evidence 
is fundamental to one’s understanding of the world:37 
Denique ut in fabrica, si pravast regula prima, 
normaque si fallax rectis regionibus exit, 
et libella aliqua si ex parti claudicat hilum,  
omnia mendose fieri atque obstipa necessu est 
prava cubantia prona supina atque absona tecta, 
iam ruere ut quaedam videantur velle, ruantque, 
prodita iudiciis fallacibus omnia primis, 
sic igitur ratio tibi rerum prava necessest  
falsaque sit, falsis quae cumque ab sensibus ortast. 
 
 
36 Cf. Kyria Doxa 24. See also Asmis (1984), esp. 153-154, supplemented by Asmis (2009), 84-104. 
37 All translations of Lucretius’ De Rerum Natura are taken from Rouse (1975). 
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Lastly, as in a building, if the original rule is warped, if the square is faulty and deviates from 
straight lines, if the level is a trifle wrong in any part, the whole house will necessarily be made in 
a faulty fashion and be falling over, warped, sloping, leaning forward, leaning back, all out of 
proportion, so that some parts seem about to collapse, all betrayed by false principles at the 
beginning. So therefore your reasoning about things must be warped and false whenever it is 
based upon false senses.  
D.R.N 4.513-521. 
 
False beliefs, resulting from misinterpretation, are recognised as a source of mental pain, leading 
one to be concerned about something when they need not be.  
The Epicurean arguments against fearing death are therefore aimed at countering these 
false beliefs in order to rationally justify why one need not be victim of mental pain and anxiety. 
Pain, either mental or physical in nature, is naturally viewed by the Epicureans as inherently 
negative, owing to their hedonist ethical theory that directly hinges on this theory of atomism and 
the infallibility of sensation.   
 
Epicurean Ethics: Hedonism 
Using sensation as the purest form of evidence, Epicureans claim that pleasure is fundamentally 
good, and that pain is fundamentally bad. They utilise the so-called ‘Cradle Argument’ (entitled 
such because the behaviour of infants is cited as evidence) to explain that one is inherently drawn 
to pleasurable things and repelled by painful things (D.L. 10.137; Cic. Fin. 1.30).38 Pleasure and 
pain are seen as natural indicators of ‘good’ and ‘bad’, as Epicurus states in his Letter to 
Menoeceus, also preserved by Diogenes Laertius:  
 
38 Brunschwig (1986), 113-144 discusses the cradle argument in relation to Epicurean and Stoic philosophy. See 
also Inwood (2016), 147-166, who specifically examines the argument in Cicero’s De Finibus.  
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καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ τέλος λέγομεν εἶναι τοῦ μακαρίως ζῆν· ταύτην γὰρ ἀγαθὸν 
πρῶτον καἰ συγγενικὸν ἔγνωμεν, καὶ ἀπὸ ταύτης καταρχόμεθα πάσης αἱρέσεως καὶ φυγῆς καὶ ἐπὶ 
ταύτην καταντῶμεν ὡς κανόνι τῷ πάθει πᾶν ἀγαθὸν κρίνοντες.  
Wherefore we call pleasure the alpha and omega of a blessed life. Pleasure is our first and kindred 
good. It is the starting-point of every choice and of every aversion, and to it we come back, 
inasmuch as we make feeling the rule by which to judge of every good thing. 
Ep. Men. 129 
 
The Epicureans are therefore hedonists, taking the position that pleasure is the highest good and 
therefore the goal (τέλος) of a human life. However, they do not advocate for the pursuit of all 
pleasure simply because it feels good in the moment. Epicurus’ particular brand of hedonism is 
actually incredibly frugal:39 
ὄταν οὖν λέγωμεν ἡδονὴν τέλος ὑπάρχειν, οὐ τὰς τῶν ἀσώτων ἡδονὰς καὶ τὰς ἐν ἀπολαύσει 
κειμένας λέγομεν, ὥς τινες ἀγνοοῦντες καὶ οὐχ ὁμολογοῦντες ἣ κακῶς ἐκδεχόμενοι νομίζουσιν, 
ἀλλὰ τὸ μήτε ἀλγεῖν κατὰ σῶμα μήτε ταράττεσθαι κατὰ ψυχήν. οὐ γὰρ πότοι καὶ κῶμοι 
συνείροντες οὐδ’ ἀπολαύσεις παίδων καὶ γυναικῶν οὐδ’ ἰχθύων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ὅσα φέρει 
πολυτελὴς τράπεζα, τὸν ἡδὺν γεννᾷ βίον, ἀλλὰ νήφων λογισμὸς καὶ τὰς αἰτίας ἐξερευνῶν πάσης 
αἱρέσεως καὶ φυγῆς καὶ τὰς δόξας ἐξελαύνων ἐξ ὧν πλεῖστος τὰς ψυχὰς καταλαμβάνει θόρυβος.  
When we say, then, that pleasure is the end and aim, we do not mean the pleasures of the prodigal 
or the pleasures of sensuality, as we are understood to do by some through ignorance, prejudice, 
or wilful misinterpretation. By pleasure we mean the absence of pain in the body and of trouble in 
the soul. It is not an unbroken succession of drinking-bouts and of revelry, not sexual love, not 
the enjoyment of the fish and other delicacies of a luxurious table, which produce a pleasant life; 
it is sober reasoning, searching out the grounds of every choice and avoidance, and banishing 
those beliefs through which the greatest tumults take possession of the soul.  
Ep. Men. 131-2 
 
Rather than advocating for gratification, emphasis is placed on prudence and eliminating pain, as 
the absence of pain is itself considered a pleasure. Epicurus distinguishes between two types of 
pleasure: kinetic (κίνησις) and katastematic (καταστηματικός). The former refers to the process 
 
39 The Epicureans had to fight against the hedonist stereotype that they indulged in luxury and debauchery. Diogenes 




of fulfilling some desire, while the latter refers to the state of having fulfilled that desire (Ep. 
Men. 136).  
Unfulfilled desires are a source of mental pain, and so it is necessary to employ prudence 
in the pursuit of desire. This is a crucial aspect of Epicurean ethics, and one which any 
discussion of eradicating anxieties must reiterate. The power to attain happiness is held entirely 
by the individual, and it is achieved by carefully curating one’s desires so as to guarantee (as far 
as possible) their fulfilment. Of desire, Epicurus recognises three different kinds: those which are 
both natural and necessary, those which are natural but not necessary, and those which are 
neither natural nor necessary (Ep. Men. 127-8). Any desire which is natural and necessary, such 
as food or shelter, should be fulfilled. They ensure survival and basic comfort; when one has 
fulfilled such desires, one is not experiencing any ‘need’. Desires which are natural but not 
necessary, such as sexual gratification, should be fulfilled in moderation, and only if doing so 
will not result in any unnecessary pain or anxiety. Finally, a desire which is neither natural nor 
necessary – including any kind of luxury or ambition – ought to be avoided; indeed, such desires 
are self-perpetuating and cannot be fulfilled at all, leading inevitably to the pain of unfulfilled 
desire. Epicurus famously advocated for a life ‘lived unnoticed’ (λάθε βιώσας), avoiding the 
traps of politics and fame, which – according to Epicurus – would always fall short of bringing 
fulfilment. This went very much against the grain of popular thought in ancient Athenian society, 
in which a good reputation and public honours were sought after as sources of pleasure.40  
 
40 Roskam (2007), 29-33.  
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The relationship between pleasure and pain is seen as purely binary. The absence of one 
equates to the presence of the other: pleasure is a lack of pain, and pain is a lack of pleasure. 
Epicurus’ third principal saying encapsulates this:41 
Ὅρος τοῦ μεγέθους τῶν ἡδονῶν ἡ παντὸς τοῦ ἀλγοῦντος ὑπεξαίρεσις. ὅπου δ’ ἂν τὸ ἡδόμενον 
ἐνῇ, καθ’ ὃν ἂν χρόνον ᾖ, οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ἀλγοῦν ἢ τὸ λυπούμενον ἢ τὸ συναμφότερον.  
The magnitude of pleasure reaches its limit in the removal of all pain. When pleasure is present, 
so long as it is uninterrupted, there is no pain either of body or of mind or of both together. 
Kyria Doxa 3 
 
The absolute height of pleasure is simply a state that is devoid of any pain. This is a key aspect 
of Epicurean hedonism, particularly in relation to erasing the fear of death: the removal of any 
threat of pain allows space for the purest pleasure to flourish. The absence of mental pain is 
referred to as ἀταραξία, while the absence of bodily pain is referred to as ἀπονία. Cicero also 
summarises the Epicurean doctrine on this matter:42 
Sic in omni re doloris amotio successionem efficit voluptatis. Itaque non placuit Epicuro medium 
esse quiddam inter dolorem et voluptatem; illud enim ipsum quod quibusdam medium videretur, 
cum omni dolore careret, non modo voluptatem esse verum etiam summam voluptatem…ut 
postea variari voluptas distinguique possit, augeri amplificarique non possit.  
So generally, the removal of pain causes pleasure to take its place. Epicurus consequently 
maintained that there is no such thing as a neutral state of feeling intermediate between pleasure 
and pain; for the state supposed by some thinkers to be neutral, being characterised as it is by 
entire absence of pain, is itself, he held, a pleasure, and, what is more, a pleasure of the highest 
order…beyond this point pleasure may vary in kind, but it cannot vary in intensity or degree. 
Cic. Fin. 1.37-9  
 
 
41 See also Kyria Doxa 18: Οὐκ ἐπαύξεται ἐν τῇ σαρκὶ ἡ ἡδονή, ἐπειδὰν ἅπαξ τὸ κατ’ ἔνδειαν ἀλγοῦν ἐξαιρεθῇ, 
ἀλλὰ μόνον ποικίλλεται. τῆς δὲ διανοίας τὸ πέρας τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀπεγέννησεν ἥ τε τούτων αὐτῶν ἐκλόγησις 
καὶ τῶν ὁμογενῶν τούτοις, ὅσα τοὺς μεγίστους φόβους παρεσκεύαζε τῇ διανοίᾳ. Pleasure in the flesh admits no 
increase when once the pain of want has been removed; after that it only admits of variation. The limit of pleasure in 
the mind, however, is reached when we reflect on the things themselves and their congeners which cause the mind 
the greatest alarms.  
42 Translation by Rackham (1983).  
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The practical implications of this claim are rather optimistic: all one needs to do in order to reach 
the happiest state possible is to avoid mental and physical pain. Physical pain is believed to be a 
relatively easy obstacle to overcome, as Epicurus’ fourth principal saying establishes:43 
Οὐ χρονίζει τὸ ἀλογοῦν συνεχῶς ἐν τῇ σαρκί, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἄκρον τὸν ἐλάχιστον χρόνον πάρεστι, 
τὸ δὲ μόνον ὑπερτεῐνον τὸ ἡδόμενον κατὰ σάρκα οὐ πολλὰς ἡμέρας συμμένει. αἱ δὲ πολυχρόνιοι 
τῶν ἀρρωστιῶν πλεονάζον ἔχουσι τὸ ἡδόμενον ἐν τῇ σαρκὶ ἤ περ τὸ ἀλγοῦν. 
Continuous pain does not last long in the flesh; on the contrary, pain, if extreme, is present a very 
short time, and even that degree of pain which barely outweighs pleasure in the flesh does not last 
for many days together. Illnesses of long duration even permit an excess of pleasure over pain in 
the flesh. 
Kyria Doxa 4 
 
Therefore, the Epicurean attitude towards physical pain is that if it is ongoing, it is tolerable, 
whereas if it is intolerable, it is brief. This takes the notion of ‘intolerable’ quite literally; if your 
body cannot tolerate the pain, you will soon die and be put out of your misery. The advocacy of 
using mental fortitude to overcome such pain is a practical illustration of the Epicureans’ 
intellectualist approach. Famously, Epicurus’ own death is given as a demonstration of how one 
can bear great physical pain. He is able to counterbalance the pain of dying by contemplating 
past pleasures (D.L. 10.22). The mind’s ability to reflect on lived experiences and to 
consequently enjoy pleasures that have since passed is crucial. While the body can experience 
both pleasure and pain, this only occurs as an immediate reaction to a concurrent stimulus. The 
mind, however, is able to recall circumstances from the past and anticipate those in the potential 
 
43 See also Sent. Vat. 4.  
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future.44 Physical pain can therefore be overcome by way of distraction, whereas mental pain 
presents a far greater challenge.45  
The Epicureans posit that mental pain is caused by unfulfilled desires and false beliefs. 
The cure is therefore simple in theory: one should only pursue natural and necessary desires, 
which are easy to obtain and result in ἀταραξία,46 and one should interpret sensory evidence 
correctly, so as not to be plagued by unnecessary fear. The eradication of needless fear is central 
to Epicurean doctrine, and the two greatest fears identified by the Epicureans are those related to 
religion and to death (Ep. Hdt. 81).47 The ‘traditional’ Greek assertion, that one’s soul departs to 
Hades upon death to be either punished or rewarded,48 generates fear of the gods and fear of 
death. The Epicureans reject this traditional religious outlook and the associated reasons for fear. 
Considerable emphasis is therefore placed on arguing against it, thus removing this threat to 
human happiness.  
Firstly, they attempt to instil the belief that the gods are entirely unconcerned with human 
affairs. They argue that the gods are perfect beings, who exist in an intermediary divine state and 
act simply as an ideal to be emulated by mortals. They did not create humans, nor do they impart 
 
44 For further discussion of anticipation and retrospect in Epicurean hedonism, see Chapter 3, as well as Warren 
(2001b). 
45 There is ongoing debate surrounding some of the details of pleasure and pain in Epicureanism. See Warren 
(2001b), as well as Woolf (2009), 158-178. 
46 See Kyria Doxa 21: Ὁ τὰ πέρατα τοῦ βίου κατειδὼς οἶδεν, ὡς εὐπόριστόν ἐστι τὸ <τὸ> ἀλγοῦν κατ’ ἔνδειαν 
ἐξαιροῦν καὶ τὸ ὅλον βίον παντελῆ καθιστάν· ὥστ’ οὐδὲν προσδεῖται πραγμάτων ἀγῶνας κεκτημένων; He who 
understands the limits of life knows how easy it is to procure enough to remove the pain of want and make the 
whole of life complete and perfect. Hence he has no longer any need of things which are not to be won save labour 
and conflict.  
47 See also D.R.N 3.59-90, where Lucretius discusses the profound negative impact that fearing death can have on an 
individual.  
48 The phrase ‘traditional’ here and elsewhere refers to the Homeric and Hesiodic depictions of theology, especially 
with regard to the Underworld, which is ruled by the god Hades. Homer’s Odyssey Book 11 contains a (generally 
accepted) representation of what the soul is expected to undergo upon death. The untethered soul continues to exist 
as a wandering shade, which undergoes moral judgement upon descending to the Underworld in order to determine 
their fate (Od. 11.569-71).  
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any moral judgement (Ep. Men. 123). It is therefore needless to be afraid of the gods or any 
potential divine punishment. Within the intellectualist Epicurean framework, the internalisation 
of this ‘correct’ view replaces the traditional ‘false belief’, thereby neatly removing religious fear 
and any associated mental pain.  
Additionally, to counter the fear of death that ‘traditional’ religion imposes, the 
Epicureans argue against the notion that there is some form of life after death which carries the 
potential for punishment.49 Rather, death marks the ultimate end of an individual. Upon death, 
the soul is said to perish along with the body instead of descending to Hades. The Epicureans 
offer numerous arguments that the soul is physical and mortal, thus demonstrating that it cannot 
survive death (most notably by Lucretius, D.R.N. 3.425-849). Of course, the fear of post-mortem 
punishment is not the only reason that one might feel anxious about the prospect of death – far 
from it. The Epicurean stance that death is the complete annihilation of an individual brings with 
it a variety of additional concerns, all of which the Epicureans are dedicated to refuting. Before 
placating the fear of annihilation, however, they must first prove that the soul perishes with the 
body upon death. Their argument for the mortality of the soul, like every other aspect of 
Epicureanism, is founded on their physical theory of atoms.  
  
Death: Soul and Self 
In his Letter to Herodotus, Epicurus states that the soul is a physical component of one’s body, 
similar to an eye or a limb. It is made up of particularly fine particles, which are dispersed all 
throughout the body (Ep. Hdt. 63; D.R.N 3.180-230). Epicurus describes the soul as being 
 
49 Even if an individual is not being punished in Hades per se, the Greek depiction of the afterlife is extremely bleak, 
as demonstrated by Achilles’ famous lament in Homer’s Odyssey (11.488-91). 
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composed of multiple kinds of atoms, those of wind and heat, which each contribute to its overall 
nature. Lucretius expands on this description:  
Nec tamen haec simplex nobis natura putanda est.  
Tenvis enim quaedam moribundos deserit aura  
mixta vapore, vapor porro trahit aera secum.  
Nec calor est quisquam, cui non sit mixtus et aer 
 
…iam triplex animi est igitur natura reperta;  
nec tamen haec sat sunt ad sensum cuncta creandum 
 
…quarta quoque his igitur quaedam natura  
necessest adtribuatur. Est omnino nominis expers 
 
…sensiferos motus quae didit prima per artus.  
 
But we must not believe this nature to be single. For a kind of thin breath mixed with heat leaves 
the dying, and the heat, moreover, draws air with it. Nor is there any heat which is not mixed with 
air… therefore, the nature of the mind is found to be threefold; yet all these three together are not 
enough to produce feeling…a fourth nature must therefore be added to these; this is entirely 
without name…and this first distributes the sense-giving motions through the limbs. 
D.R.N. 3.231-245 (with omissions)  
 
Four components of the soul can therefore be identified: wind or breath,50 heat, air, and an 
unknown fourth substance, which somehow allows for sensation. The role that the Epicureans 
give to the soul is therefore both granting sensation to the body and interpreting what the body 
senses (D.L. 10.64). Lucretius differentiates between two aspects of the soul, which are generally 
translated as ‘mind’ (animus) and ‘spirit’ (anima).51 The anima is dispersed throughout the body, 
 
50 It is not at all uncommon in Greek philosophical history for the soul to be synonymised with breath or air, and for 
death to be described in terms of breath departing the body (McKirahan (2010), 53-4). The Greek term for soul, ἡ 
ψυχή, has been etymologically linked to breath by Bremmer (1993), 14-15 and Nussbaum (1972), 2. 
51 These Latin terms are coined by Lucretius. Epicurus simply uses the term ἡ ψυχή to refer to the soul or any 
aspects thereof. Lucretius acknowledges the difficulty in converting the Greek terminology into Latin, citing the 
‘poverty of his mother tongue’ (D.R.N. 1.136-9; 3.260). For an examination of how Lucretius Latinised the technical 
Greek terms of Epicurean philosophy, see Sedley (1998). 
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providing the means for sensation, while the animus acts as the control centre and resides in the 
chest: 
Nunc animum atque animam dico coniuncta teneri  
inter se atque unam naturam conficere ex se,  
sed caput esse quasi et dominari in corpore toto  
consilium quod nos animum mentemque vocamus.  
Idque situm media regione in pectoris haeret.  
Hic exultat enim pavor ac metus, haec loca circum  
laetitiae mulcent: hic ergo mens animusquest.  
Cetera pars animae per totum dissita corpus  
paret et ad numen mentis momenque movetur.  
 
Next, I say that mind and spirit are held in conjunction together and compound one nature in 
common, but that the head so to speak and lord over the whole body is the understanding which 
we call mind and intelligence. And this has its abiding place in the middle region of the breast. 
For in this place throbs terror and fear, hereabouts is melting joy: here therefore is the intelligence 
and the mind. The rest of the spirit, dispersed abroad through the whole body, obeys and is moved 
according to the will and working of the intelligence.  
D.R.N. 3.136-144 
 
The animus and anima therefore act in conjunction with one another in a way that is comparable 
to the modern notion of the nervous system. The animus acts as the ‘brain’, receiving and 
interpreting physical messages from the anima, which is akin to the ‘nerves’, stimulating 
sensation. The animus in turn sends instructions to the anima, initiating movement. Together, the 
animus and anima comprise the soul, the loss of which not only results in death, but also defines 
death. 
The Epicureans define death as the dissolution of the soul, resulting in the absence of all 
sensation. Without the ability to sense pleasure or pain, one cannot be impacted positively or 
negatively, according to Epicurus’ hedonist framework. When the soul atoms are no longer 
bound together and to the body, they disperse and the individual dies. The fact that the soul itself 
undergoes death is in stark contrast to traditional Greek thought, which posits that while the body 
24 
 
perishes, the soul continues on to some form of afterlife. Within this mainstream theoretical 
framework, the immortal soul represents the full identity of the individual, while the body acts as 
a mortal vessel.52 The Epicureans wholeheartedly reject this with their physicalist approach, 
going to great lengths to argue that the soul, too, is mortal.53 This argument has intriguing 
implications concerning the Epicurean concept of ‘self’. The unity of body and soul in life and in 
death suggests that the Epicureans regard one’s sense of self as comprised of both, rather than 
just the soul. In mainstream Greek thought, the self is able to survive death, encapsulated as it is 
by the soul.54 Within the Epicurean framework, however, all aspects of the self are bound to the 
mortal admixture of body and soul, and will thus be obliterated upon death. Therefore, the notion 
of death is drastically different for the Epicureans, as what defines death is not just a lack of 
sensation and awareness (such as one would experience while asleep, for instance), but the 
complete annihilation of the self.  
What constitutes the nature of the Epicurean ‘self’ is a matter of conjecture, as there is no 
evidence that Epicurus himself offered a concrete definition. A general description can be 
applied, that the ‘self’ pertains to an individual’s essential being which distinguishes them from 
anyone else. Németh discusses in detail what the Epicurean ‘self’ entails, which can be crudely 
summarised as follows:55 psychological development begins with experiences, which become 
 
52 In the texts of Homer, the soul (ἡ ψυχή) is described as leaving the body at death to descend to the Underworld 
(Od. 11.62-5). Any reference to the individual is thereafter linked to the soul, and not to the body, suggesting that 
only the soul represents the individual. There is, however, some debate concerning how much of one’s ‘self’ remains 
with the shade, as Bremmer (1993), 13-70 and Nussbaum (1972), 1-3 argue that the shades are simple echoes of the 
self, yet there is evidence that the shade has access to pre-death memories (Od. 11.217-22; 11.62-5) and shows 
consistent personality traits (Od. 11.541-6).  
53 As will be discussed in Chp.2, Lucretius dedicates a large portion of his third book in De Rerum Natura to this 
issue, lobbying a range of (sometimes bizarre) arguments in an attempt to prove that the soul is mortal.  
54 See, for instance, Book 11 of Homer’s Odyssey, in which Odysseus communicates with the souls of deceased 
friends and family. See also Book 23 of Homer’s Iliad, in which Achilles speaks with the shade of Patroclus.  
55 Németh (2017), xvii. 
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memories. Experience and memory inform both one’s ‘psychophysical conception’ (recognition 
of oneself as a mental and physical being), and one’s self-awareness (which includes recognition 
of agency). The psychophysical conception and self-awareness lead to the gradual formation of a 
personal identity, which can be defined as one’s own specific qualities. The findings of self-
reflection, which accommodates all of the above components, thereby constitute the self. In 
essence, the notion of one’s self is the result of experience and reflection, including one’s 
discovery of one’s own physical and atomic nature. This is crucial to Epicurean ethical practice, 
as the process by which desires are deemed naturally worthy and false beliefs are counteracted 
hinges on reflection of one’s own attitudes and behaviours, followed by the appropriate alteration 
of these so as to adhere to Epicurean doctrine.56  
Of particular importance within this theory of self is memory. Personal identity is formed 
gradually over the course of many experiences, and, most notably, subsequent self-reflection. 
Without the capability to remember and recall past experiences, there could be no cumulative 
self, and the notion of forming a consistent identity would disintegrate. Epicurus demonstrates 
the power and key role of memory when recalling past pleasures in order to bear the physical 
pain of his own death (D.L. 10.22). His ability to recall these occurrences and re-experience the 
associated emotions demonstrates a consistent sense of self. Lucretius also drives home the 
significance of memory to a consistent self when arguing that the soul is mortal: 
nec, si materiem nostrum collegerit aestas  
post obitum rursimque redegerit ut sita nunc est,  
atque iterum nobis fuerint data lumina vitae,  
pertineat quicquam tamen ad nos id quoque factum,  
 
56  While Philodemus, On Frank Speech, fr. 84.11-12 (see Konstan, Clay, Glad, Thom & Ware (1998) for 
translation), suggests that some people possess difficult natures that render them ‘incurable’ in terms of Epicurean 
ethical therapy, Lucretius is adamant that one’s nature is never an obstacle to philosophical benefit (D.R.N 3.307-22), 
as is Epicurus himself (Ep. Men. 122).  
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interrupta semel cum sit repetentia nostri.  
et nunc nil ad nos de nobis attinet, ante  
qui fuimus, neque iam de illis nos adficit angor.  
nam cum respicias immensi temporis omne  
praeteritum spatium, tum motus materiai  
multimodi quam sint, facile hoc adcredere possis,  
semina saepe in eodem, ut nunc sunt, ordine posta  
nec memori tamen id quimus reprehendere mente;  
inter enim iectast vitai pausa, vageque  
deerrarunt passim motus ab sensibus omnes.  
 
Even if time should gather together our matter after death and bring it back again as it is now 
placed, and if once more the light of life should be given to us, yet it would not matter one bit to 
us that even this had been done, when the recollection of ourselves has been broken asunder. And 
even now we are not concerned about any self which we have been before, nor does any anguish 
about it now touch us. For when you look back upon all the past expanse of measureless time, and 
think how various are the motions of matter, you may easily come to believe that these same 
seeds of which now we consist have been often before placed in the same arrangement they now 
are in. And yet we cannot call that back by memory; for in between has been cast a stoppage of 
life, and all the motions have wandered and scattered afar from those sensations.  
D.R.N. 3.847-860 
 
Lucretius clearly demonstrates that memory is, above all else, vital to one’s sense of self. Once 
an individual dies, memory is lost. This is evident, according to Lucretius, as even if the 
possibility of reincarnation is entertained, past lives are not able to be recalled. In the 
hypothetical scenario of a cycle of rebirths, death ‘interrupts’ the process of both experience and 
memory formation and thereby prohibits recall before death. As such, even if all the atoms 
constituting an individual should reform in the future exactly as they are now, the future 
individual would not be the same. While they would look identical, they would be nothing more 
than a blank slate without the memories of formative experiences. Lucretius is therefore arguing 
that a change to oneself that is drastic enough to interrupt memory is essentially death.57 This 
 
57 This carries interesting implications for those who undergo trauma or experience any illness that interrupts 
memory. Nagel (1979), 5-6, raises this issue in relation to the possibility of experiencing post-mortem harm. This is 
also discussed in Ch. 2.  
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further informs our definition of death in the Epicurean framework: it is not simply the 
reorganisation of atoms or a lack of sensation. It is not simply that ‘one will no longer be able to 
sense’, but rather that ‘there will be no one at all’. It is the eradication of oneself, as the essential 
aspect of an individual being ceases to be.  
The famous Epicurean maxim that ‘death is nothing to us’, is therefore not merely an 
expression of their attitude towards death, but a description of what they believe death entails: 
ὁ θάνατος οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς· τὀ γὰρ διαλυθὲν ἀναισθητεῖ· τὸ δ’ ἀναισθητοῦν οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς. 
Death is nothing to us; for the body, when it has been resolved into its elements, has no feeling, 
and that which has no feeling is nothing to us. 
Kyria Doxa 2 
 
Nil igitur mors est ad nos neque pertinent hilum,  
quandoquidem natura animi mortalis habetur 
…sic, ubi non erimus, cum corporis atque animai  
discidium fuerit, quibus e sumus uniter apti,  
scilicet haud nobis quicquam, qui non erimus tum,  
accidere omnino poterit sensumque movere,  
non si terra mari miscebitur et mare caelo.  
 
Therefore death is nothing to us, it matters not one jot, since the nature of the mind is understood 
to be mortal…so, when we shall no longer be, when the parting shall have come about between 
body and spirit from which we are compacted into one whole, then sure enough nothing at all will 
be able to happen to us, who will then no longer be, or to make us feel, not if earth be 
commingled with sea and sea with sky. 
D.R.N. 3.830-831; 838-842 
 
It is upon this ‘nothingness’ that the Epicurean arguments against the fear of death rely. While 
the assertion that ‘death is annihilation’ may prompt considerable apprehension, the necessary 
implication that nothingness is entirely neutral inherently supports the position that it would be 
irrational to fear it. One cannot experience pain in the absence of sensation. The acceptance of 
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this argument results in the removal of any rational reason to be afraid of being in a state without 
sensation, as there is no risk of harm. Indeed, no one will ever be in this state, as they will not be 
at all. There will be no ‘them’ to experience death. There will be nothing, and therefore nothing 
to fear.  
This definition of death as the complete annihilation of the self, eradicating any 
possibility of sensation (and therefore pain), functions as the primary argument against the fear 
of death. Specifically, it serves to undermine the fear of being dead, and it is used as a central 
tenet from which other arguments against death-related fears develop. The fear of dying is also 
addressed by this sensory argument, as this fear can easily be reduced to a fear of pain. During 
the process of dying, if it painful, then it is brief, and it can be dealt with by overriding physical 
pain with mental pleasure (which can be done with alleged ease, if one is to take Epicurus’ own 
death scene at face value). Once one has died, all sensation and pain will cease. By clearly 
establishing the nature of death in relation to their physical and ethical theories, the Epicureans 
have demonstrated that it is needless to fear both the state of being dead and of dying.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
Building on the foundational claim that all matter is comprised of atoms, Epicurus has argued 
against the ‘traditional’ Greek outlook which fosters the greatest threat to a pleasurable life: fear 
of the gods and of death. He has posited that the soul is a physical component of the body and 
that the self is comprised of both body and soul. Death is the dissolution of the soul, which marks 
the absolute annihilation of the self. Death is therefore nothing. Epicurus has also presented his 
hedonist ethical theory, wherein pleasure is inherently good, and pain is inherently bad. Fear is 
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an acute form of mental pain and must therefore be eradicated if one hopes to achieve the human 
τέλος of εὐδαιμονία. He has illustrated that the state of being dead and the process of dying do 
not warrant any fear, as the former cannot cause one pain and any pain resulting from the latter 
can be overcome.  
However, the arguments thus far only address the fear of death when death is present. 
One may still feel apprehension at the prospect of death, and harm may be identified that is 
independent of physical pain. Fear felt at the anticipation of death, including concerns about 
one’s own mortality or premature death, have yet to be addressed. Evidently, the task of 
eradicating death anxiety is by no means complete with the above arguments alone. 
The Epicureans must now turn their attention to death-related anxieties that fall outside of 
one’s immediate experience of death and consider potential harms that are independent of 
physical pain. Lucretius’ Symmetry Argument brings such issues to the fore, sparking significant 
scholarly debate concerning the timing of pleasure and pain, and the role this plays in 





II. The Symmetry Argument 
Death is clearly defined in the Epicurean framework as the annihilation of the self. In pursuit of 
their goal to eradicate the fear of death, the Epicureans must address any anxieties related to this 
state of non-existence. Epicurus established that being dead cannot be a painful experience, 
owing to the lack of sensation. However, apprehension in the face of death is not solely due to 
the anticipation of pain. The very concept of ceasing to exist is liable to produce some anxiety, 
despite Epicurus’ assurance that it will be ‘nothing to us.’ The key argument employed by the 
Epicureans to combat this fear is known as the Symmetry Argument. This argument posits that 
post-mortem non-existence is relevantly identical to pre-natal non-existence. Just as our period 
of non-existence before our birth did not cause us any concern, so too will our non-existence 
after death be harmless. While simple in concept, the Symmetry Argument has incited significant 
debate and is thus worthy of careful examination.  
There is some dispute over how to interpret the precise intention of the argument, and the 
rendering of the symmetry claim dictates whether it is able to challenge the fear of being dead or 
the fear of mortality. The Symmetry Argument must also withstand the strongest 
counterargument levelled against the Epicurean claim that death cannot harm the deceased, that 
is known as the Deprivation Account. Scholars who support the Deprivation Account posit that it 
provides grounds for asymmetry, but there is considerable disagreement as to how exactly it does 
so.  
First, I will examine the Symmetry Argument as established by Lucretius and determine 
how it can be most accurately interpreted. I will then explore how the Deprivation Account 
opposes the Symmetry Argument, specifically in connection to identifying any potential harm 
caused by death. Finally, I will investigate – and ultimately dismiss – several modern assertions 
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of asymmetry which threaten to undermine Lucretius’ Symmetry Argument. I will conclude that, 
while the Deprivation Account presents a powerful challenge, it is nevertheless found to be 
unsatisfactory, and the appropriate rendering of Lucretius’ Symmetry Argument is able to 
withstand it.  
 
Lucretius’ Symmetry Argument 
The Symmetry Argument has inspired great contention among scholars of Epicureanism. It was 
put forward by Titus Lucretius Carus, a Roman poet and philosopher writing in the first century 
BCE.58 Lucretius is very explicit in his desire to present Epicurean doctrine in a Latinised form, a 
task that he acknowledges is difficult (D.R.N. 1.136-45). He does not claim to make any original 
contribution to the philosophy (D.R.N. 3.3-6). It is therefore likely that the ‘novel’ arguments in 
 
58 Smith (in Rouse, 1975), x-xiv. Very little is known about the life of Lucretius. He was evidently an educated 
aristocrat, widely read, and fluent in both Greek and Latin (Kenney, 1970, 369). Lucretius was a devout Epicurean 
who dedicated his six-book poem, De Rerum Natura (On the Nature of Things), to the physical and ethical theories 
of Epicureanism. His text is didactic epic, designed to teach Epicurean philosophy. The addressee of the poem is 
Memmius (DRN, 1.21-27), likely the prominent Roman politician Gaius Memmius. He is addressed, not as a patron, 
but as the object of attempted moral reformation and conversion to Epicureanism. According to Smith (in Rouse, 
1975), xliii-xlix, Memmius was the son-in-law of Sulla, enjoyed the position of tribunus plebis in 66, praetor in 58, 
propraetor of Bithynia in 57, and unsuccessful candidate for the consulship in 54. He was also a patron of poets 
(including the famous Catullus) and was the subject of some measure of political and personal scandal. He was 
therefore a fitting representative of the Roman elite who could benefit from the Epicurean message.  It would seem, 
judging by the choice of Memmius as the addressee and the choice of poetry as the medium of the message, that 
Lucretius was targeting the cultured Roman elite as his audience and his aim was to convince them of the wisdom of 
Epicureanism. The choice of poetry as the medium is also rather unorthodox for an Epicurean; Epicurus himself 
states that a wise man should be able to discuss poetry and music, but should not compose it (D.L. 10.121). However, 
Lucretius claims that it serves the purpose of sweetening the somewhat unpalatable Epicurean doctrine, comparing 
himself to a doctor administering medicine in a cup rimmed with honey (D.R.N. 1.936-950). See Segal (1990) for a 
discussion of the interplay between Lucretius’ poetry and philosophy.  
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his work, including the Symmetry Argument, were initially established in Epicurus’ lost work 
Περὶ Φύσεως (On Nature).59  
The third book of Lucretius’ De Rerum Natura focuses on the nature of the soul.60 After 
describing the atomic constitution of the soul (D.R.N. 3.94-322), Lucretius posits numerous 
arguments to demonstrate that the soul is mortal, in order to support the claim that ‘death is 
nothing to us’. These arguments initially rely on commitment to the established claim that the 
soul is a physical component of the body, and as such, the fates of both body and soul are 
inextricably linked. For instance, that which affects the body (corpus) also affects the mind 
(animus), such as age, pain, alcohol, and medicine (D.R.N. 3.425-525). Having drawn 
conclusions from observable phenomena that link the mind with the body, Lucretius constructs 
arguments that gently ridicule the contrasting view that the soul is immortal. For instance, if a 
soul were immortal, it would have to exist prior to a body and would therefore have to be 
reduced to the mental capability of an infant when it entered a newly born body. This is plainly 
absurd, as is the idea that there are numerous souls jostling to enter a new body (D.R.N. 3.760-
784).61  
The soul perishes at the moment of death, and with it, any possibility of experience. 
There is no afterlife to endure and no threat of post-mortem suffering. Lucretius proceeds to 
argue that death therefore cannot be harmful, and it is here that he introduces the Symmetry 
Argument. There are two key passages: 62 
 
59 Sedley (1998), 62-91;134-5, argues that On Nature was Lucretius’ only source, although this is open to debate 
(see Farrell (2009), 76). 
60 For a discussion of the rhetoric and diatribe of Lucretius in Book III specifically, see Wallach (1976).  
61 West (1975), 95-116, offers a detailed and insightful analysis of Lucretius’ methods of argument with regards to 
the soul being mortal. 
62 All translations of De Rerum Natura are from Rouse (1975), unless stated otherwise.  
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Nil igitur mors est ad nos neque pertinent hilum,  
quandoquidem natura animi mortalis habetur; 
et, velut anteacto nil tempore sensimus aegri,  
ad confligendum venientibus undique Poenis,  
omnia cum belli trepido concussa tumultu  
horrida contremuere sub altis aetheris auris,  
in dubioque fuere utrorum ad regna cadendum  
omnibus humanis esset terraque marique,  
sic ubi non erimus, cum corporis atque animai  
discidium fuerit, quibus e sumus uniter apti,  
scilicet haud nobis quicquam, qui non erimus tum,  
accidere omnino poterit sensumque movere,  
non si terra mari miscebitur et mare caelo.  
 
Therefore death is nothing to us, it matters not one jot, since the nature of mind is understood to 
be mortal; and as in time past we felt no distress, while from all quarters the Carthaginians were 
coming to the conflict,63 when the whole world, shaken by the terrifying tumult of war, shivered 
and quaked under the lofty and breezy heaven, and was in doubt under which domination all men 
were destined to fall by land and sea; so, when we shall no longer be, when the parting shall have 
come about between body and spirit from which we are now compacted into one whole, then sure 
enough nothing at all will be able to happen to us, who will then no longer be, or to make us feel, 
not if earth be commingled with sea and sea with sky.  
 
D.R.N.  3.832-842 
 
Respice item quam nil ad nos anteacta vetustas  
temporis aeterni fuerit, quam nascimur ante.  
hoc igitur speculum nobis natura futuri  
temporis exponit post mortem denique nostram.   
 
Look back also and see how the ages of everlasting time past before we were born have been to 
us nothing. This therefore is a mirror which nature holds up to us, showing the time to come after 




The argument seems relatively straightforward. If one is concerned by the absence of existence 
after death, one need only to compare it to the non-existence that occurred before one’s birth, an 
everlasting time (temporis aeterni) when one did not suffer any mental or physical distress. In 
 
63 This mention of war with the Carthaginians is a reference to the Second Punic War, some two hundred years prior. 
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the future, after one’s death, there likewise will be an everlasting time free from pain. Thus, pre-
natal and post-mortem non-existence are symmetrical. In both cases alike there is neither distress 
nor suffering.  
There are two possible ways to interpret Lucretius’ argument, succinctly described by 
Warren.64 Version 1, as he coins it, concerns the time during non-existence. It states that our pre-
natal non-existence was nothing to us before we were born. Therefore, since the two states are 
symmetrical, our post-mortem non-existence will be nothing to us after death. Version 2, 
however, concerns our present attitudes. It states that when we look back during our lifetime at 
our pre-natal non-existence, it is nothing to us now. Therefore, since the two states are 
symmetrical, when we look forward during our lifetime to our anticipated post-mortem non-
existence, it is nothing to us now.  
There is some debate as to which version of the Symmetry Argument was intended by 
Lucretius. While the two versions are not mutually exclusive, they each invite very different 
avenues of discussion. The version that one favours therefore greatly informs how one engages 
with the symmetry debate. Of the two possible interpretations of Lucretius’ Symmetry Argument, 
Version 1 is the least controversial. Owing to the inherently binary relationship between 
‘existence’ and ‘non-existence’, there is very little reason to argue that past non-existence is 
relevantly different to future non-existence while it is in effect. In either case, there can be no 
subject at all. It precisely echoes Epicurus’ second principal saying,65 and therefore serves as an 
argument against the fear of ‘being dead’. In contrast, Version 2 offers an argument against the 
 
64 Warren (2004), 62. See also, Warren (2001a).  
65 Kyria Doxa 2: ὁ θάνατος οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς· τὀ γὰρ διαλυθὲν ἀναισθητεῖ· τὸ δ’ ἀναισθητοῦν οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς; Death 
is nothing to us; for the body, when it has been resolved into its elements, has no feeling, and that which has no 
feeling is nothing to us. 
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fear of ‘mortality’ and would thus serve as an addition to the above argument, as opposed to a 
repetition or reinforcement of it. Version 2 is therefore the more attractive possibility. However, 
the evidence seems to favour Version 1. 
The tenses of the verb in the first passage clearly convey the argument of Version 1, with 
sensimus (perfect; we felt) securely situating lack of distress in the past and erimus (future; we 
shall be) creating a parallel feeling in the future. There is no indication in this first passage of an 
identifiable symmetry between present attitudes towards pre-natal and post-mortem non-
existence. The symmetry exclusively refers to feelings (or lack thereof) during the time at which 
we are non-existent.   
The intention of the second passage is more ambiguous and may allude to present 
attitudes. The present imperative respice (look back) seems to invite the interpretation of Version 
2. The metaphor of looking through the speculum (mirror) reinforces this, conjuring up the 
mental image of oneself looking to past non-existence with an apathetic attitude, and having this 
attitude reflected in how one then contemplates future non-existence.66 However, it is again the 
tense of the verb that gives us pause. Rather than stating that past non-existence is to us nothing, 
Lucretius states that it has been to us nothing. The verb fuerit is perfect rather than present (sit), 
which suggests that, as in the first passage, Lucretius is discussing one’s lack of feeling during 
past non-existence and not one’s present attitude towards past non-existence. If Lucretius had 
intended to demonstrate present attitudes, he would have needed to use the present tense. Warren 
 
66 Of course, the fact that the mirror metaphor appears to encourage the interpretation of Version 2 does not mean 
that it is inconsistent with Version 1. 
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expresses no doubt that this evidence is conclusive and that Lucretius’ symmetry argument is 
only intended to convey Version 1.67 This is reminiscent of Furley’s appeal to the tense evidence: 
Lucretius does not argue here from the observation that we are not now concerned about what 
happened in the Punic Wars to the claim that we should not now be concerned about anything that 
may happen after our death. He argues that we felt no pain in the past, when the Carthaginians 
came: so we shall feel no pain in the future, when we are dead. The tenses of the verbs are 
conclusive about this; there is no statement at all about our present emotions. 
Furley (1986), 76 
 
Nevertheless, there are many who are convinced that Lucretius’ intention in the second passage 
is to establish symmetry between our present attitudes towards past and future non-existence, 
despite the past tenses of the verbs. Some scholars, such as Kamm, Belshaw, and Mitsis, 
implicitly assume Version 2 without directly engaging in the debate over which interpretation is 
most appropriate. 68  This is exemplified by the summary that Mitsis offers of Lucretius’ 
Symmetry Argument:69 
Lucretius alludes in this passage to a common asymmetry in our attitudes towards death and 
prenatal non-existence: most of us find it painful to think about our death and its deprivations, but 
we seem completely unconcerned about our previous non-existence and its deprivations. 
Mitsis (1989), 306 
 
 
67 Warren (2004), 64-67.  
68 Kamm (1993), 25; Belshaw (1993), 103; Mitsis (1989), 306. Whether the popularity of supporting Version 2 is 
due to a common conviction that it is the correct interpretation or due to ignorance of the debate is unclear.  
69  This can be contrasted to Glannon (1994), 236, who, likewise without engaging in the explicit debate, 
demonstrates that his interpretation of Lucretius’ Symmetry Argument is consistent with Warren’s Version 1: 
“Herein lies the "mirror-image" argument. It says that neither the time before we existed nor the time after we cease 
to exist can be good or bad for us, precisely because we cannot experience pleasure or pain at either time. Hence the 
state of the world before we were born and the state of the world after we die are equally devoid of value for us. This 




Others are explicit in their interpretation of Version 2, such as Rosenbaum, who argues directly 
against Furley’s conclusion.70 Interestingly, Rosenbaum agrees with him that the tenses in the 
second passage point to the past, but remains entirely convinced that Lucretius is concerned with 
the symmetry of present attitudes, seemingly due to the conviction that an argument against 
fearing death ought to target presently held attitudes. He argues that this is clear from the 
surrounding context of the symmetry passages, which contains reference to attitudes, fears, and 
anxieties. This is a weak assertion, for while it demonstrates that Lucretius cares about the 
anxieties that plague his fellow man, it does not dictate that the symmetry argument specifically 
is about symmetrical attitudes rather than symmetrical experiences. Rosenbaum makes the 
following statement:  
Lucretius’ symmetry argument may justifiably be taken to be about present attitudes, not simply 
past and future attitudes. It seems clear that the symmetry comments are directed against death 
anxiety during one’s life. 
Rosenbaum (1989b), 359  
 
If Rosenbaum intends here to hinge his second statement on his first, then he is mistaken.71 
Lucretius is undeniably aiming to eradicate death anxiety within one’s lifetime. He is explicit 
and unambiguous in this purpose. But this does not rely on Lucretius arguing that our attitudes 
are symmetrical.  
Warren has been able to offer further linguistic support of Version 1 beyond the tense of 
the verbs. He has suggested a variation on the traditional translation of the second passage which 
eliminates a great deal of ambiguity. He takes the phrase quam nascimur ante (before we were 
 
70 Rosenbaum (1989), 358-360. 
71 Note that while Rosenbaum differs in his interpretation, he does support the effectiveness of the Symmetry 
Argument, and defends it against critics who assert asymmetry. See Rosenbaum (1989), 372-373.  
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born) as qualifying fuerit (was to us) rather than amplifying anteacta vetustas (the ages of 
everlasting time past).72 Warren frames the original translation (which is consistent with Rouse, 
above) as follows: 
Look back at how all the immense amount of time before we were born was nothing to us. 
 
Warren’s adaptation reads: 
Look back at how all the previous immense amount of time was nothing to us before we were 
born. 
 
This alternate translation situates the attitude towards the past non-existence in the past, 
contemporaneously with the experience, thus removing the possibility of interpreting this 
argument as Version 2.  
I argue that Lucretius’ intention with the Symmetry Argument is to establish the 
symmetrical experiences of non-existence that bracket one’s life (Version 1), with the hope that 
acceptance of this symmetry would produce symmetrical attitudes in the present. The notion of 
symmetrical present attitudes (Version 2) should therefore be considered a desired outcome of 
the Symmetry Argument, rather than a premise. It is entirely logical that if one commits to the 
argument that neither state of non-existence is harmful in any way, then one’s response to both 
states of non-existence should be a present lack of concern. Indeed, Lucretius seems fully aware 
that asymmetrical attitudes towards past and future non-existence are the norm, and he believes 
that this is leading to unnecessary anguish. His attempt to convince his audience that the 
experience is symmetrical is based on the premise that many currently have asymmetrical 
attitudes, and that this is based on the false belief that post-mortem non-existence is harmful in a 
 
72 Warren (2004), 67.   
39 
 
way that pre-natal non-existence is not. In other words, Lucretius is not trying to demonstrate 
that we do have symmetrical attitudes, but that we should have symmetrical attitudes.73  
The evidence of the verb tenses is itself sufficiently convincing that Lucretius intends to 
argue for symmetry between the experience of non-existence rather than attitudes towards non-
existence during one’s lifetime. The translation offered by Warren adds further justification for 
this interpretation. It is therefore extremely doubtful that Lucretius’ Symmetry Argument offers 
anything more than reinforcement against the fear of being dead. If Lucretius intended Version 2 
of the argument, it would be considered an attempt to also combat the fear of mortality, or the 
fear that one is going to die. The evidence thus far indicates that this is not the case. However, 
this does not negate the significance of the discussion surrounding Version 2, which remains a 
relevant challenge within Epicurean ethics. The fear of mortality must be addressed in order to 
successfully eradicate death-related anxieties, and the wealth of modern debate in reaction to the 
interpretation of Version 2 is entirely bound up with concerns over the potential harms resulting 
from mortal existence.  
The Symmetry Argument should be interpreted as additional support in the form of a 
persuasive analogy for the central Epicurean claim that ‘death is nothing to us.’ This central 
assertion has, of course, not gone uncontested. An argument that seeks to undermine this claim is 





73 Feldman (2011), 316, also makes this point, as does Kaufman (2011), 118.   
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Symmetry vs. Deprivation 
Deprivation & The Badness of Death 
The Symmetry Argument relies on the basic conviction that both pre-natal and post-mortem non-
existence are essentially the same. This is the case regardless of whether one leans towards to the 
interpretation of Version 1 or Version 2. It is therefore worth examining contributions to the 
debate that adopt either interpretation. In the case of the former, one simply needs to agree that 
the ‘experience’ (or ‘non-experience’, as the case may be) is the same during the state of non-
existence. This is straightforward and uncontroversial. In the case of the latter, however, one 
would need to accept that our attitudes towards past and future non-existence do not reasonably 
differ. As scholarly debate demonstrates, this position is considered by many to be 
counterintuitive. The goal of anyone who is attempting to discredit the Symmetry Argument is 
therefore to illustrate and justify asymmetry between past and future non-existence, thus 
explaining why our present attitudes reasonably differ.  
The argument that stands the tallest against Symmetry is Deprivation. The Deprivation 
Account was introduced by Nagel, who argues against the Epicurean stance that death cannot be 
harmful by claiming that the harm comes in the form of depriving the deceased of the goods of 
life. Nagel accepts that there is no post-mortem subject, and that death, being ‘nothing’, can only 
be considered a ‘neutral’ state rather than a negative one. The harm resulting from death is 





It is being alive, doing certain things, having certain experiences, that we consider good. But if 
death is an evil, it is the loss of life, rather than the state of being dead, or non-existent, or 
unconscious, that is objectionable.  
Nagel (1979), 3 
 
This is a compelling argument, both intuitively and logically. Death is often expressed as a sense 
of loss, either for those who are grieving at the loss of a loved one, or for the deceased who have 
lost their life and their future. The Deprivation Account is also consistent with the Epicurean 
hedonist framework, in which pleasure has the greatest value. Cutting someone off from current 
or potential pleasure would surely be viewed as harmful to a hedonist.  
Not only does this argument threaten to undermine the very heart of the Epicurean stance 
against death – that it is ‘nothing to us’ and therefore not harmful – but it also makes a case for 
asymmetry. A relevant difference between pre-natal and post-mortem non-existence is proposed 
here, which is the fact that life is lived in the interim. Life does not exist before pre-natal non-
existence, but it certainly does before post-mortem non-existence. Post-mortem non-existence 
therefore marks the loss of life and the cessation of potential pleasure, unlike pre-natal non-
existence, where there can be no loss or cessation (even if potential pleasures are yet to be 
realised). This is a difficult position to argue against.  
Nevertheless, a simple and powerful defence is offered by Lucretius himself:  
“Iam iam non domus accipiet te laeta neque uxor  
optima, nec dulces occurrent oscula nati  
praeripere et tacita pectus dulcedine tangent.  
non poteris factis florentibus esse, tuisque  
praesidium. misero misere,” aiunt, “omnia ademit  
una dies infesta tibi tot praemis vitae.”  
illud in his rebus non addunt: “nec tibi earum  
iam desiderium rerum super insidet una.”  
quod bene si videant animo dictisque sequantur,  
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dissoluant animi magno se angora metuque… 
 
Hoc etiam faciunt ubi discubuere tenentque  
pocula saepe homines et inumbrant ora coronis,  
ex animo ut dicant: “brevis hic est fructus homullis;  
iam fuerit neque post umquam revocare licebit.”  
tamquam in morte mali cum primis hoc sit eorum,  
quod sitis exurat miseros atque arida torrat,  
aut aliae cuius desiderium insideat rei.  
nec sibi enim quisquam tum se vitamque requirit,  
cum pariter mens et corpus sopita quiescunt;  
nam licet aeternum per nos sic esse soporem,  
nec desiderium nostri nos adficit ullum. 
 
“No longer now will your happy home give you welcome, no longer will your best of wives; no 
longer will your sweet children race to win the first kisses, and thrill your heart to its depths with 
sweetness. You will no longer be able to live in prosperity, and to protect your own. Poor man, 
poor man!” they say, “one fatal day has robbed you of all these prizes of life.” But they do not go 
on to add: “No longer too does any craving possess you for these things.” If they could see this 
clearly in mind and so conform their speech, they would free themselves from great anguish and 
fear of mind… 
This also is the way among men, when they have laid themselves down at table and hold goblets 
in their hands and shade their brows with garlands, that they often say from their hearts: “Short 
enjoyment is given to poor mankind; soon it will be gone, and none will ever be able to recall it.” 
As if after death their chief trouble will be to be miserably consumed and parched by a burning 
thirst, or a craving possess them for some other thing! In fact, no one feels the want of himself 
and his life when both mind and body alike are quiet in sleep; for all we care that sleep might be 
everlasting, and no craving for ourselves touches us at all.  
D.R.N. 3.894-903; 3.912-922 
 
Lucretius targets those who are grieving the loss of a loved one and those who are anticipating 
their own demise. In both instances, the source of grief is the belief that the deceased will be 
deprived, either of the joy of seeing their family or indulging in the goods that life has to offer. 
Lucretius seeks to remind them that there will also be no post-mortem desire or craving for these 
things. The deceased no longer exists and therefore experiences neither loss nor harm. So, even if 
an Epicurean were forced to concede that there is harm in the form of a loss, there would be no-
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one to experience it regardless. Lucretius’ method of countering the fear of being deprived is to 
fall back on the mantra ‘death is nothing to us.’ In this instance, Lucretius is specifically alluding 
to the meaning that we are nothing after death.74 In the absence of existence there can be no 
experience. But there can also be no desire and therefore no deprivation. Essentially, the 
argument is that there cannot be harm where there is no subject to experience it. This, I would 
argue, is logically sound. However, scholars have found something unsatisfying about it. It is not 
especially effective in softening anxiety towards one’s impending death. It, like Version 1 of the 
Symmetry Argument, offers a defence only against the fear of being dead, but nothing against 
the fear of mortality. The fear of mortality is the present fear that one’s life is going to end. It is 
surely this fear that represents the greatest threat to one’s happiness, and therefore this fear that 
ought to preoccupy the Epicureans. Lucretius’ arguments thus far, however, seem solely 
concerned with the fear of being dead. The other ‘threads’ of fear – that of mortality, premature 
death, and the dying process – are largely ignored.75 Of course, it has been demonstrated that the 
most appropriate interpretation of Lucretius’ Symmetry Argument is that it is purely designed to 
establish symmetry between the two states of non-existence that bracket one’s life. This means 
that the Symmetry Argument itself survives this particular objection, but the overall Epicurean 
stance that ‘death is nothing to us’ is still open to criticism.  
 
The Necessity of Experience 
Lucretius’ argument that there is no post-mortem subject has inspired an interest in the notion 
that something could be harmful without a subject to experience that harm. If it could be proven 
 
74 As opposed to the other meaning of the phrase, that we are not troubled by death, or we care nothing about death.  
75 Fear of the dying process would have been considered already dealt with, as it can be reduced to a fear of pain.  
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theoretically possible that something can be harmful even in the absence of experience, it would 
directly contradict the Epicurean claim that ‘death is nothing to us’, and lend considerable 
support to the notion that death is bad because it deprives the deceased of life. Nagel presents a 
scenario in which harm is inflicted on someone without their knowledge or experience. This is 
intended to be analogous with death, as a deceased person could not be aware of any suffering or 
harm.76 Nagel considers the hypothetical case of a man whose life is irrevocably altered by a 
brain injury: 
Suppose an intelligent person receives a brain injury that reduces him to the mental condition of a 
contented infant, and that such desires as remain to him can be satisfied by a custodian, so that he 
is free from care. Such a development would be widely regarded as a severe misfortune, not only 
for his friends and relations, or for society, but also, and primarily, for the person himself. This 
does not mean that a contented infant is unfortunate. The intelligent adult who has been reduced 
to this condition is the subject of the misfortune. He is the one we pity, though of course he does 
not mind his condition – there is some doubt, in fact, whether he can be said to exist any longer.  
Nagel (1979), 5-6 
 
Nagel’s man experiences a misfortune in the form of brain trauma. Following this trauma, the 
man is unable to comprehend that he has experienced any harm. The man is clearly happy in his 
ignorance and all of his needs are met.77 This is presented as an example in which something can 
be bad for someone even though they do not actually experience it. Other scenarios that attempt 
to demonstrate this possibility include undiscovered deception or betrayal by a friend.78 Nagel 
intends for this case to serve as a parallel of his conception of death; the state of death is not 
 
76 Nagel (1979), 5.  
77 Having one’s basic needs met is, of course, all that is really necessary to fulfil the Epicurean criteria for happiness 
(Kyria Doxa 21). 
78 These scenarios are suggested in passing by Nagel (1979), 5, and explored in depth by Warren (2004), 24-34, who 
ultimately finds them wanting.  
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negative because the experience is bad, but because death deprives the subject of life.79 Nagel’s 
man is unable to pursue the life that he otherwise would have, and is thus deprived by the brain 
injury; yet, he is happy after the injury. This is a crucial point: Nagel needs the subject of harm to 
be the version of the man that exists prior to the injury in order for it to be appropriately 
comparable to death because he accepts that there is no post-mortem subject. Nagel also attempts 
to demonstrate the possibility of harm that is temporally distant from its subject. He claims that 
there is a subject, but the subject precedes the harm.80 
However, while these scenarios present agreed-upon ‘bad things’ in conjunction with a 
lack of knowledge on the part of the ‘victim’, they are not adequate analogies for death. 
Rosenbaum argues the case that existence is the key difference between these scenarios and 
death. The continued existence of the brain-damaged man (or the deceived man) makes it 
incomparable to death, which is defined by the cessation of existence.81 This is contested by 
Kaufman, who claims that there is sufficient similarity between the brain-damaged man and the 
deceased in the sense that it is impossible for either to experience the life that they are being 
denied.82 With this line of thought, it is not existence but rather the ability to experience which is 
the necessary condition for comparison. However, Rosenbaum’s issue is still relevant. One can 
certainly see a parallel between the brain-damaged man and the deceased, in the sense that the 
life that they would have led (were it not for the interruption of trauma or death) is no longer a 
 
79 Nagel (1979), 4: “If we are to make sense of the view that to die is bad, it must be on the ground that life is a good 
and death is the corresponding deprivation or loss, bad not because of any positive features but because of the 
desirability of what it removes.” This view is reliant on the assumption that life is inherently positive, and not just a 
means by which to experience that which is positive.  
80 Nagel (1979), 5: “It therefore seems to me worth exploring the position that most good and ill fortune has as its 
subject a person identified by his history and his possibilities, rather than merely by his categorical state of the 
moment – and that while this subject can be exactly located in a sequence of places and times, the same is not 
necessarily true of the goods and ills that befall him.”  
81 Rosenbaum (1987), 212. 
82 Kaufman (1999), 2.  
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potential reality. Yet, existence is not merely a conduit for experience. As has been established, 
the Epicurean definition of death is complete annihilation. It is not a long sleep in which the 
deceased is numb and unable to feel anything. It is the eradication of the self. Existence and 
sense-experience must be kept distinct.  
It could be argued that if the brain damage suffered by the man is extensive enough to 
alter his psychology, then it is a form of death.83 Indeed, Nagel alludes to this (above), apparently 
in an attempt to divorce the pre-trauma version of the man from his post-trauma counterpart and 
strengthen the comparison to death (where there is no post-mortem counterpart). In examining 
the Epicurean notion of self-identity, it has become plain that cumulative memory and 
experience are vital in the formation of one’s self. This is emphasised by Lucretius’ argument 
against hypothetical reincarnation (D.R.N. 3.847-860), in which he claims that the interruption of 
memory between death and rebirth is enough of an identity change that the deceased individual 
and the individual who is reborn are actually two completely different people with unique 
concepts of self. If the brain-damaged man is reduced to a mental state that is inconsistent with 
the previous version of his self, then the version of his self before the trauma is no longer 
existent and is effectively dead. Using this framework of understanding, the brain-damaged man 
is directly comparable to the deceased. This appears to undermine the Epicurean position by 
forcing them to concede either that both the brain-damaged man and the deceased are harmed, or 
that neither of them is. However, an Epicurean could very reasonably take the latter argument. If 
it is conceded that the pre-trauma man is dead, and the brain-damaged man is a different 
psychophysical being, then it is perfectly logical to conclude that the pre-trauma man is not 
 
83 This position is examined briefly by Kaufman (1999), 2-4. He favours the opinion that it threatens the Epicurean 
argument by coercing them into the position that nothing bad has happened to the brain-damaged man (when 
‘clearly’ something bad has happened).  
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suffering in the slightest, precisely because he no longer exists to suffer. Nagel’s effort to closely 
align his pre-trauma man with an ante-mortem person does not actually offer sufficient evidence 
that they are harmed. Neither exists after trauma or death to experience any kind of deprivation. 
Nor does Nagel’s attempt to temporally separate the subject and the harm that befalls them fix 
this issue, for the effect of the harm cannot precede its cause.84 This case study simply does not 
demonstrate how something could be considered harmful when there is no subject to experience 
the harm. The brain-damaged man is also not suffering because his needs are met and he is not in 
pain. Lucretius’ argument that desire is a necessary condition for deprivation is therefore relevant 
here. If the brain-damaged man does not wish for anything beyond his basic needs, and these 
needs are met, then he meets the criteria for happiness. He is in a state of ἀταραξία and therefore 
εὐδαιμονία. An Epicurean can therefore claim that the man has not been harmed. There is 
nevertheless considerable resistance to this conclusion. There seems to be some concern that 
genuinely believing that the brain damage has not harmed this person is counterintuitive and 
rather cold-blooded. But, if this reaction is determined to be the result of a false belief (that the 
man has been harmed), then this fear is wholly unnecessary, and it is precisely what the 
Epicureans are attempting to fix. The notion that this perceived harm is actually ‘false’ invites 
the question of what is considered to be ‘truly’ harmful within the Epicurean framework.  
 
The Epicurean Definition of Harm 
The disagreement over whether the brain-damaged man is harmed raises an integral issue: what 
exactly constitutes ‘harm’ in this context, and is it distinguishable from something ‘bad’? 
According to Epicurean hedonism, they are essentially the same thing. Pain, be it mental or 
 
84 See Warren (2004), 48-50. 
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physical harm, is bad. It would seem that something could only be considered bad in terms of the 
pain that it causes.85 It is therefore fundamentally necessary for there to be a subject that is 
harmed in order for something to be considered bad within the Epicurean framework.  
Fred Feldman attempts to make a distinction between ‘intrinsic’ and ‘extrinsic’ harms, 
which directly or indirectly cause pain, respectively. He argues that things such as illness, 
poverty, and ignorance cause harm only indirectly and are thus extrinsically bad. Death, he 
claims, also falls into this category, as he concedes that it cannot be directly experienced but 
nevertheless causes harm indirectly (in the form of deprivation). 86  However, as Warren 
elucidates, extrinsic evils are considered to be evils because they cause an intrinsic bad (pain) or 
prevent an intrinsic good (pleasure). As such, it is possible to reduce all extrinsic evils to intrinsic 
evils, blurring and removing the need for the distinction between the two.87 In essence, it remains 
that the only true evil is pain, even if the road to pain is more convoluted in some situations 
compared to others. It is therefore a reasonable Epicurean argument to claim that neither the 
brain-damaged man nor the deceased have suffered any harm. Feldman anticipates this issue and 
attempts to counter it by demonstrating that there can be genuine extrinsic evils that do not 
produce intrinsic evils. He describes the following scenario: 
 
85 An implication of this argument is that the intent to cause harm may not be considered bad if no harm actually 
occurs. This is morally problematic; however, the Epicureans argue that virtuous behaviour is naturally reinforced 
by their hedonism, as the unjust are plagued by guilt and fear, which are forms of mental pain. This is laid out in 
Kyria Doxa 17: Ὁ δίκαιος ἀταρακτότατος, ὁ δ’ ἄδικος πλείστης ταραχῆς γέμων (The just man enjoys the greatest 
peace of mind, while the unjust is full of the utmost disquietude), as well as Kyria Doxa 34: Ἡ ἀδικία οὐ καθ’ 
ἑαυτὴν κακόν, ἀλλ’ ἐν τῷ κατὰ τὴν ὑποψίαν φόβῳ, εἰ μὴ λήσει τοὺς ὑπὲρ τῶν τοιούτων ἐφεστηκότας κολαστάς 
(Injustice itself is not an evil, but only in its consequence, viz. the terror which is excited by apprehension that those 
appointed to punish such offences will discover the injustice). Cf. Sent. Vat. 7. For some modern discussions of 
Epicurean justice, see Van den Steen (2009), 137-150, O’Keefe (2001a), 133-146, and Armstrong (1997), 324-334. 
86 Feldman (1992), 133-5. Kaufman (1999), 3, finds this to be a convincing argument, stating that “Feldman’s 
distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic evils easily explains why Nagel’s brain-damaged man suffered a 
misfortune, and in a way acceptable to the Epicurean, at least insofar as the Epicurean admits that the man still exists. 
Since this is so, and since deprivation need not be experienced as such (as argued above) our confidence in the 
deprivation account as the correct response to Epicurus’ challenge is increased.” 
87 Warren (2004), 29.  
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Suppose a girl is born in a strange country—call it Country A. In Country A, they do not permit 
girls to learn to read and write. In this strange country, girls are taught to do laundry and raise 
children. Suppose this girl goes through life bearing children and washing laundry. Suppose she is 
reasonably satisfied, thinking that she has lived as a woman ought to live. She goes to her grave 
never realizing what she has missed. Suppose also that she had very considerable native talent for 
poetry—that she would have been a marvellously successful and happy poet if only she had been 
given the chance. I would want to say that it is a great pity that this woman had not been born in 
another country. I would say that something very bad happened to her, even though she never 
suffered any pain as a result. 
Feldman (1992), 137-8 
 
Feldman argues that this example illustrates a situation in which something is bad for someone 
(being born in Country A) even though it does not cause pain. It is an extrinsic evil that cannot 
be reduced to an intrinsic evil. The badness is found not in pain, but in being deprived of 
pleasure that would otherwise have been experienced. This is the kind of harm that Feldman 
attributes to death – not that it causes pain, but that it deprives the subject under consideration of 
intrinsic value.88 There are three significant factors to consider about Feldman’s proposal. The 
first is that it is necessary in such examples for the subject to be unaware that they are being 
harmed in some way. If the subject were to perceive the harm, it could be considered an intrinsic 
evil as it would result in some form of mental pain. This is also the only way in which the 
situation could be analogous to death, as the deceased are not capable of awareness. The second 
factor is that the subject is living a genuinely contented existence. This must be the case or the 
harm would again be attributed to intrinsic evil.89 The third factor is that the nature of extrinsic 
evil is purely comparative; the only case in which it can be considered an evil is when the subject 
would otherwise have been in a better situation.90 That something is comparatively worse does 
 
88 Feldman (1992), 139, is very clear on this point, stating that it would be absurd to assert that death is an intrinsic 
evil, as it is not a form of pain.  
89 Warren (2004), 30-31, discusses how an Epicurean could exploit the argument if the subject were aware of the 
harm they were experiencing or were in fact discontent.   
90 Feldman (1992), 138.  
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not necessitate the conclusion that it is bad. Indeed, Feldman must concede that the life that is in 
fact lived by the subject is not bad in of itself. Feldman is therefore reaching beyond his grasp by 
concluding that the subject is suffering any harm by living their comparatively worse life. The 
comparative account can only make value judgements in the context of the comparison.91 
So, the subject must be genuinely content and unaware that their life is deficient 
compared to an unknowable alternative. This begs the question: where exactly is the harm? In 
pursing an example of how someone could be harmed without experiencing it, Feldman appears 
to have completely abandoned the Epicurean perspective, despite his claim to the contrary.92 As 
has been established, the Epicurean concept of pleasure is simply a state without pain.93 The 
above example rules out even the possibility of pain lest it be ruled as intrinsic. The subject does 
not experience any discontent or awareness of their life’s comparative deficiency. Nor do they 
suffer from unfulfilled desires, as they do not know that they should wish for alternative 
circumstances. This example does not effectively illustrate that one can be harmed without 
experiencing it. In the attempt to do so, what has been described is a normal, content life. It 
would seem that the ‘harm’ would only come into effect when the individual is informed of what 
 
91 Draper (1999), 389, is very assertive in making the argument that a comparatively worse situation does not entail 
it being bad. He states: “It would imply that I have suffered a terrible misfortune today in that I did not find 
Aladdin’s lamp and hence have not been granted three wishes by an omnipotent genie”. His point is that while 
finding the lamp would be better than not finding it, he is not currently suffering without it. Not finding it today also 
does not merit distress. Suits (2001), 69-72, is similarly unconvinced that ‘comparatively worse’ equates to ‘harm’, 
or that it warrants the conclusion that death is bad.  
92 Feldman (1992), 157: “I have attempted to provide my answers within a fundamentally Epicurean framework”.  
93 This is made explicit in Kyria Doxa 3, discussed above: Ὅρος τοῦ μεγέθους τῶν ἡδονῶν ἡ παντὸς τοῦ ἀλγοῦντος 
ὑπεξαίρεσις. ὅπου δ’ ἂν τὸ ἡδόμενον ἐνῇ, καθ’ ὃν ἂ χρόνον ᾖ, οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ἀλγοῦν ἢ τὸ λυπούμενον ἢ τὸ 
συναμφότερον. The magnitude of pleasure reaches its limit in the removal of all pain. When pleasure is present, so 
long as it is uninterrupted, there is no pain either of body or of mind or of both together. See also Cic. Fin. 1.37-9. 
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their life is missing; in which case, it is the awareness of a better possibility that causes the 
pain.94 
Perhaps the most significant issue with this example is that when the only kind of harm is 
comparative, everything could be considered harmful. Surely there is always the possibility of 
something being better than it is. One could ceaselessly fantasise about things being better than 
they are in actuality, and thus cause oneself pain as that better reality remains unattainable. 
Epicurus was well aware of this threat to happiness, and sought to encourage only desires that 
are natural, necessary, and attainable (Ep. Men. 127-8). The current reality could always be 
‘deficient’ in some way compared to any number of alternatives. Any life would be harmful to 
the subject in this case. Warren also addresses this concern, and it is worth repeating: 
If death can harm someone by marking their life deficient or revealing that it is deficient in 
comparison with another life they could have lived had they not died then, is it also true that 
while alive I am harmed because my life is deficient in comparison with another possible life I 
could be living (whether or not I have the slightest notion of the possibility of my living that other 
life)? Just a little thought could conjure up a huge variety of ways in which my life could be 
better than it is. The comparative harm approach, if left unrestricted, invites an enormous range of 
other lives in comparison with which my current life is better or worse and – in consequence – by 
which comparisons I seem to be being harmed and benefitted.  
Warren (2004), 33 
 
Warren calls for the addition of ‘limits of expectation’ to avoid the conclusion that not only is 
death always comparatively harmful, but so too is life. This particular attempt to identify a 
possible scenario in which death could be harmful has elicited the conclusion that death is 
always harmful.95  
 
94 It might be argued that awareness would reveal the pain rather than cause it. However, because the supposed harm 
is purely comparative, there is no harm and therefore no pain when the comparison is not present.  
95 Warren (2004), 33.  
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It must be emphasised that the Deprivation Account is not intended to demonstrate that 
all death is harmful. Kaufman makes this very clear:  
Death need not be a deprivation, however; hence death need not be an evil. The deprivation 
account is not committed to thinking that death is necessarily an evil. It all depends upon what 
would have happened had one not died when one did. The deprivation account purports to explain 
why death is bad, when death is bad. It is thus compatible with a particular death being bad – 
even one’s own death. 
Kaufman (1999), 1 
 
Warren’s appeal for limitation is therefore crucial for the validity of the Deprivation Account. 
Kaufman has argued that deprivation is limited by possibility, since a subject cannot be deprived 
of something that they were never able to have.96 This, however, is entirely unsatisfactory. It 
remains to be seen what the limits of possibility are. Perhaps it is life expectancy. Anyone who 
lives beyond the life expectancy of, for instance, 80 years, is not deprived by death, but anyone 
who dies prior to this is? This is counterintuitive: there is no single point in an individual’s 
lifetime when life suddenly becomes less precious and is no longer considered a ‘loss’. Perhaps 
the ‘limits of possibility’ are instead determined on a case by case basis. If Jane is terminally ill 
and cannot possibly live beyond 20 years, then she is not deprived by death, yet 96-year-old John 
who dies in car accident is deprived? This must also be rejected: the inevitability of Jane’s death 
cannot make her death any less of a ‘loss’ than anyone else’s, because everyone’s death is 
inevitable. No-one can ‘expect’ to live any longer than they in fact do, and no-one can know how 
long they can expect to live until they are within death’s grasp.   
 
96 Kaufman (1999), 10-11. This kind of limitation does go some way to argue against scenarios such as that of the 




As it currently stands, the Deprivation Account is entirely too broad, inviting the notion 
that every life and every death is comparatively harmful. So far, the attempts at limiting what can 
be considered ‘deprivation’ are counterintuitive and fallacious. The burden remains on those who 
support the Deprivation Account to define these ‘limits of deprivation’ and identify how exactly 
death can cause ‘harm’ outside of an implausible comparative context. However, the Deprivation 
Account is not solely dedicated to proving the ‘evil’ of death; it is also offered as evidence of 
asymmetry, specifically to undermine the Symmetry Argument.  
 
Accounting for Asymmetry 
The Deprivation Account has been used to demonstrate and justify asymmetry between pre-natal 
and post-mortem existence. There is, however, some debate among those who support this 
argument as to the specific cause of the asymmetry. Nagel’s initial argument is founded on the 
notion that post-mortem non-existence constitutes a ‘loss’, where pre-natal non-existence does 
not. His claim is as follows: 
This approach also provides a solution to the problem of temporal asymmetry, pointed out by 
Lucretius. He observed that no one finds it disturbing to contemplate the eternity preceding his 
own birth, and he took this to show that it must be irrational to fear death, since death is simply 
the mirror image of the prior abyss.97 That is not true, however, and the difference between the 
two explains why it is reasonable to regard them differently. It is true that both the time before a 
man’s birth and the time after his death are times when he does not exist. But the time after his 
death is time of which his death deprives him. It is time in which, had he not died then, he would 
be alive. 
Nagel (1979), 7  
 
 
97 Notice that Nagel is assuming here the interpretation of Warren’s ‘Version 2’ of Lucretius’ symmetry argument; 
that of present attitudes. 
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Nagel asserts that Lucretius’ symmetry fails on account of a reasonable difference between pre-
natal and post-mortem non-existence, which is that the latter deprives the deceased of life. 
However, the validity of this asymmetry has been questioned. If post-mortem non-existence 
deprives the individual of life, then is it possible that pre-natal non-existence is also a form of 
deprivation?  
Nagel argues against this, attempting to reinforce the asymmetry by claiming that while it 
is possible for someone to die later than they do, it is impossible for one to be born earlier than 
they in fact are.98 This line of thought has been interpreted in two ways. The first is that a person 
could only be conceived at a precise moment in time.99 This is more of a biological approach, 
using the idea that a certain sperm will fertilise a certain egg at a certain time and this will 
produce a certain person. Any conception earlier or later than this specific time will result in the 
combination of a different sperm and egg. Our birth is therefore ‘fixed’ in time, while our death 
is not. The second interpretation is a matter of identity. This rests on the notion that one’s 
experiences inform their identity from the moment of birth. Therefore, being born at a different 
time would result in different experiences and produce a different person. It is this interpretation 
which I believe to be Nagel’s intention,100 and with which I agree on the basis that it is in 
accordance with Epicurean notions of self-identity, as discussed above. If Nagel is correct in his 
 
98 Nagel (1979), 8.  
99 Rosenbaum (1989), 362, Johansson (2013), 53, and Mitsis (1988), 309 adopt this interpretation. This is examined 
and rejected by Kaufman (2011), 122-123, who maintains – very much in line with the Epicurean sense of self – that 
it is our biography and psychology that constitute who we are, rather than our genetic material.   
100 Nagel’s phrasing is ambiguous enough to support either interpretation, but his subsequent statement that “Distinct 
possible lives of a single person can diverge from a common beginning, but they cannot converge to a common 
conclusion from diverse beginnings.” leads me to favour the second interpretation, as it seems concerned with 
different life experiences. Kaufman (2011), 122-123, believes that Nagel was actually discussing birth in terms of 
gametes and genetic material. Kaufman’s emphasis on the biographical and psychological constitution of an 
individual is therefore intended as an amendment to improve upon Nagel’s original premise. While I am of the 
opinion that Nagel may have been considering the psychological implications, Kaufman’s amendment removes the 
ambiguity, which greatly clarifies and strengthens the position.  
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argument that the time of one’s birth is fixed, but not the time of one’s death, then asymmetry is 
supported. Post-mortem non-existence can deprive the deceased of time that they otherwise may 
have been alive, while pre-natal non-existence does not. Kaufman favours this approach, arguing 
that it justifies the asymmetry of pre-natal and post-mortem non-existence: 
Because possibility is a condition of deprivation – you cannot be deprived of things you cannot 
possibly have – and because a given biography or particular psychological continuum cannot 
possibly exist earlier than it in fact does, one cannot be deprived by prenatal nonexistence. 
Kaufman (2011), 123  
 
Brueckner and Fischer rather bluntly disagree with Nagel’s assessment and Kaufman’s 
amendment. They support the Deprivation Account, but they reject this explanation for 
asymmetry on the basis that they are unconvinced by such a ‘controversial metaphysical claim’ 
and see no reason why an individual could not have been born earlier or why the time of one’s 
birth would be an essential property of that individual.101 They are not alone in this judgement. 
Johansson also finds Nagel’s argument unsatisfactory, claiming that it is theoretically possible 
for one to be born earlier. Furthermore, even if it were impossible, this does not demonstrate that 
pre-natal non-existence does not deprive one of goods.102 This latter criticism can easily be 
dismissed, as the Deprivation Account clearly asserts that deprivation occurs only when the 
individual is deprived of something that they otherwise would have had. Therefore, if it were 
impossible for one to have been born earlier, they could not have experienced life sooner and 
thus could not have been deprived of life. These scholars’ interpretation of Nagel’s argument 
directly informs their resistance to the claim that one could not have been born earlier. Unlike 
Kaufman, they focus on the moment of birth in relation to a particular point in time, drawing the 
 
101 Brueckner & Fischer (1986), 215.  
102 Johansson (2013), 52-53. 
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conclusion that the two need not necessarily be related. However, they fail to consider the issue 
from the perspective of personal identity, which does indeed depend on a fixed time of birth.  
 
Future-Oriented Bias 
In their pursuit of a justification for asymmetry, Brueckner and Fischer nevertheless distance 
themselves from Nagel’s fixed birth theory and turn towards Parfit, who offers the suggestion 
that we have a rational bias towards the future.103 While Nagel argues that only post-mortem 
non-existence deprives the deceased (and therein lies the asymmetry), Parfit’s model supports 
the notion that both past and future non-existence are forms of deprivation. We are simply more 
concerned about the future. This claim therefore serves to justify asymmetrical attitudes, rather 
than identify something inherently asymmetrical about the two states of non-existence. Parfit 
introduces the following scenario to demonstrate this bias: 
I am in some hospital, to have some kind of surgery. Since this is completely safe, and always 
successful, I have no fears about the effects. The surgery may be brief, or it may take a long time. 
Because I have to cooperate with the surgeon, I cannot have anaesthetics. I have had this surgery 
once before, and I can remember how painful it is. Under a new policy, because the operation is 
so painful, patients are now afterwards made to forget it. Some drug removes their memories of 
the last few hours. 
I have just woken up. I cannot remember going to sleep. I ask my nurse if it has been decided 
when my operation is to be, and how long it must take. She says that she knows the facts about 
both me and another patient, but she cannot remember which facts apply to whom. She can tell 
me only that the following is true. I may be the patient who had his operation yesterday. In that 
case, my operation was the longest ever performed, lasting ten hours. I may instead be the patient 
who is to have a short operation later today. It is either true that I did suffer for ten hours, or true 
that I shall suffer for one hour.  
I ask the nurse to find out which is true. While she is away, it is clear to me which I prefer to be 
true. If I learn that the first is true, I shall be greatly relieved.  
Parfit (1984), 165-6            
 
103 Parfit (1984), 165-166.  
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Parfit uses his example to demonstrate his argument that we naturally prefer pain to be in the 
past and pleasure to be in the future. This kind of inherent temporal bias may offer an objection 
to Lucretius’ Symmetry Argument.   
However, while Parfit’s case offers an observation that favours the notion of an intuitive 
future bias, there is no indication that this asymmetrical attitude is necessary. If it is not 
necessary, then Lucretius’ argument that we ought to have symmetrical attitudes remains 
unchallenged. As Warren illustrates, anyone who wishes to rely on the future bias as a counter 
argument to Lucretius’ Symmetry would need to demonstrate either that our asymmetrical 
attitudes correspond to asymmetry inherent to past and future non-existence (in other words, that 
our attitudes are rational), or that our asymmetrical attitudes are fundamental to the human 
experience and are therefore inescapable, regardless of whether or not they are justified.104  
Parfit discusses some explanations to account for our bias towards the future. He is not 
expressly concerned with engaging in Epicurean debate. 105  Rather, his exploration of the 
potential reasons for the future-oriented bias is related more generally to attitudes towards time.  
His first explanation concerns ‘the direction of causation’, which is the notion that our 
ability to influence the future (and not the past) explains the future bias.106 This is an intuitively 
powerful idea; not only is the future accessible in a way that the past is not, but we can also 
actively influence it. Nevertheless, Parfit dismisses this explanation with the argument that this 
reasoning is inadequate, given that the future-oriented bias is still evident in situations when we 
are anticipating a future event over which we have no control. It also fails to distinguish between 
 
104 Warren (2004), 83-84.  
105 Parfit (1984), 175. However, when he does briefly direct his discussion towards Epicurean death philosophy, he 
argues that his identification of a future-oriented bias undermines the Epicurean assertion of symmetry.  
106 Parfit (1984), 168. 
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near and far future events, and thus offers no reason for a bias towards the near future.107 
However, bringing the issue directly into an Epicurean context, Warren points out that it is 
within our power to try and influence the circumstances surrounding our death (such as 
attempting to postpone it), whereas to alter circumstances of our birth is impossible.108 This may 
lend some credence to the notion that a future-oriented bias is justified, as there is clear 
motivation for greater concern towards future non-existence. Yet, the ‘circumstances 
surrounding one’s death’ are not synonymous with ‘post-mortem non-existence’. While one may 
manipulate the circumstances of how one dies, the experience of death is beyond both 
experience and influence.  
Parfit’s second potential explanation concerns ‘the passage of time’, which is the claim 
that the timing of an event is an essential property of that event.109 As such, past and future non-
existence differ due to the mere fact that the former has the characteristic of being in the past and 
the latter has the characteristic of being in the future. Without delving into the metaphysical 
implications of this claim, it is clear that it is not a complete explanation. While our attitudes 
differ towards past and future events, it seems far more plausible that this is owing to our 
subjective experience of time, rather than any inherent or independent quality of ‘pastness’ or 
‘futureness’ attached to an event. Even if the timing of an event was an essential property, and 
events were different purely by virtue of being in the past or future, it seems that this difference 
would be largely inconsequential. Much in the same way that a reflection in a mirror displays a 
flipped image rather than an exact replica, the qualities of ‘pastness’ and ‘futureness’ may 
distinguish events, but they remain – if not identical – relevantly symmetrical.  
 
107 Parfit (1984), 168. See also Warren (2001b), 154-162.  
108 Warren (2004), 85.  
109 Parfit (1984), 177-178. 
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The third potential explanation discussed by Parfit concerns evolution, claiming that a 
future-oriented bias has been naturally selected and ingrained in human psychology.110 This 
argument does not, however, indicate that asymmetrical attitudes are rationally justified, but 
simply that they are a product of the evolutionary process. Lucretius’ Symmetry Argument does 
not need to bow before an evolutionary argument as – again – his claim that we should have 
symmetrical attitudes remains unchallenged.111   
The explanations for the bias are therefore left wanting.112 It would seem that while it is 
easy to accept the presence of a future-oriented bias, establishing the reason for it – and even 
more importantly, justification for it – is a much more elusive task. Despite his conviction that 
the future bias is rational, Parfit actually adopts a rather Epicurean attitude and advocates against 
the bias in favour of the value of happiness:  
I believe that we ought not to be biased towards the future. This belief does not beg the question 
about the rationality of this bias. On any plausible moral view, it would be better if we were all 
happier. This is the sense in which, if we could, we ought not to be biased towards the future. In 
giving us this bias, Evolution denies us the best attitude to death. 
Parfit (1986), 177 
 
Not only does Parfit here demonstrate his firm confidence in the presence of the future-oriented 
bias, he also seems sure that this bias influences present attitudes towards death.  
However, there is one inescapable issue with extrapolating this claim from Parfit’s 
original scenario. The example is expressly concerned with the experience of pain. It therefore 
 
110 Parfit (1984), 186.  
111 One could attempt to skirt the issue of ‘should’ and argue instead that an evolutionary explanation highlights 
some inherent characteristic of humans. However, ‘inherent’ does not necessarily equate to ‘essential’. The validity 
of the evolutionary explanation is also doubtful. See below (n.183) for a discussion of arguments concerning some 
potential evolutionary justifications for the fear of death more generally. 
112 For further criticism of these explanations as discussed by Parfit, see Warren (2004), 82-93.  
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cannot be analogous with death. Brueckner and Fischer identified this issue and sought to 
circumnavigate it by appealing specifically to attitudes towards pleasure, rather than pain. 
Dedicated to the Deprivation Account as they are, Brueckner and Fischer assert that the badness 
of death is not due to the experience of pain, but to the cessation of pleasure. They therefore offer 
an equivalent to Parfit’s example that focuses on past and future experiences of pleasure: 
Imagine that you are in some hospital to test a drug. The drug induces intense pleasure for an 
hour followed by amnesia. You awaken and ask the nurse about your situation. She says that 
either you tried the drug yesterday (and had an hour of pleasure) or you will try the drug 
tomorrow (and will have an hour of pleasure). While she checks on your status, it is clear that you 
prefer to have the pleasure tomorrow. There is a temporal asymmetry in our attitudes to 
“experienced goods” which is parallel to the asymmetry in our attitudes to experienced bads: we 
are indifferent to past pleasures and look forward to future pleasures.  
Brueckner & Fischer (1986), 218-219   
 
This new example supposedly demonstrates that we have asymmetrical attitudes towards past 
and future deprivation (resulting from non-existence) because we care more about future 
experiences of pleasure than those of the past. Brueckner and Fischer go on to provide another 
example in further support of their argument: 
It is now 1985 and you will live eighty years in any case. Suppose you are given the following 
choice. Either you were born in 1915 and will die in 1995, or you were born in 1925 and will die 
in 2005. In each case, we will suppose, your life contains the same amount of pleasure and pain, 
distributed evenly through time. It is quite clear that you would prefer the second option – you 
want your good experiences in the future.  
Brueckner and Fischer (1986), 219 
 
This second scenario seeks to illustrate that we inherently favour the notion of extending our 
lives into the future rather than into the past. This has inspired much debate. When asked to give 
a preference between extending one’s life into the past (thus being born earlier) or into the future 
(thus dying later), the latter option would clearly be the more popular choice. This is relatively 
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uncontroversial,113 but the explanation as to why this asymmetrical attitude is so pervasive is far 
less certain. Brueckner and Fischer assert that it is due to the inherent bias towards future 
experiences as established by Parfit. However, this conclusion has been widely criticised, and 
many alternative explanations have been offered which warrant further examination.  
 
Early Birth vs. Late Death 
The question of why we intuitively prefer the idea of extending our lives with a later death rather 
than an earlier birth has been widely contemplated. Brueckner and Fischer argue that we are 
biased towards future experiences, as discussed above, and even go so far as to claim that we are 
indifferent to past pleasures.114 This is quite simply untrue. As any Epicurean would no doubt 
agree, our past experiences, linked to us through our memories, form an integral part of our 
being and are often a source of great pleasure when recalled.115 They are valuable to us and our 
attitudes reflect that.  
Feldman also questions Brueckner and Fischer’s claim that pre-natal non-existence is not 
bad for us and elicits no concern because it deprives us of past pleasures, to which we are 
indifferent. Feldman examines three possible interpretations of their argument, but finds each of 
them unsatisfactory in their attempt to demonstrate when death is bad for the individual who 
dies.116 The primary flaw identified by Feldman is that knowledge of oneself and anticipation of 
one’s future is necessary in order for any indifference or positive bias to apply. Feldman 
 
113 Grover (1987), 730-731, briefly considers some attitudes that would result in a desire for an earlier birth rather 
than a later death, but these are very specific (and somewhat questionable) cases.  
114 Brueckner & Fischer (1986), 219. 
115 See Chp. 1 above.   
116 Feldman (2011), 313-315.  
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introduces two examples to illustrate this point: an infant who has no conception of what his 
future may hold or of what death is, and a 20-year-old student who does not know that she is 
expected to live a very fulfilling life.117 In both cases, the sudden death of the subject is an 
undeniable tragedy. Yet, neither one of the subjects is aware that they are being deprived of 
something positive. In other words, they are indifferent to their future positive experiences 
because they cannot be aware of what these experiences would entail. Feldman therefore finds 
Brueckner and Fischer’s argument lacking in its attempt to identify the badness of death with 
temporally asymmetrical attitudes, as these attitudes may not exist in ignorant subjects.  
Feldman’s criticism led Brueckner and Fischer to adapt their argument as follows: 
Death deprives us of something it is rational for individuals to care about, whereas prenatal 
nonexistence deprives us of something it is not rational for individuals to care about. 
When death is bad for an individual X, it is bad for X because it is rational for X to care about the 
fact that if X dies, X will be deprived of some pleasant experiences (though X may not know what 
experiences these will be) that X otherwise would have enjoyed (whereas prenatal nonexistence is 
not bad for an individual because, even though it deprives him or her of pleasant experiences, it is 
not rational for an individual to care about the fact that if he or she is born late he or she will be 
deprived of some pleasant experiences).  
Brueckner & Fischer (2013), 787 
  
This amendment appears to solve the issue raised by Feldman, as it asserts than one can still be 
deprived of that which will be pleasurable in the future, but of which one is presently ignorant or 
unable to conceptualise. However, it also warrants further objection. Just as the Deprivation 
Account is generally lacking in limitation, so too is this notion of what it is ‘rational to care 
about’. Brueckner and Fischer define their notion of rationality as similar to ‘propositional 
justification’, which is to say that sufficient reason is their condition for rationality rather than 
 
117 Feldman (2011), 313-314.  
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knowledge or comprehension.118 What constitutes ‘sufficient reason’ is frustratingly vague, and 
only goes partway in establishing how ‘rational’ or ‘reasonable’ cares are determined. Perhaps 
the rationality of a care is determined by a kind of general intuition or, conversely, it is 
determined by the individual subject on a case-by-case basis. In the case of the former, there is 
the risk that individuals who do not share the ‘general’ definition of rational concern are to be 
considered deprived of goods. In the case of the latter, Feldman’s issue has not been 
appropriately addressed. How can the individual determine what is rational for them to care 
about if they have neither knowledge nor conception of both those cares and one’s self in 
relation to those cares? Brueckner and Fischer seem to be advocating for the idea that if one 
‘would’ care about something if they did know about it, then it is a reasonable and rational care 
for them to have. I argue that whether one ‘would’ care about something is contingent on their 
sense of self and their personal identity. What one ‘would’ care about is subjective, differs 
between individuals (and cultures), and is most certainly subject to change over the course of 
one’s life. Any attempt to determine what one would or should care about ‘if only they knew’ is 
presumptuous at best.  
Similarly baffled by the statement that we are indifferent to past experiences of pleasure, 
Belshaw offers a slightly different critique of Brueckner and Fischer’s argument. He 
demonstrates that the hospital scenario put forward by Brueckner and Fischer suggests 
indifference only towards pleasures which are forgotten and from which our present concerns are 
insulated.119 Belshaw’s own attempt to explain asymmetrical attitudes towards past and future 
non-existence harkens back to Nagel’s notion that our identity is bound up with the timing of our 
birth. He believes, as I do, that within the Epicurean framework, the present version of one’s self 
 
118 Brueckner and Fischer (2013), 788. 
119 Belshaw (1993), 108.  
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is contingent on past experiences. Therefore, if the past were to be altered in any way, so too 
would one’s identity. Belshaw claims that, given the choice between extending one’s life by 
being born earlier or dying later, one is more likely to choose the latter because the past is ‘set’ in 
one’s mind, and all that one has experienced in the past has led to one’s present self. The future, 
however, is open, in the sense that additional time in the future may increase the chances of 
fulfilling one’s desires as they currently apply to the present version of one’s self. Belshaw 
summarises this argument quite simply: 
My claim, then, is that the widespread asymmetrical attitude is contingent upon the similarly 
widespread attitude about the causal relevance of the past to the present structure of our 
psychological selves. And insofar as it is reasonable to have these beliefs, so it is reasonable to 
have the attitude. 
Belshaw (1993), 112 
  
This explanation for asymmetry is more emotionally resonant than that of Brueckner and Fischer 
and is more attuned to the Epicurean sense of self. It offers a fair justification for one’s tendency 
to prefer the notion of extending one’s life through a later death rather than an earlier birth. 
Belshaw’s claim is also somewhat immune to Feldman’s concern with Brueckner and Fischer’s 
argument. Rather than relying on notions of temporally relative preferences – the idea that we 
care more about future than past pleasures – Belshaw asserts that our attitudes rely on the 
implicit assumption that the past cannot be altered. For Belshaw, then, it does not matter if a 
subject is anticipating any particular kind of future; regardless, it is the future alone that holds 
possibility, and therein lies the asymmetry.  
In an attempt to defend their argument, Brueckner and Fischer respond to Belshaw’s 
criticism that they have demonstrated indifference to past pleasure only if the pleasure has been 
forgotten or is inconsequential. They contend that it is precisely the inaccessibility of these 
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pleasures that make them relevant to the issue of death.120 This qualification lessens the force of 
their controversial claim that we are indifferent to past pleasures. The emphasis is then placed on 
context; in the context of choosing between an isolated pleasure in the past (which does not 
impact the present) and an isolated pleasure in the future (which likewise does not impact the 
present), one is more likely to choose a future pleasure. The only difference between the two 
pleasures is temporal, so it supports the notion of a future-oriented bias and therefore of 
asymmetrical attitudes towards past and future deprivation. Despite this adaptation, Brueckner 
and Fischer’s argument is still rather shallow. The claim that we are indifferent to past pleasures 
remains unconvincing; Parfit’s original scenario and those subsequently offered by Brueckner 
and Fischer only indicate that a comparative value can be placed on past and future pleasures, 
not that past pleasures are themselves insignificant. Furthermore, the future-oriented bias serves 
more as a description of asymmetry than an explanation for why we hold such attitudes. The bias 
itself still requires either an explanation or a justification; preferably both. As Kaufman stated, 
Brueckner and Fischer have attempted to justify a bias by placing it in the context of a larger bias, 
claiming that our attitudes are rational simply because we have such attitudes, which is simply 
inadequate.121 
Grover also weighs in on the asymmetry debate with an argument not dissimilar to 
Belshaw’s.122 She brings attention to our first-person perspective, asserting that our desires at 
any given point in time are contingent on our present conception of self: 
Consider a 24-year-old who is asked to state a preference between imminent death, early birth, 
and delayed death. A 24-year-old who has a positive attitude towards her life will almost certainly 
place in first position the delayed death alternative, for it is only on the delayed death alternative 
 
120 Brueckner & Fischer (1993), 329.  
121 Kaufman (2011), 117. 
122 Grover (1987), 728-731. 
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that present attachments, reflections, and ongoing plans do not have to be given up. On the early 
birth alternative ongoing activities would become past activities, and so the person would have 
nothing to look forward to. So while objectively there is nothing to choose between, in choosing 
between an early birth and delayed death, from the first person perspective of someone who is 
enjoying what she is doing, and wants to continue with these activities, there is all the difference 
in the world. 
Grover (1987), 730 
 
This assertion, like Belshaw’s, carefully considers the role of one’s self in determining why there 
is a tendency to prefer a later death compared to an earlier birth. One is more motivated to extend 
one’s life into the future because the future is when one’s present desires may be achieved.  
This explanation is strengthened when considered in conjunction with Belshaw’s claim 
that we naturally view the past as ‘set’. The inaccessibility of the past, as well as the possibility 
of fulfilling one’s present desires in the future, offers a convincing explanation for why we hold 
a future-oriented bias. Additionally, an argument inspired by Parfit’s discussion of the ‘direction 
of causation’ may offer further insight. This principle states that we are biased towards the future 
because we have the power to influence the future. One of the failings of this argument is that 
there are some future events which we cannot affect; yet the bias appears to persist. However, 
there is no circumstance where the future is not perceived to affect us. Events in the future hold 
greater sway over our present selves because we understand that ‘future’ events will eventually 
become ‘present’ events. By contrast, past events will never become ‘present’ events. Our 
experience of time is linear, flowing like a river in one direction from the future, through the 
present, and then on to the past. We therefore expect to experience future events in the present at 
some point, while past events move on behind us. That is not to say, of course, that past events 
cannot influence us; on the contrary, as I have argued above, memories which allow us to relive 
and learn from past experiences are extremely powerful in informing our present ‘selves’. But 
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we will never again experience a past event as we did when it was happening in the present. The 
river cannot flow backwards. This claim can fit neatly with the arguments by Belshaw and 
Grover to explain and justify the future-oriented bias as follows: 
I. Our perception of time is that it flows in one direction, like a river. Therefore, 
II. We believe that the past is fixed and inaccessible (Belshaw), and 
III. We believe that only in the future can our present goals and desires be realised 
(Grover). 
IV. Owing to our first-person perspective, we are motivated by our present desires 
(Grover). 
V. We believe that the future can impact our lives in a way that the past cannot, as 
the future will eventually become the present. Therefore, 
VI. We prefer pleasurable events to be in the future because we will experience them 
in the present, and 
VII. We prefer painful events to be in the past because we will not experience them in 
the present.  
 
This combination of arguments permits the most appropriate explanation for the presence of a 
bias towards the future and a subsequent preference for a later death rather than an early birth. 
The future-oriented bias can be explained by the inherent assumption that future events will 
become present experiences, while past events will not. 123  When forced to decide between 
extending one’s life into the past or into the future, we are more likely to choose the latter, owing 
to Belshaw’s and Grover’s respective assertions that we assume our present situations are 
contingent on the past being ‘fixed’, and that only the future holds the potential to satisfy the 
needs of our present selves. It is therefore both rational and justifiable that we hold asymmetrical 
attitudes towards past and future experiences.  
 
123 Of course, the future is not fixed, and an anticipated pleasurable event may not actually eventuate in the present. 
It may therefore seem fallacious to claim that a future pleasurable event ‘will’ be experienced. However, time 
marches ever ceaselessly onwards, and the future will come to pass, regardless of whether or not it is the future that 
we presently have in mind.  
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However, this is not the case with death. Death is, by definition, devoid of experience. In 
the absence of experienced phenomena, these biases and preferences that are evident within 
one’s attitudes are no longer supported. The future-oriented bias does not justify or rationalise 
asymmetrical attitudes towards pre-natal and post-mortem non-existence because neither is 
experienced, regardless of whether it occurs in the past or in the future. The bias simply 
demonstrates a preference for pleasure to be in the future and pain to be in the past. There is no 
basis for temporal preference when the phenomenon involves neither pain nor pleasure. Likewise, 
the tendency to favour a later death over an early birth is not due to some kind of apathy towards 
pre-natal non-existence. Rather, our present selves are dependent on fixed past experiences and 
our current goals are contingent on the possibility of future experiences. Preferring to extend 
one’s life into the future rather than into the past does not necessitate the view that death is 
harmful; or indeed, that one’s attitude towards death factors into this preference at all.  
The asymmetrical attitudes that we hold cannot extend beyond the limits of our 
experience. Therefore, while the future-oriented bias and the preference for a later death offer 
justification for asymmetrical attitudes, these attitudes are specific to experienced phenomena 
and do not justify asymmetrical attitudes towards pre-natal and post-mortem non-existence. This 
argument is supported by Glannon, who, unlike those who defend the Deprivation Account, 
concurs with the Epicurean stance that experience is a necessary condition of pleasure or pain: 
Once we cease to exist as persons, as experiencing subjects, the temporal asymmetry between 
past and future dissolves, since the asymmetry itself is a function of a person's psychology. 
In the light of this psychology, it is irrational to care now about the goods of which we allegedly 
will be deprived by death. For it is rational to be concerned about the pleasure and pain, the 
happiness and suffering, that we actually experience as persons. Yet we cannot experience 
anything after we die. Thus we cannot experience any deprivation of goods after we die. Epicurus 
and Lucretius would not deny that we have a bias toward the future, provided that it is the lived 
future, between the present and the event of death, that is at issue. What they do deny is that it is 
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rational to be concerned about or have a bias toward the future that obtains after death. This 
period cannot affect us, qua experiencing subjects, because we do not exist at that time.  
Glannon (1994), 238 
 
It is evident that one’s acceptance of these asymmetrical attitudes does not compel one to 
concede that the Deprivation Account has any merit. The Deprivation Account relies on the 
notion that one can be harmed by something that they do not experience. If one rejects this 




The Deprivation Account has certainly offered a compelling challenge to Lucretius’ Symmetry 
Argument. However, it is found to be unsatisfactory, as it fails to account for the ‘badness’ of 
death. The attempts to establish asymmetry – either on the basis of a future-oriented bias or the 
notion that the past is fixed in some way – are insightful, but they are limited to one’s lived 
experience. Thus far, there has been no successful validation of asymmetry between pre-natal 
and post-mortem non-existence. Whether or not one is convinced by the Deprivation Account is 
ultimately dependent on the perception of whether experience is necessary for harm. The 
Epicurean framework strongly indicates that experience is necessary, and Lucretius’ initial 
rebuttal of the Deprivation Account stands strong. The Deprivation Account and its subsequent 
arguments concerning the perception of time are not without controversy, even if one does 
support the notion that one can be harmed without experiencing it. The wealth of debate among 
scholars of Epicureanism is evidence of this.  
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Despite the multitude of clashing opinions in the symmetry debate, the evidence from 
Lucretius himself makes it very clear that the Symmetry Argument has a singular intention. It is 
designed to demonstrate that pre-natal and post-mortem non-existence are relevantly identical 
while they are in effect. Warren’s ‘Version 1’ interpretation is by far the most likely, and it 
remains undefeated by those supporting the Deprivation Account. Therefore, the Symmetry 
Argument builds on Epicurus’ argument that there is nothing to fear about being dead. It does 
not propose any assurance against the fear of mortality, as many have presumed.   
However, this is not to say that Lucretius offers no defence against the fear of mortality, 
simply that this defence is not encapsulated by the Symmetry Argument. Rather, the Symmetry 
Argument is one component of a network of arguments that form a holistic Epicurean approach 
to understanding life and death. Epicurean philosophy advocates an entire lifestyle geared 
towards maximising pleasure during one’s finite existence. This cannot be encompassed by a 
single Symmetry Argument. Further examination of the Epicurean texts will illustrate that 
multiple strands of death-related anxiety are addressed by the Epicureans in their commitment to 







III. Fighting Fear: A Holistic Approach 
The Epicureans have thus far successfully addressed the fears of being dead and of dying. 
However, two crucial death-related concerns remain: the fear of mortality and the fear of 
premature death. Each of these fears presents a very different challenge for the Epicureans. 
Neither is preoccupied with pain or the state of being dead, but rather the prospect of death. It is 
therefore of paramount importance that the Epicureans are able to address each of these fears, as 
they pose a serious threat to one’s ἀταραξία and εὐδαιμονία.  
I will first examine the arguments against the fear of mortality. The Symmetry Argument 
was criticised for not encompassing this concern. However, it will quickly become apparent that 
this fear is not overlooked by the Epicureans. The discussion surrounding the fear of mortality 
also brings to light a potential issue regarding consistency, namely that the arguments against 
fearing death rely on recalled and anticipated pleasures, which appears to be at odds with 
hedonism. I will seek to defend the Epicureans from both ancient and modern critics who accuse 
them of such inherent contradiction. I will then turn to the arguments against the fear of 
premature death. These arguments are embedded within Epicurean hedonist doctrine and they 
broadly seek to demonstrate that the quality of one’s life is not determined by its length. Three 
key claims are identified: that pleasure is independent of time, that a ‘complete’ life is likewise 
irrespective of temporal duration, and that endless time (immortality) is inherently undesirable. I 
will conclude that the Epicurean cure for the fears of mortality and premature death is to embrace 





The Fear of Mortality 
The fear that one is going to die, or the fear of mortality, is distinct from both the fear of being 
dead and the fear of the process of dying. It is fear in response to the inevitable prospect of one’s 
death. While one may remain entirely untroubled by the imminence of death and dying, armed 
with the knowledge that neither of these occurrences will cause any harm, one may still consider 
one’s own mortality with trepidation. Being disturbed by the finite nature and uncertain length of 
one’s own existence is therefore a genuine threat to one’s happiness. Indeed, it may represent an 
even greater danger than the fears of death and dying, which are dispelled comparatively easily 
by removing the possibility of pain. As has been demonstrated, the Symmetry Argument is not 
designed to confront the fear of mortality. If this was all that was to offer, then critics would be 
correct in identifying the absence of an argument against the fear of mortality as a yawning gap 
in the Epicurean attempt to eradicate death-related anxiety. However, a wider examination of 
Epicurean texts beyond Lucretius’ Symmetry Argument will demonstrate that the fear of 
mortality is indeed both acknowledged and addressed within Epicurean ethical theory.  
  
Addressing the Fear of Future Non-Being  
In pursuit of an Epicurean argument against the fear of mortality, both Warren and Furley steer 
our attention towards Epicurus’ Letter to Menoeceus, in which he expounds his ethical theory.124 
The following passage is of particular relevance: 
ὥστε μάταιος ὁ λέγων δεδιέναι τὸν θάνατον οὐχ ὅτι λυπήσει παρών, ἀλλ’ ὅτι λυπεῖ μέλλων. ὃ γὰρ 
παρὸν οὐκ ἐνοχλεῖ, προσδοκώμενον κενῶς λυπεῖ. 
 
 




Foolish, therefore, is the man who says that he fears death, not because it will pain when it comes, 
but because it pains in the prospect. Whatsoever causes no annoyance when it is present, causes 
only a groundless pain in the expectation. 
Ep. Men. 125 
 
This passage is very explicitly concerned with present attitudes. Warren appeals to this passage 
as somewhat of a ‘missing link’ between his two versions of the Symmetry Argument. Version 1 
demonstrates that both pre-natal and post-mortem non-existence are symmetrical in terms of 
experience. Conversely, Version 2 states that our present attitudes towards pre-natal and post-
mortem non-existence are symmetrical. As has been established, Lucretius’ Symmetry Argument 
sought to demonstrate Version 1, while advocating for the adoption of Version 2. That is, 
because the experience of non-existence is the same before birth and after death (Version 1), we 
ought to presently have the same lack of concern for post-mortem non-existence as we do for 
pre-natal non-existence (Version 2). Version 1 can therefore be used as a premise for Version 2. 
Warren is able to demonstrate that this is precisely the intention of Epicurus, by deriving the 
following principle from the above passage: 
Whatever causes no pain when present, causes only empty distress when anticipated. 
Warren (2004), 101 
 
Warren also calls attention to the closeness between the two verb-and-participle phrases λυπήσει 
παρών (present pain) and λυπεῖ μέλλων (anticipated pain), which, he suggests, is designed to 
carefully erode the distinction between the two. Transitioning between the two phrases is purely 
a matter of tense: the verb must change between present and future, and the participle must 
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change from ‘present’ to ‘anticipated’.125 This serves to reinforce Epicurus’ message that the 
only difference is timing, and that any fear for a future event which will not cause pain when 
present is based on false understanding. Warren then lays out the full argument against fearing 
mortality, using his principle to bridge the gap between Versions 1 and 2: 126 
Version 1: Our post-mortem non-existence will be nothing to us after our 
death. 
Ep. Men. 125: Whatever causes no pain when present, causes only empty distress 
when anticipated. 
Therefore: Since death causes no pain when present, it causes only empty 
distress when anticipated (and empty distress is no real distress at 
all). 
Conclusion (Version 2): Looking forward from within a lifetime, our post-mortem non-
existence is nothing to us.  
 
 
This is an elegant solution to the issue that Lucretius’ Symmetry Argument does not offer any 
consolation for the anticipatory fear of death. The Symmetry Argument is simply intended to 
offer persuasive force to the central claim that death cannot harm the one who dies. The 
Epicureans also posit generally that it is foolish to fear presently that which will not cause any 
harm in the future. These two principles work together to illustrate the Epicurean attitude to 
mortality: because death will not cause harm, there is no reason to fear it now. When the 
Symmetry Argument is viewed as one argument amongst many in a holistic ethical framework, it 
becomes apparent that the Epicureans were not neglecting the fear of mortality.  
Furley also recognises the significance of Epicurus’ attitude towards unnecessary 
anticipatory fear. However, rather than using it in conjunction with Lucretius’ Symmetry 
Argument, Furley understands it as one of the key premises in Epicurus’ original argument that 
 
125 Warren (2004), 102. 
126 Warren (2004), 103. 
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‘death is nothing to us’. He lays out the structure of the argument as follows, drawing solely 
from Epicurus’ Letter to Menoeceus: 
I. Nothing is good or bad for a man except what stimulates his feelings (of pleasure or 
pain).  
II. The dead feel nothing. 
III. Hence nothing is good or bad for one who is dead. 
IV. Hence his state of being dead is not (good or) bad for one who is dead. 
V. But if a thing is not bad when it is present, there is no rational ground, at any previous 
time, for fear of its future presence. 
VI. Hence no living person has any rational ground for fear of his future state of being dead. 
 
Furley’s presentation of Epicurus’ argument clearly situates any death-related fear in the present, 
thereby counteracting both the fear of death and the fear of mortality simultaneously.127 This 
supports Warren’s demonstration that the Epicureans did indeed strive to relieve the fear of 
mortality, despite this not being encapsulated by Lucretius’ Symmetry Argument. However, 
unlike Warren, Furley does not use this principle to supplement the Symmetry Argument. Rather, 
he presents it simply as a claim that is made by Epicurus and demonstrates that Lucretius did in 
fact echo this himself in his own writings.  
Furley focuses on a small section of Book III in De Rerum Natura, between the two key 
passages in which Lucretius develops his Symmetry Argument (D.R.N 3.832-842; 3.972-975). 
After reiterating that our ‘selves’ comprise both body and soul (D.R.N 3.843-6), Lucretius 
explores the notion that, given the infinity of time, our specific configuration of atoms has in the 
past and will again in the future be reassembled exactly as it is now. Yet, this has no impact on 
us, due to the interruption of memory and therefore self. Lucretius then states the following:128 
 
 
127 Nussbaum (1994), 201-202, presents a very similar construction of Epicurus’ argument. Cf. Warren (2004), 41. 
128 This passage was also discussed in Chapter I as evidence for the crucial role that memory plays in the Epicurean 
sense of ‘self’.  
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nec, si materiem nostrum collegerit aestas  
post obitum rursimque redegerit ut sita nunc est,  
atque iterum nobis fuerint data lumina vitae,  
pertineat quicquam tamen ad nos id quoque factum,  
interrupta semel cum sit repetentia nostri.  
et nunc nil ad nos de nobis attinet, ante  
qui fuimus, neque iam de illis nos adficit angor.  
nam cum respicias immensi temporis omne  
praeteritum spatium, tum motus materiai  
multimodi quam sint, facile hoc adcredere possis,  
semina saepe in eodem, ut nunc sunt, ordine posta  
nec memori tamen id quimus reprehendere mente;  
inter enim iectast vitai pausa. 
 
Even if time should gather together our matter after death and bring it back again as it is now 
placed, and if once more the light of life should be given to us, yet it would not matter one bit to 
us that even this had been done, when the recollection of ourselves has been broken asunder. And 
even now we are not concerned about any self which we have been before, nor does any anguish 
about it now touch us. For when you look back upon all the past expanse of measureless time, and 
think how various are the motions of matter, you may easily come to believe that these same 
seeds of which now we consist have been often before placed in the same arrangement they now 




Using this passage, Furley attributes to Lucretius another argument that derives symmetry, which 
explicitly concerns present attitudes rather than the experience of non-existence.129 Lucretius 
introduces the idea that we ought not to be concerned about future existences (characterised by 
the reassembly of the atoms which constitute our present body and soul) because we will have no 
memory of any time prior to such a future existence.130 He reinforces this by pointing out the fact 
that we cannot presently recall past existences, and thus they cause us no distress when we look 
 
129 Furley (1986), 77.  
130 Lucretius’ exploration of past and future lives is hypothetical. The belief in reincarnation is entirely incompatible 
with the Epicurean outlook on life and death. The interruption of memory is crucial here: when our atoms inevitably 
reassemble, they create an identical likeness of ‘us’, but ‘we’ do not come back into existence. It is likely that 
Lucretius’ use of the pronouns nostrum, nobis, nos, and nostri in this passage is to demonstrate that the reassembly 
of ‘our’ atomic configuration does not affect the present ‘us’ in any way. See Chapter I for an examination of the 
Epicurean conception of ‘self’.  
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back (respicias). While this passage creates symmetry between past and future existences, it is 
the non-existence (the dissolution of our atomic composition) between potential lives that is the 
focal point of any distress. This passage therefore does what Lucretius’ ‘mirror analogy’ (D.R.N. 
3.972-975) appears to do but does not: establish symmetry between present attitudes towards 
past and future non-existence. The methodology here seems to be similar to that of the Symmetry 
Argument. The construction of a parallel is designed to provide additional persuasive support for 
a pre-established principle. In the case of the Symmetry Argument, this principle was that ‘death 
is nothing to us’, whereas this particular passage reinforces the claim that it is irrational to fear 
non-existence during one’s life. Furley’s conclusion is simply that this provides evidence for 
Lucretius’ concern for present attitudes towards fearing death, as this is not found in the 
Symmetry Argument.131 He makes no assessment of how this passage may counter the fear of 
mortality. However, it seems clear that Furley’s interpretation of this passage demonstrates that, 
just as the fear of being dead is deemed to be irrational within the Epicurean ethical framework, 
so too is fearing now that one is going to die.  
Furley and Warren have each identified arguments embedded in Epicurean ethical theory 
that are aimed at countering the fear of mortality. The arguments build on the key doctrine that 
‘death is nothing to us’. The Symmetry Argument supports this claim and serves to undermine 
fears concerned with the potential pain of being dead and of the dying process. It is becoming 
increasingly clear that the Epicurean arguments are not intended to function by themselves. In 
particular, the Symmetry Argument is not designed to encapsulate the entire Epicurean stance 
against fearing death. Rather, each argument is one part of a whole. Thus far, the fears of being 
 
131 Furley (1986), 77.  
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dead, of dying, and of mortality are all clearly addressed when the Epicurean arguments are 
viewed holistically.  
This holistic approach is very effective, but it must be absolutely watertight if it is going 
to succeed. Each argument is reliant on underlying principles, so any apparent contradiction 
within the Epicurean approach could cause the entire philosophy to collapse. The above 
arguments against the fear of death have been met with the accusation that they are inconsistent 
with Epicurean hedonism, as they rely on accepting the validity of pleasure and pain that is 
temporally removed from present experience.132 The Epicureans must therefore demonstrate that 
their hedonist principles are compatible with their arguments against fearing death. To do so, 
they must justify the role of temporally distant pains and pleasures in their hedonist framework; 
that is, pains and pleasures that are recalled or anticipated.  
 
Recollection and Anticipation   
While the Symmetry Argument focuses on the fear of being dead, by addressing the experience 
of non-existence (or rather, lack thereof), the Epicureans also have clear arguments that address 
the anticipatory concern of mortality. They were therefore far from oblivious to concerns outside 
of one’s present experience. However, a potentially damaging issue for Epicurus’ holistic ethical 
framework is the questionable validity of pleasure or pain that is temporally distant from present 
experience. In other words, there is the concern that any pleasurable feeling resulting from 
anticipation or recollection is not a ‘true’ experienced pleasure. If this were the case, the 
 
132 Specifically, the argument against the fear of dying (and advice on how to overcome pain generally) rests on the 
strength of recalled pleasure. In turn, the arguments against the fear of mortality are reliant on adopting anticipatory 
feelings in the present (i.e. the absence of pain in the future means an absence of fear in the present). Recalled and 
anticipatory feelings must be considered ‘real’ in the present for these arguments to maintain cogency.  
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Epicurean position would be weakened owing to inconsistencies between their arguments against 
death and their basic hedonist principles.  
Cicero was a notable ancient objector to Epicurean hedonism on these grounds.133 He was 
very dismissive of Epicurus’ claim to have overcome the physical pain of his dying days by 
recalling pleasurable memories (D.L. 10.22). The implication of Cicero’s criticism is that 
Epicurus’ reassurances against the evil of death are actually undermined by his hedonism: 
Audi, ne longe abeam, moriens quid dicat Epicurus, ut intellegas facta eius cum dictis discrepare: 
‘Epicurus Hermarcho S. cum ageremus’, inquit, ‘vitae beatum et eundem supremum diem, 
scribebamus haec. Tanti aderant vesicae et torminum morbi ut nihil ad eorum magnitudinem 
posset accedere.’ Miserum hominem! Si dolor summum malum est, dici aliter non potest. Sed 
audiamus ipsum. ‘Compensabatur’, inquit, ‘tamen cum his omnibus animi laetitia quae capiebam 
memoria rationum inventorumque nostrorum.’ 
But I must not digress too far. Let me repeat the dying words of Epicurus, to prove to you the 
discrepancy between his practice and his principles: ‘Epicurus to Hermarchus, greeting. I write 
these words,’ he says, ‘on the happiest, and the last, day of my life. I am suffering from diseases 
of the bladder and intestines, which are of the utmost possible severity.’ Unhappy creature! If 
pain is the Chief Evil, that is the only thing to be said. But let us hear his own words. ‘Yet all my 
sufferings,’ he continues, ‘are counterbalanced by the joy which I derive from remembering my 
theories and discoveries.’ 
Cic. Fin. 2.96 
 
Epicurus’ death scene showcases the primary Epicurean defence against fearing the pain of 
dying, which is the notion that mental pleasure can override physical pain, and that one can 
generate mental pleasure through recollection. Cicero clearly judges this to be impractical, 
claiming that since Epicurus is in pain, and pain is the ultimate evil according to hedonism, the 
only reasonable conclusion (from an Epicurean standpoint)134 is that Epicurus is in a rather 
 
133 Cicero’s anti-hedonist arguments, especially in De Finibus, are examined in detail by Morel (2016), 77-95 and 
Warren (2016), 41-76. See also Inwood (1990), 143-164. 
134 Cicero’s own position is stoic, which considers strength of mind that endures pain as no evil at all. 
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lamentable situation. Certainly, it seems a stretch to argue that the mere memory of a positive 
experience could overpower considerable physical pain.  
The dubious nature of recalled pleasure also throws into doubt the validity of pleasure felt 
in anticipation of some positive experience. If the thing that is generating the feeling of pleasure 
has not actually happened yet, it may be that the feeling of pleasure is ‘empty’ or ‘false’. Even 
more damning would be if that which is generating pleasure does not actually happen as 
anticipated. In that case, the feeling of pleasure would be groundless in retrospect, and the pain 
of disappointment may result. Cicero also highlights this issue, again demonstrating what he 
deems to be an inconsistency: in this case between the Epicurean argument that ‘death is nothing 
to us’ (either when it happens or in anticipation) and the practice of writing wills:  
Quaero etiam quid sit quod cum dissolutione, id est morte, sensus omnis exstinguatur, et cum 
reliqui nihil sit omnino quod pertineat ad nos, tam accurate tamque diligenter caveat et sanciat ‘ut 
Amynomachus et Timocrates, heredes sui, de Hermarchi sententia dent quod satis sit ad diem 
agendum natalem suum quotannis mense Gamelione, itemque omnibus mensibus vicesimo die 
lunae dent ad eorum epulas qui una secum philosophati sint, ut et sui et Metrodori memoria 
colatur.’ 
What I want to know is this: if all sensation is annihilated by dissolution, that is, by death, and if 
nothing whatever that can affect us remains, why is it that he makes such precise and careful 
provision and stipulation ‘that his heirs, Amynochus and Timocrates, shall after consultation with 
Hermarchus assign a sufficient sum to celebrate his birthday every year in the month of Gamelion, 
and also on the twentieth day of every month shall assign a sum for a banquet to his fellow 
students in philosophy, in order to keep alive the memory of himself and of Metrodorus’? 
Cic. Fin. 2.101 
 
Cicero’s account of Epicurus’ will echoes that which is preserved by Diogenes Laertius (D.L. 
10.16-21).135 Cicero takes issue with Epicurus’ decision to leave a will as it conveys a concern 
 
135 Diogenes’ preservation is generally agreed to be genuine; see Warren (2004), 162-163. Epicurus’ will details his 
instructions for his personal property, the running of his philosophical school, his funeral arrangements, and the 
manumission of several slaves. 
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for post-mortem affairs despite Epicurus’ claim that one completely ceases to exist after death. 
Epicurus’ argument against the fear of mortality seems to be working against him here: why be 
concerned about something now if it cannot impact you when it occurs? 
There is some debate in modern scholarship concerning the validity of Cicero’s criticism. 
Warren is notably insistent that Cicero is correct in his assertion that the act of writing wills is 
simply inconsistent with Epicurus’ central ethical theory.136 Warren frames a will as an insurance 
against potential post-mortem harm, which betrays a concern for one’s well-being after death.137 
This concern cannot be held in conjunction with a genuine belief that ‘death is nothing to us’. 
Warren considers and quickly dismisses a defence of writing wills by Callahan: 
The vast majority of us are greatly comforted now to know that after our deaths the law can be 
used to contribute to the good of the persons and the causes we care about. If maintaining this 
fiction of harm and wrong to the dead in our legal institutions is the most effective way of 
securing this comfort…then keeping them is exceedingly well justified.  
Callahan 1987, 352 
 
Callahan’s argument seeks to shift the concern from post-mortem affairs to present affairs: he 
asserts that we write wills in order to secure comfort in the present, and thus the benefit of the 
will is ante-mortem rather than post-mortem. This does not satisfy Warren, who rightly 
maintains that this does not resolve the inconsistency between writing wills and the belief that it 
is irrational to fear that in the future which cannot hurt when it occurs. If one is genuinely 
convinced that one cannot exist post-mortem, then there is no rational reason for any concern in 
the present.138  
 
136 Warren (2004), 163-199. See also Warren (2001c).  
137 Warren (2004), 168-169.  
138 Warren (2004), 170-172.  
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Warren claims that there are two possible ways in which one could justify Epicurean 
will-writing, which are worth quoting in full: 
1. He can try to find some sense in which the Epicurean can take present pleasure in 
contemplating positive post-mortem events which does not suggest that he can also be 
adversely affected by negative post-mortem events. 
 
2. He can try to argue that the pleasures promoted by a will, although not the testator’s own, 
provide sufficient justification for an Epicurean will-writer. 
  
Warren 2004, 173-174  
 
Warren rejects both of these options. He denies the former on the grounds that while it may 
justify contemplating the future, it does not justify writing a will in order to actively influence 
the future. Contemplation may induce a valid pleasurable experience in the present, but writing 
the will is still contradictory to the sincere belief that one cannot be impacted by the enactment 
of said will. To put it another way, if the contemplation of caring for one’s loved ones after death 
is pleasant, then contemplation is all that is necessary. Writing a will does not add anything to 
that pleasurable experience, because the enactment of the will occurs after one is beyond the 
capability of experiencing pleasure.139 Warren also denies the latter option, for the simple reason 
that such an altruistic motivation is incompatible with the inherently egoistic nature of Epicurean 
hedonism. 140  One final defence of Epicurean will-making that Warren considers is cultural 
context. He suggests that Epicurus’ will is not determined by his philosophy, but rather by 
Athenian property and inheritance law which would impact the existence of his philosophical 
school after his death.141 Why this would be considered a rational justification for post-mortem 
concern (while providing for loved ones isn’t) is unclear. Warren’s argument has thus far been 
 
139 Warren (2004), 174-177.  
140 Warren (2004), 180-186. He does, however, acknowledge the evidence for Epicurean advocation for some 
seemingly altruistic acts, such as dying for a friend (D.L. 10.120).  
141 Warren (2004), 191.  
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that Epicurus would have no reason to care about the living world after his own death, since he 
will not be part of it. The security of his philosophical school would surely also be 
inconsequential to Epicurus, according to this understanding.  
At first glance, Cicero’s criticisms – around which Warren builds a robust case against 
Epicurean will-making – appear to genuinely undermine the cogency of the Epicurean arguments. 
However, it is entirely possible for an Epicurean to demonstrate that their hedonism is 
constructed specifically to allow for feelings of pleasure and pain outside of present experience 
without compromising any of their established arguments against the fear of death. Furthermore, 
contrary to Warren’s argument, the Epicurean model of friendship allows for concern of loved 
ones beyond strict egoism, meaning that an Epicurean can legitimately act to preserve the 
interests of loved ones after their own death.  
It must never be forgotten that the Epicureans’ ethical theory rests entirely on their 
physical theory. This dictates that the nature of the world is atomic, and that everything is 
physically composed of atoms (Ep. Hdt. 40-41). Sensation is thereby the only truly reliable 
measure of phenomena, meaning that if something is felt, then it must be ‘true’ (Ep. Hdt. 31-32; 
Kyria Doxa 23). Epicurean philosophy therefore does not allow for ‘false’ pleasures, because 
any sensation of pleasure must be a physical and indisputable experience. 142  To recall a 
pleasurable occurrence is to re-experience it quite literally.143 Likewise, any pleasure that is felt 
in anticipation of something good is a genuine feeling in the moment, regardless of when that 
something is actually realised. Even if that something never happened, it could not invalidate the 
 
142 Even a feeling of pleasure resulting from something entirely hypothetical, such as a daydream, would be a 
physical and genuine feeling. However, an Epicurean might advise that one avoids daydreaming lest it lead to 
disappointment or idleness.  
143 Interestingly, this is not at odds with modern thinking on the subject: when we recall memories, we reactivate 
particular neurological pathways and release corresponding chemicals to incite an emotional response. In this sense, 
recalling a memory is a very physical process and produces very real emotional reactions.  
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anticipatory pleasure, as that is felt at the prospect of the thing, while the occurrence of the thing 
would generate a novel and different feeling of pleasure (and if it did not occur, a new feeling of 
pain).144   
This foundational physical theory allows the Epicureans not only to accept temporally 
distant pleasures, but also to advocate for them when appropriate. Epicurus promoted forgoing 
short-term pleasure that might ultimately lead to pain, as well as choosing to endure pain that 
would eventuate in pleasure:145  
ταύτην γὰρ ἀγαθὸν πρῶτον καὶ συγγενικὸν ἔγνωμεν, καὶ ἀπὸ ταύτης καταρχόμεθα πάσης 
αἱρέσεως καὶ φυγῆς καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτην καταντῶμεν ὡς κανόνι τῷ πάθει πᾶν ἀγαθὸν κρίνοντες. καὶ 
ἐπεὶ πρῶτον ἀγαθὸν τοῦτο καὶ σύμφυτον, διὰ τοῦτο καὶ οὐ πᾶσαν ἡδονὴν αἱρούμεθα, ἀλλ’ ἔστιν 
ὅτε πολλὰς ἡδονὰς ὑπερβαίνομεν, ὅταν πλεῖον ἡμῖν τὸ δυσχερὲς ἐκ τούτων ἕπηται· καὶ πολλὰς 
ἀλγηδόνας ἡδονῶν κρείττους νομίζομεν, ἐπειδὰν μείζων ἡμῖν ἡδονὴ παρακολουθῇ πολὺν χρόνον 
ὑπομείνασι τὰς ἀλγηδόνας. Πᾶσα οὖν ἡδονὴ διὰ τὸ φύσιν ἔχειν οἰκείαν ἀγαθόν, οὐ πᾶσα κακόν, 
οὐ πᾶσα δὲ ἀεὶ φευκτὴ πεφυκυῖα.  
Pleasure is our first and kindred good. It is the starting-point of every choice and of every 
aversion, and to it we come back, inasmuch as we make feeling the rule by which to judge every 
good thing. And since pleasure is our first and native good, for that reason we do not choose 
every pleasure whatsoever, but ofttimes pass over many pleasures when a greater annoyance 
ensues from them. And ofttimes we consider pains superior to pleasures when submission to the 
pains for a long time brings us as a consequence a greater pleasure. While therefore all pleasure 
because it is naturally akin to us is good, not all pleasure is choiceworthy, just as all pain is an 
evil and yet not all pain is to be shunned.  
Ep. Men. 129 
 
Epicurus’ particular brand of hedonism is evidently not limited to the ‘here and now’ as some 
other forms of hedonism are.146 It is entirely possible and indeed rational to draw feelings of 
 
144 Naturally, if an anticipated pleasurable experience did not occur, one would feel disappointed, but this would not 
eliminate the earlier feeling of anticipatory pleasure. The Epicurean defence against this kind of disappointment is of 
course to be very selective of one’s desires in the first place, so as to minimise the possibility of disappointment. It is 
paramount that an Epicurean plans their life such that they are not at the mercy of avoidable pains. 
145 Cf. Sent. Vat. 73.  
146 For instance, the Cyrenaics are known to prioritise present pleasures (D.L. 2.66). See Warren (2001b) for a 
comparison between Epicurean and Cyrenaic hedonism, esp. 164-169.  
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pleasure from memory or from future possibility. As such, the act of planning for something to 
occur in the future which presently gives one pleasure is completely reasonable. The term ‘plan’ 
is key here: one must use reasonable evidence to evaluate the likelihood of future possibilities 
and act to ensure the best outcome.  
Of course, as Warren has emphasised, it would be irrational to plan (in terms of both 
contemplation and action) for a time in one’s future when one will not exist, even if the act of 
planning is itself pleasurable. However, this is only the case if the beneficiary of such a plan is 
perceived to be oneself.147 In the case of a will, those who benefit from it are loved ones, who are 
understood to persist after one’s own death. Warren is dubious of any motivation that purely 
concerns the well-being of other people and not oneself, owing to Epicurean hedonism. He 
argues that a genuinely altruistic act cannot be reconciled with a system in which one’s own 
pleasure is the τέλος of every action.148 However, a model of other-regarding behaviour proposed 
by Algra demonstrates that Epicurean hedonism is not as strictly egoistic as interpreted by 
Warren. While Warren presents a dichotomy between the two discrete options of ‘egoism’ and 
‘altruism’, Algra offers something of a middle ground, which he dubs the model of ‘social 
appropriation’. It can be summed up as follows: 
It involved the notion that others – or at least some others – are regarded as belonging to us, that 
their wishes and interests, and their happiness and pain, are regarded as our own. According to 
this model of ‘social appropriation’, certain forms of interpersonal relations – family relations, 
but also what we would call friendship or love, i.e. roughly the kinds of relations covered by the 
Greek noun philia – develop in such a way that the parties involved come to regard those they 
love no longer as individuals whose interests can be weighed off against, or be treated as 
instrumental to, one’s own: they rather look upon these others as fellow members of a community, 
as belonging to, or even part of, their own life: hence people rejoice in their friends’ joy and 
 
147 Post-mortem concerns that are entirely related to oneself, such as the wellbeing of one’s corpse, are completely 
irrational for the Epicureans. Philodemus argues against such concerns throughout his treatise On Death.  
148 This apparent tension in Epicurean ethics has been widely discussed in modern scholarship, particularly in terms 
of the value of friendship. See Annas (1993), Armstrong (1997), Cooper (1999), O’Keefe (2001b), White (2002), 
and Woolf (2004). For a discussion of other-regarding behaviour in the context of education, see McConnell (2015).  
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grieve with their friends’ grief. One might say that, from the morally relevant perspective, in such 
relations the boundary between the self and the other gets blurred. 
Algra 2003, 268-269 
 
Algra’s model essentially expands the sense of self to include those whom one loves. He 
develops this argument from an analysis of Epicurean texts on friendship,149 which suggest that 
while the early stages of friendship rest on a model of reciprocity, the relationship develops 
further with the model of social appropriation.150 The well-being and interests of loved ones 
become entangled with one’s own. Acting to ensure the well-being of a loved one is therefore 
not a subordination of one’s own interests, and as such, is not incompatible with hedonism.   
This model of social appropriation provides key justification for Epicurean will-writing. 
As Callahan initially suggested, the time at which the will-writer experiences pleasure is in the 
present, during the writing of the will. This is an anticipatory pleasure at the reasonable 
expectation of loved ones being cared for after the will-writer’s own death. The anticipatory 
pleasure is ‘real’ in the sense that it is a physical sensation that is exclusive to the present act of 
writing the will. The perceived subject of the pleasure resulting from the enactment of the will is 
the loved ones of the deceased. The will-writer is acting in their own interest and affording 
themselves pleasure by planning for the benefit of loved ones whose well-being is intimately 
bound up with their own, while fully aware that this benefit will not impact themselves in the 
 
149 Such as: Sent. Vat. 61; Kyria Doxa 39; Cic. Fin. 1.67; D.L. 10.120. See especially Sent. Vat. 23 (translation by 
Inwood & Gerson, 1994): πᾶσα φιλία δι’ ἑαυτὴν ἀρετή, ἀρχὴν δὲ εἴληφεν ἀπὸ τῆς ὠφελείας; Every friendship is 
worth choosing for its own sake, though it takes its origin from the benefits [it confers on us]. This translation uses 
Usener’s emendation of αἱρετή for ἀρετή, which Inwood & Gerson (1994), 37, regard as all but certain, although 
this is contended by Brown (2002), 68-69. 
150 Algra (2003), 281-282.  
87 
 
future at all.151 Evidently, writing a will is an act that promotes one’s own pleasure before one 
dies, while greatly reducing any anxiety concerning the well-being of loved ones after one’s own 
death.  
Writing a will may also contribute to the well-being of loved ones (and therefore oneself) 
in the present, before one’s death, as it may be considered an act of generosity. It would provide 
a demonstration of friendship and care towards one’s loved ones before death.152 Epicurus was 
hailed for his generous character, both generally in terms of his motivation for philosophical 
teaching and specifically in relation to his will (D.L. 10.9-11). Generously bequeathing one’s 
possessions to others would also illustrate a healthy detachment from material worth. Indeed, 
Philodemus wrote that leaving a will is evidence of commitment to the Epicurean claim that 
‘death is nothing to us’:  
ἀλλ’ ἐοίκασι διὰ τὸ φιλόζωον 
ἐκ τοῦ πεφρικέναι τὸν θάνατον, οὐ 
διὰ τὸ βιοῦν ἡδεως, καὶ τὰς ἐπιβολὰσ 
τὰς ἐπ’ αὐτὸν ἐξωθεῖν, εἶθ’ ὅταν ἐναρ- 
γὴς αὐτοῦ γένηται θεωρία, παράδο- 
ξος αὐτοῖς ὑποπίπτει, παρ’ ἣν αἰτίαν 
οὐδὲ διαθήκας ὑπομένοντες γράφεσ- 
θαι περικατάληπτοι γίνονται καὶ δι- 
ξυμφορεῖν ἀναγκάζονται 
 
But because of an attachment to life that results from being frightened of death, not because they 
live pleasantly, they seem even to banish applications of the mind to it; then when observation of 
it becomes distinct, it comes to them as a paradoxical thing, for which reason, being unable to 
bear even to write a will, they are overtaken and surrounded, and are forced to bear a double 
burden of misfortune.  
Phil. De Morte. 39.6-14. 
 
151 This remains the case even if a deceased individual’s will is not executed according to their instructions. This 
would not impact the deceased because they no longer exist. It is also not necessary for someone to witness the 
result of their positive action in order for them to feel pleasure. The pleasure that is felt by the individual themselves 
is not through the act of executing the will, but the act of creating the will before their death.  
152 Assuming, of course, that one shares the details of one’s will with those to whom it pertains.  
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Cicero’s criticism that writing a will is inconsistent with the Epicurean claim that ‘death 
is nothing to us’ therefore does not hold up to scrutiny. Warren’s additional concern that altruism 
and hedonism are incompatible in the Epicurean framework is assuaged by examining 
interpersonal relationships beyond the overly reductive dichotomy between ‘egoism’ and 
‘altruism’. The act of writing a will is compatible with the Epicurean values of pleasure and 
friendship. It is a presently pleasurable action to undertake which does not rely on a post-mortem 
subject. 
Epicurean hedonism is fundamentally tied into their arguments against fearing death. Far 
from undermining the claim that ‘death is nothing to us’, the frugal and temporally independent 
nature of Epicurean pleasure is designed to reduce the pain of death-related anxiety and increase 
the ease of living a pleasant life. This becomes ever more apparent when examining the final 
major hurdle for Epicurean death therapy: the fear of dying prematurely. Having effectively 
combatted the fear of dying painfully, the fear of non-existence, and the fear of mortality, the 
Epicureans must address the concern that death may cut one’s life short, in order to successfully 
eradicate death anxiety. 
 
The Fear of Premature Death 
The fear of premature death creates an altogether different challenge for the Epicureans. This is 
the fear that one is going to die ‘too soon’, resulting in life being ‘cut short’. It is therefore 
preoccupied with the shape and content of one’s life rather than the nature of one’s death. As 




We have seen that the Epicurean strategy for eliminating the fears of death, dying, and 
mortality commences with targeting the underlying ‘false belief’ that informs the fear, and this 
case is no different. In order to address the fear of premature death, the Epicureans attempt to 
alter the preconception of what constitutes a ‘complete’ life. In essence, they seek to dissociate 
the duration of time from any notion of pleasure or fulfilment, with the conclusion that a life 
cannot be ‘cut short’ if the measure of a good life is independent of temporal duration. The 
Epicureans argue that more time does not allow for greater pleasure, that a ‘complete’ life is not 
determined by the length of a life, and that infinite time would in fact be undesirable. Each of 
these arguments will be examined in turn.  
 
Time and the Maximisation of Pleasure 
Epicurus is very explicit in his claim that greater time does not equate to greater pleasure. This 
seems to be a rather strange assertion for one so committed to hedonism. One would assume that 
a hedonist would prefer to experience pleasure for a longer amount of time than for a shorter 
amount of time. However, this assumption implies that value is dependent on time, and Epicurus 
rejects this concept: 
<ὁ δὲ σοφὸς οὔτε παραιτεῖται τὸ ζῆν> οὔτε φοβεῖται τὸ μὴ ζῆν· οὔτε γὰρ αὐτῷ προσίσταται 
τὸ ζῆν οὔτε δοξάζεται κακόν εἶναί τι τὸ μὴ ζῆν. ὥσπερ δὲ τὸ σιτίον οὐ τὸ πλεῖστον πάντως 
ἀλλὰ τὸ ἥδιστον αἱρεῖται, οὕτω καὶ χρόνον οὐ τὸν μήκιστον ἀλλὰ τὸν ἥδιστον καρπίζεται. 
 
The wise man does not deprecate life nor does he fear the cessation of life. The thought of life 
is no offence to him, nor is the cessation of life regarded as an evil. And even as men choose 
of food not merely and simply the larger portion, but the more pleasant, so the wise seek to 
enjoy the time which is most pleasant and not merely that which is longest. 
 




For the Epicureans, it is the pleasantness of the time that determines the value of that time, as 
opposed to the amount of time that determines the value of the pleasure. The analogy of 
choosing a greater quality of food over a greater quantity emphasises the point that the fulfilment 
of one’s life (and one’s stomach) is achieved through a greater degree of pleasure rather than 
time. The length of one’s life is therefore far less significant in comparison to how pleasurable it 
is. 
The obvious objection to this argument is that a larger amount of time – while not itself a 
measure of value – would nevertheless afford one the opportunity and the potential for more 
pleasure. It would act as a means to an end, the end being the most pleasure possible in one 
lifetime. A shorter amount of time would appear to limit the chance for obtaining pleasure, and it 
is most likely that one would choose a longer pleasant life over a shorter pleasant life. This 
concern is voiced by Cicero:  
At enim, quemadmodum tute dicebas, negat Epicurus ne diuturnitatem quidem temporis ad beate 
vivendum aliquid afferre, nec minorem voluptatem percipi in brevitate temporis quam si illa sit 
sempiterna. Haec dicuntur inconstantissime. Cum enim summum bonum in voluptate ponat, negat 
infinito tempore aetatis voluptatem fieri maiorem quam finite atque modico…qui autem voluptate 
vitam effici beatam putabit, qui sibi is conveniet si negabit voluptatem crescere longinquitate?  
It may be rejoined that Epicurus, as you yourself were saying, maintains that long duration cannot 
add anything to happiness, and that as much pleasure is enjoyed in a brief span of time as if 
pleasure were everlasting. In this he is grossly inconsistent. He places the Chief Good in pleasure, 
and yet he says that no greater pleasure would result from a lifetime of endless duration than from 
a limited and moderate period…But if one thinks that happiness is produced by pleasure, how can 
he consistently deny that pleasure is increased by duration? 
Cic. Fin. 2.87-88 
 
A response to this can be found in the Epicurean definition of pleasure. Of the two types of 
pleasure that are recognised by the Epicureans, katastematic (καταστηματικός) is the superior. 
Katastematic pleasure refers to the state of having one’s desires fulfilled, while the other type of 
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pleasure, kinetic (κίνησις), refers to the active process of fulfilling one’s desires (D.L. 10.136).153 
The achievement of katastematic pleasure is to experience ataraxia (ἀταραξία) and aponia 
(ἀπονία), that is, to be without want of anything and to be devoid of any pain, both of the mind 
and of the body. Epicurus’ third Kyria Doxa states that there can be no higher pleasure than 
this:154  
Ὅρος τοῦ μεγέθους τῶν ἡδονῶν ἡ παντὸς τοῦ ἀλγοῦντος ὑπεξαίρεσις. ὅπου δ’ ἂν τὸ ἡδόμενον 
ἐνῇ, καθ’ ὃν ἂν χρόνον ᾖ, οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ἀλγοῦν ἢ τὸ λυπούμενον ἢ τὸ συναμφότερον. 
 The magnitude of pleasure reaches its limit in the removal of all pain. When pleasure is present, 
so long as it is uninterrupted, there is no pain either of body or of mind or of both together. 
D.L. 10.139 
 
While pleasure may vary in nature, it cannot be increased beyond this state of painless 
tranquillity. Cicero further objects that it is inconsistent to claim that pain can increase while 
pleasure cannot,155 but this criticism also fails in light of the Epicurean understanding of pleasure. 
Katastematic pleasure is not the opposite of pain, but rather the absence of it.156 As such, more 
time would not amplify the amount of pleasure that one can experience.157 In other words, the 
Epicurean definition of absolute pleasure cannot accumulate and is not subject to temporal 
duration.158 Rosenbaum frames this in a most useful way: because katastematic pleasure is the 
 
153 See Chapter I. 
154 This is also mentioned by Cicero in Fin. 1.63: neque maiorem voluptatem ex infinito tempore aetatis percipi 
posse quam ex hoc percipiatur quod videamus esse finitum; ‘[He says that] no greater pleasure could be derived 
from a life of infinite duration than is actually afforded by this existence which we know to be finite.’  
155 Cic. Fin. 2.88. 
156 See also Rosenbaum (1990), 27-32.  
157 It also appears to be the case that more experience will also not increase pleasure (although it would create 
variety). This raises the concern that, once the greatest pleasure has been achieved, there is no longer any point in 
living. However, the Epicureans did not advocate for suicide, claiming that the wise man does not fear or seek death 
(Ep. Men. 126), and that anyone who finds reason for committing suicide is small-minded (Sent. Vat. 38). For 
modern discussions of suicide in Epicureanism see Cooper (1999), 515-541, and Englert (1994), 67-96. 
158 Lucretius does include a simile of a soul acting like a leaking vessel (D.R.N. 3.1003-1010), suggesting that one 
could store up past pleasures. This does not necessarily imply the accumulation of pleasure but rather supports the 
92 
 
greatest that one can experience, and this can be achieved in a very short span of time, then a 
shorter amount of time is all that is required in order to live the best life possible. Once 
happiness is achieved, it cannot be a reasonable motivation for wishing to extend one’s life.159 
While kinetic pleasure offers variation, it cannot produce greater pleasure than the absence of 
pain. It is certainly positive to experience, but not necessary to pursue. Therefore, while death 
could shorten your life, it would not be able to rob you of any potential pleasure that you 
otherwise would have experienced, because the height of potential pleasure has already been 
experienced with the achievement of ataraxia.160 Death could only limit the kinetic pleasure that 
one could experience, but this is secondary to katastematic pleasure and is not required for 
ataraxia.  
 This independent relationship between pleasure and time is also reiterated in Kyriai 
Doxai 19 and 20:161 
ὁ ἅπειρος χρόνος ἴσην ἕχει τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ ὁ πεπερασμένος, ἐάν τις αὐτῆς τὰ πέρατα 





argument that complete happiness is akin to ‘fullness’, and a leaky vessel can never be properly filled. See Görler 
(1997), 193-207. 
159 Rosenbaum (1990), 26. 
160  See Philodemus De Morte 38.14-19 (translation by Henry): [ὁ δὲ νοῦν ἔχων, ἀπειληφὼς ὃ δύναται πᾶν 
περιποιῆσαι τ]ὸ πρὸς εὐδαίμονα βίον αὔταρκες, εὐθὺς ἤδη τὸ λοιπὸν ἐντεταφιασμένος περιπατεῖ κα[ὶ] τὴν μίαν 
ἡμέραν ὡς αἰῶνα κερδα[ί]νει; But the sensible man, having received that which can secure the whole of what is 
sufficient for a happy life, immediately then for the rest (of his life) goes about laid for burial, and he profits by one 
day as (he would) by eternity. See also Sanders (2011), 225.  
161  Philodemus echoes these exact sentiments in his De Morte 3.32 (translation by Henry): ἐπιχεώμ[εθα... 
ει]ρημένοιξ Διὸς σωτῆρ[ος ὡς] τὴ[ν αὐτὴν ἡ]δονὴν ὁ ποςὸς χρόνος τῶι ἀ-πείρωι] παρασκευάζειν πέφυκεν ὅτ[αν τις 
αὐ]της καταλάβη<ι> τοὺς ὅπους, τὸ [δὲ σύνκρι]μα τὸ σάρκινον εὐθὺς ἀπολα[-βεῐν ταὐτ]ὸ μέγεθος τῆς ἡδονῆς 
ὅπε[ρ…] ἄπειρος χρόνος περιεποίη[σε; ‘Let us drink in honour of Zeus the Saviour over [what has been demolished, 
as] a certain extent of time is by nature such as to provide the [same] pleasure as [infinite time, when one] 
comprehends its limits, and the fleshy [compound] (is by nature such as) [to] receive immediately [the same] 
magnitude of pleasure as infinite time [itself(?)] secures.’ Cf. Sent. Vat. 26.  
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Unlimited time and limited time afford an equal amount of pleasure, if we measure the limits of 
that pleasure by reason. 
 
Kyria Doxa 19 
 
 
ἡ μὲν σὰρξ ἀπέλαβε τά πέρατα τῆς ἡδονῆς ἄπειρα καὶ ἄπειρος αὐτήν χρόνος παρεσκεύασεν· ἡ δὲ 
διάνοια τοῦ τῆς σαρκὸς τέλους καὶ πέρατος λαβοῦσα τὸν ἐπιλογισμόν καὶ τοὺς ὑπέρ τοῦ αἰῶνος 
φόβους ἐκλύσασα τὸν παντελῆ βίον παρεσκεύασε, καὶ οὐθὲν ἔτι τοῦ ἀπείρου χρόνου 
προσεδεήθη· <οὐ> μὴν ἀλλ' οὔτε ἔφυγε τὴν ἡδονήν οὐθ' ἡνίκα τὴν ἐξαγωγὴν ἐκ τοῦ ζῆν τὰ 
πράγματα παρεσκεύαζεν, ὡς ἐλλείπουσά τι τοῦ ἀρίστου βίου κατέστρεψεν. 
  
The flesh receives as unlimited the limits of pleasure; and to provide it requires unlimited time. 
But the mind, grasping in thought what the end and limit of the flesh is, and banishing the terrors 
of futurity, procures a complete and perfect life, and has no longer any need of unlimited time. 
Nevertheless it does not shun pleasure, and even in the hour of death, when ushered out of 
existence by circumstances, the mind does not lack enjoyment of the best life. 
 
 Kyria Doxa 20 
 
These two maxims not only attempt to demonstrate that pleasure is not dependent on temporal 
duration, but also to establish the role of proper reasoning in this process. The appeal to reason 
urges the budding Epicurean to abandon their false belief and preconception that more time will 
equate to greater pleasure. Separating the concepts of pleasure and time is not intuitive, as Cicero 
illustrated, and yet it is essential to accept in order to remove the fear of dying prematurely. This 
is typical of the Epicurean intellectualist approach, and it highlights the necessity of examining 
these arguments from within the Epicurean framework, as the arguments are built on such 
foundations. 
Furley, while ultimately unconvinced by what he dubs ‘dogma without argument’, offers 
the useful analogy of health for understanding katastematic pleasure.162 Perfect health benefits 
one’s experience of life and is therefore desirable. However, one’s level of health has a limit: 
 
162 Furley (1986), 81. This analogy is also explored by Rosenbaum (1990), 26-27.  
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once it is ‘full’, it cannot accumulate beyond this point. While one would surely wish to sustain 
full health during one’s lifetime, insofar as one is able, it would be peculiar to wish to extend 
one’s life in order to experience ‘more’ health.163 One could also view full health as a ‘default’ 
state. That is, health is only diminished when something negative is introduced which 
compromises it, such as an illness or a poor diet. Full health could be defined as the complete 
absence of ailment, much in the same way that absolute pleasure is defined by the Epicureans as 
the complete absence of pain or distress. This analogy is apt, especially in light of the 
philosophical goal to improve the health of one’s mind and soul.164 An Epicurean sage who is 
able to maintain stable ataraxia will live a life most pleasurable.165  
An appropriate understanding of Epicurean pleasure illustrates that temporal duration is 
not integral to living a happy life.166 This dissociation between pleasure and time serves as the 
keystone for the Epicurean arguments designed to counter the fear of premature death. With this 
principle securely established, the notion of what constitutes a ‘complete’ life can be challenged 





163 Furley (1986), 82. 
164 According to Porphyry, Ad Marc. 31 (translation by Inwood & Gerson, 99): Epicurus wrote, ‘Empty is the 
argument of the philosopher by which no human disease is healed; for just as there is no benefit in medicine if it 
does not drive out bodily diseases, so there is no benefit in philosophy if it does not drive out the disease of the soul’.  
165 Feldman (1992), 147, is therefore once again overlooking the Epicurean framework when he describes hedonism 
as an equation comprised of adding pleasure and subtracting pain in order to determine the quality of one’s life: ‘If 
hedonism is true, then the value of a life for a person is determined in this way: first consider how much pleasure the 
person experienced throughout her life. Add it up. Then consider how much pain the person experienced through her 
life. Add it up. Then subtract the pain from the pleasure. The hedonic value of the life is the result.’ 
166 See also Mitsis (1988), 321 and Rosenbaum (1990), 22-27.  
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A Complete Life  
The fear of premature death diverts focus away from the nature of death to the quality of one’s 
life. Epicurus has established that the maximisation of pleasure is not reliant on a certain length 
of time, thus addressing any concern related to the duration of one’s life. A key remaining issue 
is that one’s life will be incomplete when one dies. This question of completeness is very much 
bound up with the question of what comprises a fundamentally ‘human’ life.  
It is initially tempting to think that the completeness of one’s life is dependent on time, 
and that one would be satisfied that one’s life is complete if one manages to live to a ripe old age. 
However, the immediately apparent issue with this assumption is that fulfilment does not simply 
occur with the passing of time, but rather with the realisation of goals and satisfaction of desires. 
These goals and desires also do not simply vanish once one has reached a certain age. It is for 
this reason that ‘completeness’ should be considered in terms of ‘fulfilment’ as opposed to 
‘being finished’. ‘Finished’ suggests that there is nothing more that one would wish to do. 
‘Fulfilled’, however, alludes to a sense of wholeness and satisfaction, with the impression that 
one has lived as best as one could, in accordance with one’s own values.167  
The Epicureans lay out their values very explicitly, advocating for the careful selection of 
one’s own desires so as to avoid unwarranted frustration. Desires which are both natural and 
necessary – such as food, shelter, and companionship – are preferred as these are the desires 
which the body and mind require in order to be happy (Ep. Men. 127-8). Anything beyond this 
simple requirement is superfluous and sometimes dangerous, as it may lend itself to 
 
167 Cf. the justification offered by Nussbaum (1994), 15 n.5, for her translation of the philosophical term εὐδαιμονία: 
‘Eudaimonia is often rendered “happiness”: but this is misleading, since it misses the emphasis on activity, and on 
completeness of life, that is (as Aristotle cogently argues) present in the ordinary use of the Greek term, and wrongly 
suggests that what is at issue must be a state or feeling of satisfaction…I shall therefore usually either transliterate 
the term or use the cumbersome “human flourishing”.  
96 
 
disappointment.168 Epicurus follows his explanation of natural and necessary desires with an 
emphasis on the connection between the pursuit of appropriate desires and the quality of one’s 
life:  
Τούτων γὰρ ἀπλανὴς θεωρία πᾶσαν αἵρεσιν καὶ φυγὴν ἐπανάγειν οἶδεν ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος 
ὑγιειαν καὶ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀταραξίαν, ἐπεὶ τοῦτο τοῦ μακαρίως ζῆν ἐστι τέλος. τούτου γὰρ χάριν 
πάντα πράττομεν, ὅπως μήτε ἀλγῶμεν μήτε ταρβῶμεν· ὅταν δ’ ἅπαξ τοῦτο περὶ ἡμᾶς γένηται, 
λύεται πᾶς ὁ τῆς ψυχῆς χειμών, οὐκ ἔχοντος τοῦ ζῷου βαδίζειν ὡς πρὸς ἐνδέον τι καὶ ζητεῖν 
ἕτερον ᾧ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τοῦ σώματος ἀγαθὸν συμπληρωθήσεται. 
He who has a clear and certain understanding of these things will direct every preference and 
aversion toward securing health of body and tranquillity of mind, seeing that this is the sum and 
end of a blessed life. For the end of all our actions is to be free from pain and fear, and, once we 
have attained this, the tempest of the soul is laid; seeing that the living creature has no need to go 
in search of something that is lacking, nor to look for anything else by which the good of the soul 
and of the body will be fulfilled.  
Ep. Men. 128 
 
Epicurus makes it clear that the framing of one’s desires has a significant impact on one’s ability 
to satisfy such desires and reach a state of happiness, which is the ultimate motivation behind 
any action.169 If one is experiencing any frustration or disappointment as a result of unfulfilled 
desires, then one should first examine the desire and determine its worth. For an Epicurean, the 
‘fulfilment’ of one’s life is therefore based on living in accordance with these frugal hedonist 
values and directing all of one’s energy towards attaining freedom from pain and fear, rather than 
merely living for a certain length of time.  
Lucretius supports this emphasis on ‘natural’ value and Epicurus’ attempt to dissociate 
pleasure and temporal duration with his ‘Speech of Nature’ (D.R.N. 3.931-977). Lucretius 
supposes that if Nature were given a voice, she would admonish those who balk at death and 
 
168 Any form of luxury or ambition is classed as both unnatural and unnecessary, as it is likely that the desire will 
never actually be satisfied. See Chapter I.  
169 See also Philodemus De Morte 14.2-14.14 (translation by Henry), in which he emphasises the attainability of the 
goal of tranquillity, as opposed to the perpetually unattainable goal of something like knowledge.   
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wish to extend their lives. Lucretius’ choice to speak in the voice of Nature gives the impression 
that what is deemed ‘natural’ (in this instance, a natural lifespan) is right and proper, much in the 
same way that Epicurus emphasises the inherent primacy of natural desires. As Reinhardt points 
out, Nature’s tone is one of impatience and self-evidence, peppered with curt, direct questions,170 
implying that any attempt to go against Nature is foolhardy at best and hubristic at worst:  
quid tibi tanto operest, mortalis, quod nimis aegris  
luctibus indulges? quid mortem congemis ac fles?  
nam si grata fuit tibi vita anteacta priorque  
et non omnia pertusum congesta quasi in vas  
commoda perfluxere atque ingrata interiere,  
cur non ut plenus vitae conviva recedis  
aequo animoque capis securam, stulte, quietem? 
 
What ails you so, O mortal, to indulge overmuch in sickly lamentations? Why do you groan aloud 
and weep at death? For if your former life now past has been to your liking, if it is not true that all 
your blessings have been gathered as it were into a riddled jar, and have run through and been lost 
without gratification, why not, like a banqueter fed full of life, withdraw with contentment and 
rest in peace, you fool? 
D.R.N. 3.933-939 
 
This passage uses another feasting analogy, which conveys Epicurus’ message that quality is 
superior to quantity. However, the main force of this analogy is the notion that it is greedy to 
wish for more life than is given. If one’s life has been a good one, then one should depart with 
gratitude and contentment.  
This is followed by the argument that, conversely, if one’s life has held nothing but 
misery and there is no possibility of improving it, then death ought to be considered a relief 
(D.R.N. 3.940-943).171 Each argument therefore leads to the same conclusion regarding one’s 
 
170 Reinhardt (2002), 295-6. 
171 Epicurus elsewhere makes clear that it is possible to pursue philosophy and achieve ἀταραξία at any age (Ep. 
Men. 122), suggesting that this argument is designed by Lucretius to persuade his reader of a false dichotomy (that 
either one’s life was good or it was bad) wherein the only appropriate response to death is passive acceptance. While 
98 
 
attitude towards death. The end of one’s life should not be disputed, regardless of how positive 
or negative one’s life has been before this point. Nature’s speech then seeks to tackle the fear of 
premature death more directly: 
nam tibi praeterea quod machiner inveniamque,  
quod placeat, nil est: eadem sunt omnia semper.  
si tibi non annis corpus iam marcet et artus  
confecti languent, eadem tamen omnia restant,  
omnia si pergas vivendo vincere saecla,  
atque etiam potius, si numquam sis moriturus. 
 
For there is nothing else I can devise and invent to please you: everything is always the same. If 
your body is not already withering with years and your limbs worn out and languid, yet 
everything remains the same, even if you shall go on to outlive all generations, and even more if 
you should be destined never to die. 
D.R.N. 3.944-949 
 
This argument is reminiscent of Epicurus’ claim that while pleasure may vary, it cannot increase 
with time. Nature claims here that even if someone were to die young, they would not be robbed 
of anything that they would have experienced had they died when they were older.172 That is not 
to say that the young have experienced everything that life has to offer. Rather, there is the same 
opportunity for the greatest degree of pleasure all throughout one’s lifetime. Nature is similarly 
dismissive of the lamentations of the elderly in the face of death:   
grandior hic vero si iam seniorque queratur  
atque obitum lamentetur miser amplius aequo,  
non merito inclamet magis et voce increpet acri?  
“aufer abhinc lacrimas, balatro, et compesce querellas!  
omnia perfunctus vitai praemia marces;  
sed quia semper aves quod abest, praesentia temnis,  
 
the standard reading of finem uitae facere (D.R.N. 3.943) is a recommendation for the unfortunate man to end his 
life via suicide, Reinhardt (2002), 299, briefly acknowledges an alternate reading as a recommendation to accept 
one’s death in the future, which is appealing in its consistency with Epicurean attitudes towards suicide, but is not 
necessarily a more accurate translation.   
172 Philodemus, De Morte 12.7 (translation by Henry), also claims that the man who has died young is not to be 
pitied if he has lived well. Sanders (2011), 226, adds to the translation of this passage the sentiment that it is ‘folly’ 
to fear untimely death due to the hope that greater time will afford greater pleasure.  
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imperfecta tibi elapsast ingrataque vita,  
et nec opinanti mors ad caput adstitit ante  
quam satur ac plenus possis discedere rerum.  
nunc aliena tua tamen aetate omnia mitte  
aequo animoque agedum iam concede: necessest.” 
 
But if in this regard some older man, well stricken in years, should make complaint, wretchedly 
bewailing his death more than he ought, would she [Nature] not have reason to cry more loudly 
still and to upbraid bitter words? “Away, away with your tears, ruffian, check your lamentations! 
All life’s prizes you have enjoyed and now you wither. But because you always crave what you 
have not, and contemn what you have, life has slipped by for you incomplete and ungratifying, 
and death stands by your head unexpected, before you can retire glutted and full of the feast. But 
now in any case dismiss all that does not befit you age, and with equanimity, come now, yield to 
your years: thus it must be.” 
D.R.N. 3.952-962 
 
Like the young, the elderly are depicted as entitled and greedy when they are lamenting the end 
of their lives. The message is that, regardless of age, one should neither expect nor wish for a 
longer life than is lived, for that would not be in accordance with the natural order. Lucretius 
immediately follows Nature’s speech with a reminder that this natural order relies on a cycle of 
formation and dissolution, owing to the atomic constitution of matter. In order for new things to 
come into existence, that which currently exists must cease to be: 
cedit enim rerum novitate extrusa vetustas  
semper, et ex aliis aliud reparare necessest:  
nec quisquam in barathrum nec Tartara deditur atra:  
materies opus est ut crescant postera saecla;  
quae tamen omnia te vita perfuncta sequentur;  
nec minus ergo ante haec quam tu cecidere, cadentque.  
sic alid ex alio numquam desistet oriri  
vitaque mancipio nulli datur, omnibus usu. 
 
For the old order always passes, thrust out by the new, and one thing has to be made afresh from 
others; but no one is delivered into the pit of black Tartarus: matter is wanted, that coming 
generations may grow; and yet they all, when their life is done, will follow you, and so, no less 
than you, these generations have passed away before now, and will continue to pass away. So one 





Lucretius’ reiteration of this natural cycle of being explains why it is ‘greedy’ to wish for an 
extension of life: for one to live longer than one’s natural lifespan is to overstay one’s welcome. 
Life is continuously being recycled through the reassembly of atomic compounds, meaning that 
one’s life is not entirely one’s own,173 and will always be finite. If it were infinite, there would be 
no change and no new life. A dual argument is therefore presented: one ought to attune one’s 
attitude to the facts of nature, and one’s wish for immortality would actually have negative 
consequences for life itself.  
Using the voice of Nature, Lucretius has asserted that no one has the right to live longer 
than is ‘natural’, whether one is fortunate, unfortunate, young, or old. Instead of lamenting one’s 
impending death, one ought to graciously remove oneself from the ‘banquet’ (conviva) that is 
life. However, this analogy exposes the concern that a banquet, like a ‘natural’ lifespan, consists 
of a certain structure. The parts that collectively form the whole must themselves be completed 
in order for the experience to reach its conclusion. Nussbaum identifies this issue, arguing that 
the banquet analogy weakens Lucretius’ assertion that a life cannot be cut short: 
This argument tells us that life, like a meal, has, or is, a temporally unfolding structure…we can 
see that it also supports the judgement that death can come too soon and, in effect, almost always 
does. For it almost always cuts short, before the point of repletion and satiety, the temporally 
extended process of living a human life that seems to be admitted, within the argument, to be a 
good thing. If one dies prematurely – for example, before reaching the main course – this will be 
the worst sort of death; for it will make fruitless those “courses” in the meal whose primary 
function was to prepare appetite and palate for the main course.  
Nussbaum (1994), 211 
 
 
173 This echoes Ep. Men. 127: Μνημονευτέον δὲ ὡς τὸ μέλλον οὔτε ἡμέτερον οὔτε πάντως οὐχ ἡμέτερον, ἵνα μήτε 
πάντως προσμένωμεν ὡς ἐσόμενον μήτε ἀπελπίζωμεν ὡς πάντως οὐκ ἐσόμενον; We must remember that the future 
is neither wholly ours nor wholly not ours, so that neither must we count upon it as quite certain to come nor despair 
of it as quite certain not to come. Cf. Sent. Vat. 14. 
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Two significant components of Nussbaum’s interpretation are that death will almost always be 
premature, and that a premature death undermines the value of life before that point. Both of 
these claims are unduly pessimistic and at odds with the Epicurean framework. Any concession 
that a death could be premature inevitably allows for the possibility that all deaths are premature. 
When value is dependent on temporal duration, the ‘point of repletion and satiety’ is 
indeterminate and elusive. There is no specific age or life chapter at which one’s life is deemed 
to be complete, meaning that almost every life could be considered cut short by death, as 
Nussbaum states. Clearly, this is a belief that would cause distress in anyone contemplating their 
own mortality, hence the Epicurean imperative to remove this as a threat. Nussbaum also claims 
that a premature death makes ‘fruitless’ the courses that precede ‘the main course’. This 
translates to the concern that death will frustrate one’s life goals and therefore invalidate any 
progress made towards those goals during one’s lifetime.174 The implication of this rather grim 
outlook is that, because almost everyone is going to die ‘prematurely’, there is the constant threat 
that one’s current actions are pointless because they may not be completed before one’s death. 
This suggests that the ‘point’ of one’s actions is simply to be completed, which is a judgement 
that lends itself to disappointment, given that every mortal is going to die sometime.175 The 
Epicureans dodge this concern with their definition of pleasure as a state of being rather than an 
end point (Ep. Men. 128; 139), as well as their advocacy for fulfilling only those desires which 
are deemed to be ‘natural and necessary’ (D.L. 10.127-8). The purpose of an Epicurean’s actions 
 
174 This fear is also expressed by Rorty (1983), 177: ‘The drama will continue without their participation, and 
perhaps none the worse for that. What turns such sorrow into fear is that thought that all our efforts to live well, our 
attentions and dedications were for nothing, that our joys and generosities, pains and stoic resolutions were all in 
vain.’  
175 Nussbaum (1994), 211, goes on to say: ‘One would have eaten differently had one known the main course was 
not going to arrive’, meaning that one would have lived differently had one known that one’s life was about to end. 
While this is certainly true, it is also the case that death is inevitable, and that it is always the case that one’s life is 
going to end – the question is simply when. An Epicurean could justifiably argue that proper appreciation of life 
should therefore not begin only when one’s death becomes imminent but should have been present all along. 
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is to derive pleasure, and that pleasure is not dependent on satisfying some goal or ambition. 
Therefore, no action is ever in vain if it is pleasurable.176  
Nussbaum’s interpretation relies on reading the analogy ‘ut plenus vitae conviva recedis’ 
as withdrawing from the banquet as a satisfied guest does; that is, at the natural conclusion of the 
banquet. This clearly leaves open the possibility that one could be forced to depart before the 
banquet is complete. Reinhardt, however, has offered an alternative interpretation that does not 
fall into the trap of implying that a life can be terminated prematurely, or that a departure before 
the ‘main course’ compromises the completeness of one’s life. Reinhardt suggests that ‘ut plenus 
vitae conviva recedis’ may be understood as an invitation to withdraw from the banquet at any 
time, as one would if they were a satisfied guest – regardless of how far through the feast they 
actually happened to be.177 This reading shifts the emphasis to one of internal attitude rather than 
external circumstance, which is far more in tune with the rest of Nature’s speech, as well as the 
general tone of Epicurean therapeutic advice.178 Nature’s Speech therefore reiterates that the 
Epicurean notion of a ‘complete’ life is entirely independent of both temporal duration and the 
conclusion of one’s actions. This serves to reduce anxiety that one’s life will be cut short or that 
one’s actions will prove to have been in vain.  
A similar but distinct concern regarding the completeness of one’s life is that one will not 
get the opportunity to experience a ‘full’ human life before one’s death. Striker brings this to the 
 
176 Take, for instance, the act of tending a garden. If one enjoys the act of gardening, and one finds pleasure in the 
thought that they are working towards producing food in that garden, then those actions are not pointless even if one 
will no longer be alive when it comes time to harvest, because the actions themselves were enjoyed. Nussbaum 
(1994) 192-238, repeatedly discusses the diminished value of an activity that is ‘cut short’ by death. By doing so, 
she is overlooking the value that is found in the process of doing the action, and – quite contrary to the Epicurean 
approach – focusing entirely on the value of the finished product. 
177 Reinhardt (2002), 296-7.  
178 By arguing that happiness is independent of time, it appears that the Epicureans stress the responsibility of the 
individual in creating the circumstances for their own happiness. Self-sufficiency seems to be crucial in the 
Epicurean model, so as to maintain a feeling of tranquillity throughout the turbulence of everyday life. 
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fore with her ‘Operatic Analogy’, which likens one’s life trajectory to the performance of an 
opera and raises the issue of what constitutes a fundamentally ‘human’ life: 
The eighteen year old who wants to continue living is like someone who has watched the first act 
of an opera and is justifiably annoyed if the performance breaks off at this point. He is angry, not 
because he had thought he was going to spend three hours instead of only one, but because he 
wanted to see the entire opera, not just a part of it. 
Striker (1988), 325 
 
Striker’s analogy is intuitively powerful because it rightly dismisses the length of one’s life as 
only incidentally relevant and identifies the arc of one’s life as the true source of concern. The 
length of the opera is largely arbitrary, as the purpose of attending is to experience a complete 
narrative. Anything short of this is a disappointment.179 This understanding is comparable to 
Nussbaum’s interpretation of Lucretius’ banquet analogy in that the notion of a complete life is 
reliant on the fulfilment of a certain structure of ‘stages’. The ‘first course’, the ‘first act’, and 
‘childhood development’ may all be equated and deemed insufficient in isolation. One must 
experience every ‘stage’ in order to qualify for a complete life. The difference between 
Nussbaum’s and Striker’s approaches is the former’s emphasis on the satisfaction of goals as 
opposed to the latter’s emphasis on the fulfilment of criteria.180  
Striker is careful to clarify that her analogy is only generally intended to reflect human 
experience. Unlike an opera, there can be no exact point that marks the completeness of a human 
 
179 While Striker herself does not address this (stressing the general nature of the analogy), it may be assumed that 
an appropriate ‘life narrative’ would be determined on an individual basis, lest it be wrongly assumed that there is 
only one kind of complete life. It would be absurd to claim that any given person’s life could only be complete if 
they experienced the life stage of parenthood, for instance. Rosenbaum (1990), 34-35, touches on the relative nature 
of one’s life arc and aspirations in his criticism of Striker’s argument. 
180 This very slight difference is expressed in Nussbaum’s concern with how ‘fruitful’ the earlier stages of life are in 
relation to its duration, while Striker’s notion of completion is reliant on the passive experience of a certain life 
structure. It may be inferred from this that Nussbaum views complete as ‘being fulfilled’ while Striker views 
complete as ‘being finished’.  
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life. The essence of the analogy, Striker argues, is the expectation of certain life stages.181 This 
reliance on intuitive expectation undermines Striker’s argument, as it is fundamentally 
incompatible with the Epicurean perspective. Lucretius’ Speech of Nature berates those who 
expect more life precisely because no one is entitled to it (D.R.N. 3.971). Epicurus states this 
even more explicitly:  
Μνημονευτέον δὲ ὡς τὸ μέλλον οὔτε ἡμέτερον οὔτε πάντως οὐχ ἡμέτερον, ἵνα μήτε πάντως 
προσμένωμεν ὡς ἐσόμενον μήτε ἀπελπίζωμεν ὡς πάντως οὐκ ἐσόμενον.  
We must remember that the future is neither wholly ours nor wholly not ours, so that neither must 
we count upon it as quite certain to come nor despair of it as quite certain not to come. 
Ep. Men. 127 
 
By claiming that the future does not belong to us, Epicurus is attempting to undermine any sense 
of entitlement towards one’s life. He implies that having expectations about one’s life that are 
largely outside of one’s control may lead to disappointment. He therefore advocates for its 
avoidance, much in the same way that he does in the case of ambition, owing to its tendency to 
be self-perpetuating and therefore frustrating. Striker may be absolutely correct in her argument 
that an individual may fear that their life may be incomplete if they do not experience their 
expected life trajectory, but an Epicurean would be able to dodge that fear by removing the 
underlying expectation. Striker’s analogy therefore does not adequately refute the Epicurean 
position when considered from within the Epicurean framework.  
There is some understandable hesitation in embracing such an Epicurean approach to life. 
By attempting to erase expectations, ambitions, and any desire that exceeds survival and simple 
comfort, there is concern that the Epicureans are too frugal and thereby compromise some 
 
181 Striker (1988), 326. 
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aspects of what it means to be human.182 It is evident that the Epicurean notion of a ‘complete’ 
life is independent of both temporal duration and the achievement of certain goals or life stages. 
While this may be at odds with some widely-held preconceptions, there is no suggestion of 
inconsistency within the Epicurean framework, or of any indication that this system of belief 
would be an impossible undertaking if accepted fully.183 The Epicurean conception of a fulfilled 
and complete life is reliant on the consistent pursuit of natural and necessary desires which will 
contribute to a state of ongoing mental and bodily tranquillity. This idea is summed up nicely by 
Rosenbaum: 
The Epicurean idea would be this: There is no goal or type of goal, the objective achievement of 
which is necessary for a person to live a complete life. The requirement that a person achieve 
such goals in order to have a complete life would be, for Epicurus, an abstract, unjustifiable, and 
anxiety-producing cultural imposition on human thriving.  
Rosenbaum (1990), 36 
 
 
182 For instance, Santayana (1922), 33, describes Epicurus as ‘hating life’ and ‘recommending a sort of pleasure 
which has no excitement and no risk about it.’  
183 There is some discussion surrounding the evolutionary function of fearing death, and thus its role in a ‘complete’ 
and ‘fundamentally human’ life. Rorty (1983), 180-182, argues that fearing death is an instinctive survival mechanic 
and attributes to it a motivational function. Fischer (2006), 198, applies this evolutionary approach to one of his 
contributions to the Symmetry Debate, identifying a ‘clear survival benefit to creatures who care especially about 
the future’, and extrapolates some justification for asymmetrical attitudes towards the past and future. This seems to 
build on Parfit’s (1984), 186, passing assumption that temporal biases are the result of evolution. However, while it 
is undisputed that pain serves as a reactionary function that dissuades organisms from interacting with that which is 
harmful, fear plays a preparatory role in an organism faced with a potentially harmful situation (in that physiological 
arousal prepares one for fight or flight). Fear, therefore, certainly serves a purpose, but when fear is experienced 
without previous experience of a particular stimulus (such as death), it is the result of generalisation, meaning that it 
is not necessarily rational and may be unlearned. Furthermore, the popular view in the field of evolutionary 
psychology is that there is little to support the claim that fearing death is essential for survival, reproduction, and 
therefore natural selection. As has been pointed out by Jong and Halberstadt (2016), 85, ‘a lack of fear of death 
would have to lead directly to life-harming behaviour in order for some kind of natural selection and evolutionary 
pathway to occur,’ and this is far from certain. Kirkpatrick and Navarrete (2006), 288-290, also state that the notion 
of a ‘survival instinct’ predates the field of evolutionary psychology, and the evidence actually suggests that an 
individual survival instinct would not be favoured by the evolutionary process as it may contradict the goal of 
ensuring the survival (and therefore replication) of an entire gene pool. As such, from an evolutionary standpoint, 
the fear of death would likely not serve a fundamental purpose and would not be integral to a ‘complete’ life.  
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Such a life cannot be ‘cut off’ by death, and there is no need to fear the nullification of goals and 
ambitions.  
Thus far, the Epicureans have tempered the fear of premature death by illustrating that 
temporal duration does not inform one’s degree of pleasure or fulfilment of a ‘complete’ life. 
Nor is the achievement of certain goals or story arc necessary for one’s life to be deemed whole 
and ready for conclusion. Therefore, one need not be concerned that one will die ‘too soon’, or 
that death will rob one of a fulfilling life. One further argument to be deployed by the Epicureans 
is that immortality, or everlasting life, will not grant any further happiness than our own mortal 
existence.  
 
The Undesirability of Immortality 
The Epicurean belief that the achievement of a complete and pleasurable life is not dependent on 
temporal duration has been clearly established. An extended or even infinite amount of time is 
unnecessary in the pursuit of ἀταραξία. Indeed, the ceaseless prolongation of one’s life may 
actually cause more harm than good. There has been some discussion surrounding the 
desirability of eternal life, with many concluding that it would eventually become intolerable.184 
Epicurus himself hints at such a viewpoint by suggesting that a key component to enjoying life is 
not to extend it, but to avoid any desire to extend it:   
ὅθεν γνῶσις ὀρθὴ τοῦ μηθὲν εἶναι πρὸς ἡμᾶς τὸν θάνατον ἀπολαυστὸν ποιεῖ τὸ τῆς ζωῆς θηντόν, 
οὐκ ἄπειρον προστιθεῖσα χρόνον, ἀλλὰ τὸν τῆς ἀθανασίας ἀφελομένη πόθον. 
 
 
184 See for instance: May (2009), 60-63; Nussbaum (1994), 227-232; Kagan (2012), 243; Cave (2012), 74-75; 
Scheffler (2013), 83-110. 
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So a correct understanding that death is nothing to us makes the mortality of life enjoyable, not by 
adding infinite time but by removing the desire for immortality.  
Ep. Men. 124 
 
This emphasis on the importance of a ‘correct understanding’ is a reassertion of the ideal 
intellectualist approach, and is of course built on Epicurean atomic theory, which rejects the 
possibility of immortality. Yet, there seems to be an exception to this rule. The immortal gods 
still occupy a space in Epicurean ethics, despite the threat of inconsistency with atomic theory 
(Ep. Men. 123). The gods are lauded as ideals to emulate, which gives the impression that 
immortality would not be perceived as essentially negative to the Epicureans.  
The precise Epicurean attitude towards immortality is therefore rather unclear. Epicurus 
has suggested that we ought to remove desire for immortality. Indeed, arguing that infinite life 
would be a fundamentally negative experience would certainly be a powerful addition to 
Epicurus’ arguments against fearing premature death. The ongoing modern debate centres on 
whether or not immortality would necessarily become boring, and thus diminish the pleasures 
that would motivate one to keep on living. This debate can therefore be evaluated using the 
perspective of an Epicurean hedonist: if immortal life would eliminate the possibility of 
immortal pleasure, then immortality must be viewed as inherently negative.    
 A significant contribution to the discussion surrounding the desirability of immortality 
was made by Bernard Williams. Using as a case study the Karel Čapek play, ‘The Makropulos 
Affair’, Williams argues that an immortal life would eventually become boring and meaningless 
to the extent that it would be unliveable.185 The play tells the story of a woman named ‘EM’ 
 
185 Williams (1973), 82-100. It must be noted that while Williams does bring Lucretius into his discussion of 
immortality, he is not approaching this topic with an Epicurean mind-set. Nevertheless, his contribution to the 
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(originally she is named Elina Makropulos, followed by a number of aliases, all with the initials 
‘EM’). She is given an elixir of life by her father in order to prolong her existence. During the 
play, she is 342 years old. Her story concludes with her declining to take the elixir again and 
electing to die, as her life has descended into pure tedium and has lost all meaning.186 From this 
case, Williams extrapolates what was later dubbed the ‘Necessary Boredom Thesis’, which 
argues that immortality would inevitably become boring, owing to limitations in what one person 
can experience:  
Her [EM’s] trouble was it seems, boredom: a boredom connected with the fact that everything 
that could happen and make sense to one particular human being of 42 had already happened to 
her. Or, rather, all the sorts of things that could make sense to one woman of a certain character; 
for EM has a certain character, and indeed, except for her accumulating memories of earlier times, 
and no doubt some changes of style to suit the passing centuries, seems always to have been 
much the same sort of person.  
Williams (1973), 90.  
 
Williams is quite convinced that experiences are limited and would therefore eventually start to 
repeat, at which point they would become monotonous. This makes an intuitive kind of sense; 
even an activity that one enjoys very much can become unpleasant in too great a quantity or if 
repeated too frequently. However, Williams goes one step further by claiming that boredom 
would have to be ‘unthinkable’ in order for immortality to be attractive.187 His exact reasoning 
for this is unclear.188 The possibility of boredom is certainly not unique to an immortal life, and it 
could very reasonably be argued that it is one of many emotions that are encompassed by a 
healthy, balanced mortal life. Boredom may drive one to seek out new experiences, or signal that 
 
debate is highly relevant in how it has shaped scholarly opinions on the value of immortality, and in how it can 
assist in forming an understanding of the Epicurean position.  
186 The formula for the elixir is subsequently destroyed by a young woman, despite protests from some ‘older men’.  
187 Williams (1973), 96. 
188 Fischer (1994), 261, also makes this objection.  
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one ought to change how one spends one’s time. It may be unpleasant, but it is not without 
value.189 If, however, boredom was the only (or even predominant) emotion that one could feel – 
and one was unable to seek new experiences or change one’s circumstances so as to alleviate the 
boredom – then immortality would be a dreary prospect indeed. The threat of some boredom 
does not decrease the desirability of immortality, but the threat of overwhelming or ceaseless 
boredom certainly does. An Epicurean would likely take a similar approach. Their goal is to 
maximise pleasure, in accordance with their definition of pleasure as the absence of pain. Unless 
an immortal life was expected to be inescapably boring to the point of causing mental anguish, 
then it is likely that immortality would not be viewed as inherently negative.  
Williams also raises an intriguing point regarding consistency of self: he supposes that, 
while EM would be somewhat shaped by her experiences, she would essentially retain her 
character, which suggests a limitation not only in the variety of experiences she could live 
through, but also a limitation in how she could possibly react to those experiences. This 
consistency would no doubt exacerbate the alleged monotony. However, this claim does rely on 
an unjustifiably static conception of self. Owing to an endless number of experiences, it seems 
almost inevitable that an individual would change considerably over the course of an immortal 
lifespan, probably even to the extent that a younger version of themselves would barely 
recognise them.190 This is not necessarily negative, nor is it sufficient reason to believe that 
immortality would be negative. The Epicurean sense of self is, as established, informed by the 
accumulation of experience and reinforced by self-reflection. 191  Williams’ limited identity 
 
189 The notion that something could be unpleasant but useful seems at first to be at odds with Epicurean hedonism. 
However, the Epicureans made it clear that proper reasoning must be applied in their pursuit of pleasure, and a 
short-term pain that eventuates in pleasure may occasionally be appropriate (Ep. Men. 129). See also Chp. 2.  
190 Fischer (1994), 267-268, also rejects Williams’ limited identity condition.  
191 See Chp. 1.  
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condition is inconsistent with this aspect of Epicurean theory, which again suggests that an 
Epicurean would not share Williams’ concern that immortality must be painfully boring. 
Williams’ argument rests heavily on intuition, leading to some resistance from those, 
such as Fischer, who reject the notion that boredom is necessarily inevitable: 
In general, single-minded and unbalanced pursuit of any single kind of activity will be 
unattractive. But of course from the fact that one’s life will be unending it does not follow that it 
must be unitary or unbalanced.  
Fischer (1994), 261.  
 
Fischer makes a distinction between two different kinds of pleasure: ‘self-exhausting’ and 
‘repeatable’, both of which are relative to particular individuals. He argues that, with appropriate 
temporal distribution, repeatable pleasures would not become tiresome, but would be an endless 
source of pleasure that would stave off any life-consuming boredom. Building on this argument, 
Fischer and Mitchell-Yellin claim that it is absurd to believe that some experiences would lose 
value simply because they are not ‘new’ experiences. They cite examples such as friendship and 
sex, which, even with repeated experience, continue to provide pleasure and – crucially – 
variation of such pleasure. One friendship is never exactly like another, meaning that even if an 
individual experienced thousands of friendships, there is no reason to believe that they would 
become tedious.192  
Fischer and Mitchell-Yellin then introduce a very useful distinction between two 
different kinds of boredom, both of which they attempt to argue would not impact an immortal 
individual: ‘content-boredom’, which refers to a lack of desire for anything that compels one to 
continue living, and ‘motivational-boredom’, which refers to a lack of energy to pursue any 
 
192 Fischer & Mitchell-Yellin (2014), 355-360.  
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desires.193 Against the former, they argue that repeatable pleasures and varied experiences would 
thwart the issue. In all likelihood, an Epicurean would broadly agree with this, as long as the 
pleasure resulted from the fulfilment of natural or necessary desire. A combination of repeated 
and varied pleasures would assist in maintaining the tranquil state of ataraxia by ensuring the 
continuation of katastematic pleasure (being without need) and adding some kinetic pleasure 
(variation). The latter notion of ‘motivational-boredom’ is trickier to address and immediately 
provides more compelling support for the undesirability of immortality. It suggests that even if 
there are an infinite number of experiences for a single individual, that single individual may not 
be equipped with sufficient energy to fill an eternity with such experiences. ‘Motivational-
boredom’ could explain why someone might tire of something like friendship (which Fischer and 
Mitchell-Yellin believe to be inconceivable): even with the knowledge that each new friendship 
could bring great (and varied) fulfilment, one may lack the drive to go through the motions of 
forming a new friendship, if one had spent thousands of years doing just that, time and time 
again. By way of explaining ‘motivation-boredom’, both May and Nussbaum suggest that the 
availability of an endless amount of time would eliminate time constraints that would motivate 
an individual to act on desires. 194  Without any drive to do something now and with the 
knowledge that something can always be done later, it is conceivable that an immortal individual 
would lose motivation and develop some degree of listlessness.  
Fischer and Mitchell-Yellin’s response to this is curious. Rather than attempting to argue 
that time constraints are not necessarily related to motivation, they argue that an immortal person 
actually would still be subject to time constraints. They do this in two ways. Firstly, they argue 
that external phenomena are still subject to temporal decay, even if the immortal individual is not. 
 
193 Fischer & Mitchell-Yellin (2014), 361. 
194 May (2009). 60-63; Nussbaum (1994), 229.  
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They offer the example of a desire to visit the Pyramids of Giza; since the pyramids will 
someday be eroded and lost, there is a time constraint (albeit a very distant one). They also 
suggest that there are certain time-sensitive life events, such as your child’s first steps, which 
cannot ‘always be done later’.195 Secondly, they argue that an immortal person such as EM will 
eventually die, and is therefore still bound by time constraints. They identify EM as ‘medically 
immortal’ rather than ‘truly immortal’, meaning that while she is ageless and immune to death by 
natural causes, she is not unable to be killed. If she fell off a cliff or were shot, she would die.196  
This argument raises some significant issues. Even with the inevitability of a ‘medically 
immortal’ individual’s death, their lifespan may still be tediously long. Their death would also 
likely be sudden, if it is only a spontaneous accident or deliberate act that could kill them. 
Therefore, at any given time, they could reasonably assume that they have a vast amount of time 
ahead of them. The notion of some far-off sudden death would not be sufficient to introduce a 
motivational time-constraint. Compare, for instance, to the difference in attitude between a 20-
year-old and an 80-year-old, or between a healthy person and one who is terminally ill. In both 
cases, the latter would likely be more aware of the finite amount of time ahead of them, because 
death is at a much closer proximity. An additional issue with this argument is that their approach 
cannot fully apply to a ‘truly immortal’ individual who is invulnerable to death, or even a 
particularly lucky ‘medically immortal’ individual who happens to never die.197 Fischer and 
Mitchell-Yellin even concede at the very beginning of their argument that a truly infinite lifespan 
may induce a disinterest in life:  
 
195 Fischer & Mitchell-Yellin (2014), 367-368.  
196 Fischer & Mitchell-Yellin (2014), 363-366.   
197 Fischer & Mitchell-Yellin (2014), 368-370. They consider a lucky ‘medically immortal’ person as a category in 
their own right, dubbed a ‘robust immortal’.  
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But it just seems implausible to us, and upon reflection, it can even seem remarkably pessimistic, 
to suppose that anyone in EM’s circumstances would have lost all categorical desires and thus all 
interest in life. It is certainly an interesting thesis about infinitely long human life, or even a 
human life that extended for millennia or more; but three hundred years (or a bit more) just seem 
like too few to necessarily result in a complete loss of projects that could provide (or ground) 
reasons to continue to live (or to want to continue to live)! Moreover, it is not clear that every 
person who might be in EM’s circumstances would suffer from her loss of interest in life. 
Fischer & Mitchell-Yellin (2014), 355. 
 
Fischer and Mitchell-Yellin make it clear with this statement that their arguments are directly 
addressing the specific situation of EM. Their admission that boredom may be applicable in an 
infinite or extremely long life somewhat undermines their later claims that ‘truly immortal’ 
individuals would not be ‘motivation-bored’, although their core argument only maintains that 
boredom would not necessarily take hold. 
This counterargument to ‘motivational-boredom’ that is introduced by Fischer and 
Mitchell-Yellin is therefore inadequate. However, an Epicurean can easily dismiss the threat of 
‘motivational-boredom’. Where Fischer and Mitchell-Yellin attempted to impose motivational 
time-constraints on an immortal individual, the Epicureans can invoke their already well-
established principle that pleasure is simply not dependent on time. The presence of a time-
constraint would not provide any additional motivation for an Epicurean. Rather, it is pleasure 
alone that ought to motivate action (informed by appropriate reason, of course). The length of 
one’s life is also inconsequential, as it does not dictate how pleasurable that life is. Yet again, it 
would seem that the Epicureans need not perceive immortality to be negative.   
The Necessary Boredom Thesis has merit, although modern discussion remains divisive. 
It is immediately apparent that an unfavourable view of immortality would be a useful tool in the 
Epicurean fight against the fear of premature death. The Epicureans have demonstrated that both 
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pleasure and a complete life are not dependent on time. The argument that immortality would 
cause life to lose all meaning would serve the Epicureans well, and support Epicurus’ claim that 
‘a correct understanding that death is nothing to us makes the mortality of life enjoyable’ (Ep. 
Men. 124).  
Nevertheless, the Necessary Boredom Thesis is clearly incompatible with Epicurean 
hedonism. An Epicurean reaches the height of pleasure when all pain is removed (ἀταραξία and 
ἀπονία) and appropriate desires are satisfied (katastematic pleasure). Neither ‘content-boredom’ 
nor ‘motivational-boredom’ would be an issue for an Epicurean who has achieved katastematic 
pleasure and is in a state of passive tranquillity. Motivation and value are driven by pleasure 
rather than time and any variation provided by kinetic pleasure is welcome but ultimately 
unnecessary. Therefore, as long as an Epicurean’s basic needs are met and they are without 
mental or physical pain, they are as happy as they could possibly be. It must be concluded that 
immortality would not be inherently negative to an Epicurean. Yet, Epicurus still tells us not to 
desire immortal life.  
It is evidently not the state of immortality itself that is negative to the Epicureans. Rather, 
it is the desire for immortality that causes pain. Because we mortals are indeed mere mortals, 
immortality is not possible for us.198 Any genuine desire for immortality would inevitably lead to 
disappointment and mental anguish. The Epicureans have established that the maximisation of 
pleasure and the achievement of a ‘complete’ life are not dependent on time. The length of one’s 
life – whether it is fleeting or eternal – does not determine whether it is good or bad. The 
Epicureans do not argue that immortality is inherently worse than mortality, as it is sufficient for 
 
198 Practically speaking; outside of philosophical musings or the possibility of technology extending the human 
lifespan far into the future. 
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them to demonstrate that it is simply unnecessary and impossible, which they do so successfully. 
Once this ‘correct understanding’ is embraced, a budding Epicurean can abandon any 
unfulfillable yearning for immortality and focus instead on enjoying the mortality that they have.    
The one persistent problem with this account of the Epicurean attitude towards 
immortality is the presence of the immortal gods. Divine worship played an important role in 
Epicurean ethics, yet the very existence of the gods seems to contradict a central tenet of atomic 
theory: that all atomic compounds are eventually dissolved (D.L. 10.42): 
πρῶτον μὲν τὸν θεὸν ζῷον ἄφθαρτον καὶ μακάριον νομίζων, ὡς ἡ κοινὴ τοῦ θεοῦ νόησις 
ὑπεγράφη, μηθὲν μήτε τῆς ἀφθαρσίας ἀλλότριον μήτε τῆς μακαριότητος ἀνοίκειον αὐτῷ 
πρόσαπτε· πᾶν δὲ τὸ φυλάττειν αὐτοῦ δυνάμενον τὴν μετ’ ἀφθαρσίας μακαριότητα περὶ αὐτοῦ 
δόξαζε. Θεοὶ μὲν γάρ εἰσιν. ἐναργὴς δέ ἐστιν αὐτῶν ἡ γνῶσις· οἵους δ’ αὐτοὺς <οἱ> πολλοὶ 
νομίζουσιν, οὐκ εἰσίν· οὐ γὰρ φυλάττουσιν αὐτοὺς οἵους νοοῦσιν.  
First, believe that God is a living being immortal and blessed,199 according to the notion of a god 
indicated by the common sense of mankind; and so believing, thou shalt not affirm of him aught 
that is foreign to his immortality or that agrees not with blessedness, but shalt believe about him 
whatever may uphold both his blessedness and his immortality. For verily there are gods, and the 
knowledge of them is manifest; but they are not such as the multitude believe, seeing that men do 
not steadfastly maintain the notions they form respecting them.  
Ep. Men. 123 
 
Long and Sedley have offered a potential solution to this contradiction: they suggest that the 
Epicurean conception of the gods is that they are not corporeal beings. Rather, they are ‘streams 
of images’ that are conceived of by individuals as paradigms of each person’s ethical ideal.200 
 
199 Long & Sedley (1987), 140, translate ἄφθαρτον as ‘imperishable’ rather than ‘immortal’, which is perhaps more 
fitting given the context of atomic theory.   
200 Long & Sedley (1987), 144-147. Sedley (2011), 29-30, defends this ‘idealist’ position against the opposing 
‘realist’ theory that the gods were actually conceived of as corporeal beings. Obbink (1989), 201-202, argues in 
favour of the ‘idealist’ account, while Konstan (2011), 53-71, asserts the ‘realist’ account, using evidence from 
Lucretius (D.R.N. 3.800-23) that suggests the gods are able to replenish lost matter (and thus do not decay) and are 
composed of such fine material that they are impervious to damage by other atoms (and thus cannot be harmed). As 
Long (2019), 72, states, both the ‘idealist’ and the ‘realist’ readings attribute a life of endless duration to the 
Epicurean gods.    
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This is in line with a criticism by Cicero that Epicurus attempts to avoid saying that the gods are 
atomic compounds (as atomic compounds must be perishable), and thus attributes to the gods a 
‘quasi-body’ (Cic. Nat. D. 1.71).201 According to this interpretation, the gods are imperishable 
and blessed simply because they are conceived to be. As concepts, they are preserved by us, 
making them everlasting and invulnerable to natural wear and tear.  
The gods are vehemently described as immortal and blessed. They live in constant 
pleasure, and as such, they represent an ideal that an Epicurean sought to emulate:  
Ταῦτα οὖν καὶ νυκτὸς πρός τε τὸν ὅμοιον σεαυτῷ, καὶ οὐδέποτε οὔθ’ ὕπαρ οὔτ’ ὄναρ 
διαταραχθήσῃ, ζήσεις δὲ ὡς θεὸς ἐν ἀνθρώποις. Οὐθὲν γὰρ ἔοικε θνητῷ ζῴῳ ζῶν ἄνθρωπος ἐν 
ἀθανάτοις ἀγαθοῖς. 
Exercise thyself in these and kindred precepts day and night, both by thyself and with him who is 
like unto thee; then never, either in waking or in dream, wilt thou be disturbed, but wilt live as a 
god among men. For man loses all semblance of mortality by living in the midst of immortal 
blessings. 
Ep. Men. 135 
 
However, this begs the question: how can a mortal rival the happiness of the gods and become 
‘godlike’ if immortality is unattainable? Immortality and indestructability cannot be prerequisites 
to happiness; if this were the case, even the most dedicated Epicurean could never achieve this 
goal. It is clear that the emulation should not be of the gods’ state of being, but rather their 
attitude. Death cannot touch the gods and so they are entirely unmoved by it. This is exactly the 
view that is shared by the steadfast Epicurean: ‘when we are, death is not’ (Ep. Men. 125). 
Becoming ‘godlike’ is therefore an entirely attainable goal. Warren argues along similar lines:202  
 
201 Konstan (2011), 57-58 uses Cicero’s talk of ‘quasi-flesh’ and ‘quasi-blood’ as evidence for his ‘realist’ theory 
that the Epicurean gods are corporeal but are made of incredibly fine material such that other atoms can simply pass 
through them.  
202 See also Long (2019), 70-71.  
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There are gods. Epicurus is a god, and is honoured as such, as anyone will be who similarly 
attains the correct Epicurean view of the world. Being ‘mortal’ is no obstacle to complete 
happiness, nor, therefore, to the divinity which this complete happiness constitutes…The 
goodness of a life is a matter to be decided on a hedonic scale which rejects the influence of 
duration. Thus the gap between god and mortal in terms of eudaimonia is reduced by denying the 
relevance of sheer mortality. If to be immortal is to live without thinking death relevant at all to 
one’s life, then the Epicurean sage is indeed ‘immortal’. Death is ‘nothing to him’. 
Warren (2000), 260-261 
 
One must simply embrace the Epicurean way of life, eradicate false beliefs and replace them 
with ‘correct understanding’. An Epicurean can transcend their mortal state by being 
unconcerned by their mortality.203 Thus, immortality in the sense of everlasting life is framed as 
a state of being that is inconsequential to one’s happiness in a bid to mitigate the dangerous 
desire for the impossible.   
The Epicureans remove the desire for immortality, not by claiming that it is inherently 
worse than mortality, but by demonstrating that it is unnecessary in one’s pursuit of godlike 
happiness. This argument, together with the assertion that both pleasure and a ‘complete’ life are 
independent of temporal duration, are designed to persuade the budding Epicurean that there is 
no threat of life being ‘cut short’ by death. Life can be lived fully and blissfully in a finite 
amount of time. One therefore need not be afraid of dying prematurely.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
Both the fear of mortality and the fear of premature death present genuine threats to one’s mental 
wellbeing. Each fear is therefore carefully addressed as part of the broader Epicurean mission to 
 
203 Long & Sedley (1987), 148, offer the alternative suggestion that an Epicurean sage can become ‘godlike’ in the 
more abstract sense that they themselves take on ‘the divine role of perpetual ethical models for future generations.’  
118 
 
alleviate death-related anxieties. The Epicurean arguments against these fears are intricately 
woven together in a holistic ethical framework.  
The Symmetry Argument was met with significant criticism for not addressing the fear of 
mortality. Yet, with a wider examination of the Epicurean texts, it is clear that the fear of 
mortality was recognised and addressed. The simple claim that one need not presently fear that 
which will not cause harm in the future supplements the Symmetry Argument and the central 
doctrine that ‘death is nothing to us’. The fear of mortality, or that one is going to die, is thereby 
neatly dismissed. Furthermore, this is achieved without any contradiction to Epicurus’ hedonist 
foundation, which has been shown to clearly accommodate recalled and anticipated pleasures.  
The arguments against the fear of premature death also revolve around the Epicurean 
conception of pleasure. Epicurus divorces the concept of pleasure from that of temporal duration, 
claiming that the greatest pleasure can be achieved in a limited time span. A pleasurable, fulfilled, 
and ‘complete’ life is therefore entirely independent of time. An endless existence, while not 
perceived as inherently negative, will not grant any more pleasure than a finite existence. Death 
– whenever it comes – will not diminish one’s potential for living a happy life and therefore 
cannot cut a life short.  
The remedy against the fears of mortality and premature death is to be found in adopting 
the Epicurean way of life. The correct understanding of pleasure, desire, and fulfilment will arm 
the budding Epicurean will all the tools necessary to eradicate any creeping anxieties related to 





The aim of this thesis has been to examine the arguments put forward by the Epicureans in their 
attempt to eradicate the fear of death. In order to do so, the Epicurean theories of atomism and 
hedonism needed to first be understood, as these are the two pillars upon which their entire 
philosophy stands. Bound up with these two theories is the fundamental claim that ‘death is 
nothing to us’. Upon death, our atomic souls dissipate, resulting in the absence of both pain and 
self. We care nothing of death, for we are nothing in death.  
Of course, the fear of death is not a single, isolated fear. There are multiple strands of 
anxiety that are encompassed by this broader concern. The Epicureans recognised this, as 
evidenced by the network of arguments built around their ethical goal of removing fear, which 
constitutes the very heart of their philosophical venture. Four discrete categories of death-related 
fear are identified and addressed by the Epicureans: the fear of being dead, the fear of dying, the 
fear of mortality, and the fear of premature death. The argument against the first of these fears is 
clearly encompassed by the claim that ‘death is nothing to us’. As we become nothing upon 
death, death can in no way harm us. The fear of dying, meanwhile, can be reduced to a fear of 
pain. The Epicureans claim that physical discomfort can be overcome by mental pleasure, and 
Epicurus himself demonstrates how this principle can be employed to alleviate the pain of dying. 
The arguments against the fears of mortality and premature death are less distinct but are 
nevertheless incorporated into Epicurean doctrine. The former is found in the Epicurean belief 
that a future occurrence ought not to be feared if it will cause no harm. The latter assertion is 
especially dependent on hedonism. The Epicureans argue that a life cannot be ‘cut short’ or end 
‘too soon’, because temporal duration does not dictate the degree of pleasure or completeness in 
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an individual’s life. Epicurus maintains that one will be more able to enjoy mortal life once the 
impossible and damaging desire for immortality is abated.  
The Epicurean goal of eradicating death-related anxiety, and particularly their claim that 
death cannot cause harm, has incited no small amount of criticism. Lucretius’ Symmetry 
Argument, which has been shown to serve as persuasive support for Epicurus’ claim that ‘death 
is nothing to us’, has been met with counter-arguments and allegations of asymmetry. Many 
critics of Epicureanism favour the Deprivation Account, which contends that death causes harm 
by depriving an individual of the pleasures of life. After careful evaluation, I find the 
Deprivation Account and the assorted attempts at proving asymmetry to be invariably flawed and 
insufficient in their attempt to both illustrate the ‘evil’ of death and undermine the Symmetry 
Argument. I believe that the majority of critics fail to examine these Epicurean arguments from 
within the Epicurean framework. Their arguments are lobbied externally, betraying a lack of 
commitment to the underlying Epicurean principles of atomism and hedonism; principles that 
would be deeply engrained in the mind and outlook of an Epicurean sage. The Epicurean 
arguments require these foundations to succeed, and with the security of these foundations, they 
cannot fail. 
I am convinced that the Epicureans accomplished their goal of eradicating death anxiety, 
in accordance with their intellectualist perspective. They have soundly demonstrated that there 
are no grounds for the rational fear of death within their philosophy. The Epicureans promoted 
no less than a holistic way of life: they found utmost happiness in the absence of pain, and 
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